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In terms of the British Army in the Great War, the study of whether or how the army 
learned has become the dominant historiographical theme in the past thirty years.  
Previous studies have often viewed learning and institutional change through the lens of 
the ‘learning curve’, a concept which emphasises that the high command of the British 
Army learned to win the war through a combination of trial and error in battle planning, 
and through careful consideration of their collective and individual experiences.  This 
thesis demonstrates that in order to understand the complexities of institutional change 
in the Great War, we must look beyond ill-defined concepts such as the learning curve 
and adopt a more rigid framework.   
 
This thesis examines institutional change in the British First Army in the 1915 campaign 
on the western front.  It applies concepts more commonly found in business studies, 
such as organisational culture, knowledge management and organisational memory, to 
understand how the First Army developed as an institution in 1915.  It presents a five-
stage model – termed the Organisational Development Model – which demonstrates how 
the high command of the First Army considered their experiences and changed their 
operational practices in response. This thesis finds that the ‘war managers’ decision-
making was affected by a number of institutional and personal ‘inputs’ which shaped 
their approach to understanding warfare.  This thesis examines the manner in which new 
knowledge was created and collated in the immediate post-battle period, before studying 
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how the war managers considered new information, disseminated it across the force and 
institutionalised it in the organisation’s formal practices, structures and routines. 
 
In a broad sense, this thesis does three things.  First, by examining how the army learned 
it moves beyond standard narratives of learning in the British Army in the Great War 
and highlights the complex interplay between personal and institutional learning 
processes.  Second, by focusing on institutional change in the 1915 campaign, it sheds 
new light on an understudied yet crucial part of the British war experience.  Finally, in 
creating the Organisational Development Model, it provides a robust platform on which 






My thesis examines institutional change and organisational learning in the British First 
Army on the western front in the 1915 campaign.  It employs concepts more commonly 
associated with Business Studies, such as ‘organisational culture’, ‘knowledge 
management’ and ‘organisational forgetting’, to understand how the First Army learned 
as an institution.  Rather than focussing on what the institution learned, my thesis 
concentrates on how it learned from its experiences of battle.  To do this, I studied the 
decision-making of key war managers, the methods used to create, collate and consider 
new knowledge, and the means the army used to disseminate and institutionalise 
relevant information across the force.  My thesis presents the first model, termed the 
Organisational Development Model, which demonstrates how learning occurred in the 
British Army of the Great War.  In doing so, it further demonstrates that concepts from 
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Introduction: Learning as Institutional Change 
 
Its very misfortunes and mistakes make 1915 particularly worthy of study.  In 
remembrance of the final victory, we are apt to forget the painful and weary stages by 
which it was reached, and the heavy cost in our best lives.1 
        Sir James Edmonds 
 
Learning from experience is an important facet of organisational development in 
military institutions.  In terms of the British military in the Great War, the study of 
whether or how the army learned has emerged as a key historiographical theme in the 
past thirty years.2  Over the course of the war the British Army underwent a process of 
profound transformation, both in terms of an unprecedented increase in size and 
firepower, and in a development of its operational and tactical efficiency.  Key to this 
increase in combat effectiveness was the learning process both of individual senior and 
staff officers, and of the army as an institution.  That learning process saw the high 
command of the British Army learn better fighting techniques as the war progressed, 
through trial and error in battle planning and through reflection on their professional 
experiences, which, in turn, enabled officers to incorporate new tactics and technologies 
into their operational doctrine.3  While it is now generally accepted that a learning 
process occurred within the British Army during the Great War, the manner in which the 
                                                 
1 Sir James Edmonds and Captain G.C. Wynne, History of the Great War based on Official 
Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military 
Operations – France and Belgium, 1915, Vol.1 (London, 1927), xi [afterwards cited as British 
Official History]. 
2 Heather Jones, ‘As the Centenary Approaches: The Regeneration of First World War 
Historiography’, Historical Journal 56.3 (2013), 862. 
3 William Philpott, ‘Total War’, in Matthew Hughes and William Philpott (eds), Palgrave 




army learned from its experiences and adapted its tactics in response to the strategic 
situation on the western front remains poorly understood. 
 
Studies of the British Army in the Great War tend to describe the process of institutional 
change as a ‘learning curve’.  Advocates of this theory stress that the British High 
Command learned the techniques necessary to achieve operational victory despite 
external factors such as a shortage of essential war material, the inexperience of the pre-
war British Army, the unprecedented nature of the strategic conditions on the western 
front, and the problems of fighting as the junior member of a coalition.4  This school of 
thought is countered by those who argue that the British Army’s institutional 
weaknesses in terms of its organisational culture presented a barrier to effective 
learning.5  In these terms, the British senior officers were unable or unwilling to attempt 
to learn the lessons of modern warfare because of ingrained ideas on how battles should 
be fought.  While the concept of the learning curve has proven useful in moving the 
debate on British operational performance away from the ‘mud and blood’ works of the 
twentieth century, its amorphous and ill-defined nature fails to explain how learning 
occurred within the institution.  This thesis addresses this problem by drawing upon 
ideas prevalent in Business Studies, such as organisational culture theory and knowledge 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities 
(London, 2002); Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London, 2011); 
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 1916-1918 (New Haven, 1996); Peter 
Simkins, From the Somme to Victory: The British Army’s Experience on the Western Front, 
1916-1918 (Barnsley, 2014). 
5 See, for example, Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and 
the Emergence of Modern War, 1900-1918 (London, 1987); Tim Travers, How the War was 
Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western Front (London, 1992); 
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (New Haven, 2006). 
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management, and on recent work in military innovation studies, to create a framework 
for better understanding institutional learning and adaptation in the British Army on the 
western front.  The new framework advanced by this thesis is the first of its kind in the 
study of the British Army in the Great War and is summarised and illustrated by the 
‘Organisational Development Model’ which is developed in the chapters that follow. 
 
While the British Army of 1915 was comprised of many thousands of men, this thesis 
focuses on the decision-making of a relatively small number of officers who occupied 
senior command and general staff positions.  The term used to describe these men in this 
thesis is ‘war managers’.  It was first applied to the British Army in the Great War by 
Simon Robbins, who used it to describe those officers responsible for ‘managing the 
operations of the British Army’.6  Robbins used a broad definition of these officers, 
including ‘the principal senior command, administrative, medical and staff posts within 
the BEF’.7  This thesis takes a more narrow view and limits the term ‘war manager’ to 
those officers within the BEF structure who were responsible for actively planning 
offensive actions, and excludes those – such as the Adjutants-General, Quartermasters-
General and Medical Officers – with more administrative roles.  Furthermore, war 
management occurs at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. 
However, as this thesis is concerned with organisational development at the operational 
and tactical levels in the British First Army, it focuses on war managers who operated 
                                                 
6 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front: Defeat into Victory (Abingdon, 
2005), 188. 
7 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 188. 
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within the First Army structure. The war managers included in this study are listed in 
appendix one. 
 
Simon Robbins noted that the tempo of learning in the British Army on the western front 
split into four distinct phases: the opening phase of mobile warfare (August–November 
1914); a period of stalemate as the army rapidly expanded (December 1914–June 1916); 
a period in which the army recognised the need for change and implemented new 
techniques and technologies (July 1916–August 1917); and finally a dramatic 
transformation of how the army considered and conducted operations (September 1917–
November 1918).8  The subject of this thesis is the organisational development of the 
British First Army on the western front during the second of these phases.  This 
corresponds with General Sir Douglas Haig’s period of command of the First Army (26 
December 1914–19 December 1915).  The First Army presents a useful subject for the 
study of learning in the wider British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the 1915 campaign 
and analysis of its experiences aids understanding of the army’s performance and 
development over the wider course of the war.  In an eight month campaign the First 
Army planned and executed five offensive actions: Neuve Chapelle (10–12 March); 
Aubers Ridge (9–10 May); Festubert (15–25 May); Givenchy (15–16 June); and Loos 
(25 September–13 October).9  The central aim of this thesis is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the First Army in learning from its previous experiences and adapting its 
operational procedures accordingly.  It addresses a number of questions.  How did First 
                                                 
8 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 132. 




Army’s war managers attempt to evaluate their battles experiences?  How were lessons 
learned and institutionalised in doctrine and training?  What drove the learning process?  
Did the war managers apply sustained logic to the planning of offensive actions at the 
operational and tactical levels or did external constraints, including a lack of key war 
materials, limit the First Army’s ability to learn?  Processes summarised in the 
Organisational Development Model allow conclusions to be drawn by demonstrating 
how the First Army learned from its experiences in the 1915 campaign. 
 
Despite the importance of the 1915 campaign in the overall development of the BEF it 
has received little of the scholarly attention which had been directed to other areas of the 
British military contribution to the Great War.  For Gary Sheffield, 1915 is ‘something 
of a forgotten year as far as the Western Front is concerned’, a point echoed by Nick 
Lloyd who suggested that the campaign is ‘noticeable only for its absence in the 
historiography’.10  In the fifteen years since Sheffield’s comments there has been little 
academic reappraisal of the 1915 campaign and as a result elements of the BEF’s 
operations on the western front in that campaign ‘are almost entirely disremembered’.11  
The public perception of the First Army’s offensive operations in 1915 has been 
coloured by Alan Clark’s work, The Donkeys, in which the author charted the 
‘destruction of an army – the old professional army of the United Kingdom, that always 
                                                 
10 Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, 335; Nick Lloyd, ‘With Faith and Without Fear: Sir Douglas Haig’s 
Command of First Army During 1915’, Journal of Military History 71.4 (2007), 1053. 
11 Spencer Jones, ‘Introduction: The Forgotten Year’, in Spencer Jones (ed.), Courage without 
Glory: The British Army on the Western Front, 1915 (Solihull, 2015), xxiv. 
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won the last battle…[and was] machine-gunned, gassed and finally buried in 1915’.12  
Clark argued that the British high command were ‘butchers’ who were responsible for 
‘excesses of stubborn leadership’ which turned their men into ‘useless cannon fodder’.13  
While Clark’s polemic has been roundly criticised, the negative image he painted of the 
British high command has remained firmly entrenched in the British national 
consciousness.  Indeed, the lack of study of this period of the war has tended to reinforce 
the standpoint that in 1915 the British war managers were the ‘butchers and bunglers’ of 
popular memory.14  As such, the campaign remains both neglected and denigrated in the 
study of the British experience in the Great War.  Even the centenary commemorations 
have failed to stimulate widespread interest in the experience of the BEF in the 
campaign. While only three publications directly address the events on the western front, 
at least ten works have been published in the period 2013–2015 on the smaller invasion 
of Gallipoli.15  This thesis addresses this gap in the historiography. 
 
Aside from the British Official History, the remainder of the historiography of the First 
Army’s 1915 campaign can be split into three groups.  The first takes the form of 
sentimental narrative accounts of the fighting, based on eyewitness testimony, which 
tend to reinforce the ‘mud and blood’ view of offensive operations.  Philip Warner’s, 
                                                 
12 Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London, 1961), 11. 
13 Clark, The Donkeys, 43, 57. 
14 See, for example, John Laffin, Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (Stroud, 2003). 
15 These works are Andrew Rawson, The 1915 Campaign (Barnsley, 2015); Paul Kendall, The 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle: Britain’s Forgotten Offensive of 1915 (Barnsley, 2016); and Jones, 
Courage without Glory, cited above.  A further work which contains some essays on the 1915 
campaign is Peter Liddle (ed.), Britain and the Widening War, 1915–1916: From Gallipoli to the 
Somme (Barnsley, 2016).  On the Gallipoli campaign see, for example, Jenny Macleod, Gallipoli 
(Oxford, 2015); Edward Erikson, Gallipoli: Command under Fire (London, 2015); Metin Gurcan 
and Robert Johnson (eds), The Gallipoli Campaign: The Turkish Perspective (London, 2016). 
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The Battle of Loos resulted from the author’s appeal in 1976 for survivors to provide 
their reminiscences of the battle and the result is an interesting, if rather disjointed, 
collection of personal recollections.16  In a more wide-ranging work, Lyn Macdonald 
also used personal accounts to highlight the BEF’s experience of fighting throughout 
1915.17  The second group saw amateur historians focus on particular battles of the 
campaign with which they typically had a family, local or regimental connection.  Niall 
Cherry and Gordon Corrigan echoed the findings of Sir James Edmonds, the official 
historian, preferring to blame the high casualties on inexperienced troops and a lack of 
key war matérial, rather than flaws in the war managers’ decision-making.18  These 
works were augmented by Robin Neillands’ The Death of Glory, which sought to 
demonstrate that the ‘generals of 1915 were trying to…make the old methods of war 
work in an entirely new situation’.19  Adrian Bristow took a more traditional view in his 
examination of the ‘bloody fiasco’ of the Battle of Aubers Ridge.20  Bristow argued that 
the blame for the failure to capture the first objectives on 9 May 1915 lay at the feet of 
Haig, whose ‘poverty of imagination’, ‘lack of compassion for his troops’, ‘stubborn 
nature’ and ‘over-confidence in his abilities’ led to the deaths of thousands of British 
soldiers.21  While these works contribute to the general historiography they add little to 
the debate on learning and British operational performance in the 1915 campaign.  The 
third group marked the entry of professional historians into the study of the British 
                                                 
16 Philip Warner, The Battle of Loos (London, 1976). 
17 Lyn Macdonald, 1915: The Death of Innocence (London, 1993). 
18 Niall Cherry, Most Unfavourable Ground: The Battle of Loos, 1915 (Solihull, 2005); Gordon 
Corrigan, Loos 1915: the Unwanted Battle (Stroud, 2006). 
19 Robin Neillands, The Death of Glory: the Western Front in 1915 (London, 2006), 7. 
20 Adrian Bristow, A Serious Disappointment: the Battle of Aubers Ridge, 1915, and the 
subsequent munitions scandal (London, 1995), 162. 
21 Bristow, A Serious Disappointment, 162. 
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Army in 1915.  Nick Lloyd’s Loos: 1915 was the first academic treatment of that battle, 
in which the author sought to place the Battle of Loos within the wider debate on the 
performance of the BEF on the western front.22  A recent collection of essays edited by 
Spencer Jones has examined the strategic, operational, tactical and logistical issues faced 
by the war managers in 1915 and pays particular attention to neglected areas of the 
campaign including analysis of the planning of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, command 
during the Battle of Festubert, the development of the Royal Flying Corps, and the 
supply of ammunition to the front.23  Sitting between the second and third groups is John 
Baynes’ Morale, which examined the experiences of the 2nd Scottish Rifles in the Battle 
of Neuve Chapelle.24  Baynes used that battle as a lens through which to establish the 
reasons why the battalion’s morale was sustained even after devastating casualties. 
While Lloyd’s, Jones’ and Baynes’ works are important in situating the events of 1915 
into the wider debate on learning in the British Army, they make little attempt to qualify 
how that learning actually occurred.  
 
The past twenty-five years have also seen a reappraisal of the career of General Sir 
Douglas Haig, and recent works have moved the examination of command away from 
personality-driven studies towards more critical analyses of Haig’s decision-making as a 
war manager.  Studies of Haig as a commander fall into two categories: those critical of 
Haig’s performance on the one hand and more sympathetic, revisionist works on the 
                                                 
22 Nick Lloyd, Loos: 1915 (Stroud, 2006). 
23 Jones (ed.), Courage without Glory. 
24 John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage - the Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle 
of Neuve Chapelle, 1915 (London, 1965). 
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other.  Works in the first category include Gerard de Groot’s influential studies which 
highlight the importance of Haig’s pre-war career in shaping his command style, and J. 
P. Harris’ Douglas Haig and the First World War, which asserted that Haig ‘found it 
intellectually difficult to adjust to the unusual conditions that arose on the western 
front’.25  Added to this is Nick Lloyd’s essay on Haig’s command of the First Army, 
which concluded that Haig’s ‘unrealistic pre-war ideas’ and ‘inflexible and dogmatic 
approach’ to battle planning negatively affected the British Army throughout the 1915 
campaign.26  The second category of biographies takes a revisionist approach and argues 
that Haig was under-rated as a commander and, while he inevitably made mistakes, 
factors other than his decision-making also contributed to the high casualty rate and lack 
of operational success.27  This school of thought argues that throughout the war, Haig 
and the rest of the British army underwent a profound learning curve which culminated 
in the successful Hundred Days campaign of autumn 1918. 
 
Historiography of Learning in the British Expeditionary Force 
The origins of the learning curve theory are unclear.  Jay Winter and Antoine Prost 
identify the concept as being an argument developed by ‘new’ British military historians 
                                                 
25 Gerard de Groot, Douglas Haig, 1861–1928 (London, 1988); Gerard de Groot, ‘Educated 
Soldier or Cavalry Officer?: Contradictions in the pre-war career of Douglas Haig’, War & Society 
4.2 (1986): 51-69; J. P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge, 2008).  A 
further work in this category is Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (London, 1991) 
although it does not cover Haig’s command of the First Army in 1915. 
26 Lloyd, ‘“With Faith and Without Fear”’, 1051-76. 
27 John Terraine, Douglas Haig: the Educated Soldier (London, 1963); Andrew Wiest, Haig: 
Evolution of a Commander (Washington DC, 2005); Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds), 
Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914–1918 (London, 2006); Walter Reid, Architect of 
Victory: Douglas Haig (Edinburgh, 2006); Gary Mead, The Good Soldier: the Biography of 
Douglas Haig (London, 2007); Sheffield, The Chief; Gary Sheffield, Douglas Haig: From the 




in the 1980s and 1990s.28  Heather Jones suggested that the concept was ‘pioneered, in 
particular, by Gary Sheffield’, while William Philpott asserted that ‘the origins of this 
concept are lost in the mists of time – it has been suggested that historians at Sandhurst 
(Paddy Griffith, Paul Harris and Gary Sheffield included) initiated it in the 1980s’.29  In 
a recent development, Peter Simkins ‘admitted to being at least partly responsible for 
applying the term “learning curve” to the process of operational and tactical 
improvement in the BEF’.30  While doubt remains over the specifics, there is a general 
consensus that the concept began in Britain around thirty years ago and had gained 
mainstream academic attention by the last years of the twentieth century.  In 1999, Brian 
Bond suggested that many historians now ‘broadly incline to the positive interpretation 
of the British Army’s role and are more concerned with apportioning credit for the 
“learning curve” rather than denying its existence’.31  This point was echoed by Ian 
Beckett, who suggested in 2005 that the concept was ‘now generally accepted among 
historians’ and Sheffield who asserted in 2011 that ‘for the last few years historians have 
debated the extent, nature and speed of the learning curve’, instead of trying to establish 
whether or not it happened.32 
 
                                                 
28 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to 
the present (Cambridge, 2005), 59, 75. 
29 Jones, ‘As the Centenary Approaches’, 862; William Philpott, ‘Beyond the “Learning Curve”: 
The British Army’s Military Transformation in the First World War’, Royal United Services 
Institute Analysis 10 (November 2009), online www.rusi.org (accessed 25 May 2014). 
30 Simkins, From the Somme to Victory, xiv. 
31 Brian Bond, ‘Introduction’ to Brian Bond (ed.), Look to Your Front: Studies in the First World 
War by the British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst, 1999), vii. 
32 Ian F. W. Beckett, ‘Introduction’ to Ian F. W. Beckett and Stephen J. Corvi (eds), Haig’s 
Generals (Barnsley, 2005), 3; Gary Sheffield, ‘The Somme: A Terrible Learning Curve’, BBC 
History Magazine (1 July 2011), online, www.historyextra.com (accessed 2 April 2014).   
33 
 
By the early Twenty-First century, the study of the learning curve concept had gathered 
pace.  Sheffield advanced the theory that there was more than one curve and these 
curves were, in fact, ‘far from even’.33  The theory of multiple curves is echoed by 
Simon Robbins who identified separate processes in leadership, staff work, training, 
tactics and operations.34  Recent research undertaken by William Stewart adds that while 
the concept of the learning curve is useful to describe the process of improvement in a 
macro sense, it fails when specific formations or actions are examined.35   The wider 
theory is not without its detractors; Sir John Keegan dismissed the idea that a learning 
curve occurred, and suggested in 1999 that studies by ‘young military historians’ into 
infantry formations and tactics were ‘a pointless waste’.36  While Keegan was not 
advocating a return to the blinkered views of Alan Clark, he was correct to suggest that 
there was no one overarching solution to understanding the development of warfare on 
the western front. 
 
The concept of the learning curve has proven a popular tool in understanding the 
operational performance of individual army formations at different levels of command.  
The first attempt at gauging the performance of individual British units was the Imperial 
War Museum’s SHLM Project which sought to evaluate all the British infantry divisions 
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on the western front against a pre-determined set of criteria.37  The aim of the project 
was to demonstrate that the British Army did undertake a learning curve and that units 
steadily improved as the war progressed, however, the project was wound up before 
conclusions could be drawn.38  In a similar study, Peter Simkins examined 966 
divisional attacks made in the Hundred Days campaign in 1918 and concluded that the 
BEF had seen an overall improvement in terms of quality of leadership and small arms 
tactics by the final campaign of the war.39  These initial attempts at empirical analysis of 
operational performance were followed by a succession of dedicated divisional studies 
which charted the progress of a single infantry division through its war experiences.  
Kathryn Snowden’s study found that the 21st Division had improved in terms of 
performance as the war progressed but concluded that a number of variables including 
weather and terrain meant that the division experienced an ‘erratic learning curve’.40  
Similarly, Alun Thomas concluded in his study of the 8th Division that ‘the evolution of 
[the] division’s operational effectiveness was not a smooth process...and can be said to 
be a series of steps up or down’.41  Generally speaking, divisional studies undertaken in 
the past fifteen years have broadly inclined to support the idea that the units concerned 
improved their operational performance over the course of the war.42  Recent research 
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conducted by Stuart Mitchell has built on these conclusions and shown that the learning 
process of the 32nd Division was a ‘complex interplay between effective structure, 
battle-wise lower ranks and good leadership’ and found that ‘there was no one set of 
prescribed bullet points for the BEF’s learning process’ at the divisional level.43  
Andrew Iarocci in his study of the 1st Canadian Division focussed on training as a 
means of evaluating learning in a particular formation.  Iarocci concluded that, with 
regards to the Canadians, the idea of units ascending ‘a neat slope of progress over time 
from 1914 to 1918’ needed to be reconsidered and argued that the men of 1918 were not 
more or less capable than their predecessors, only better equipped.44   
 
While divisional studies are useful in understanding changes in operational performance 
in a single formation they do have their limitations.  By necessity they are narrow in 
scope, providing detailed examinations of a key tactical unit of the BEF.  As a result, 
these studies can only pass judgement on a fraction of the wider British Army.  A further 
problem lies in the lack of separation of the performance of commanders from that of 
their formations.  General Haig, for one, believed that the performance of a division was 
the reflection of its commander’s ability and that a failure to achieve objectives was the 
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result of a want of offensive spirit on the part of the divisional commander.45  Modern 
divisional histories have also tended to highlight the importance of the commander in 
determining the success of operational performance.  This approach leaves little room 
for recognition of the fact that parts of a division, or indeed any other army formation, 
could function at a level of effectiveness separate from that of their commander.  Only 
one study has examined operational performance from the perspective of army 
command; Jonathan Boff’s examination of the British Third Army in the Hundred Days 
campaign found that while some elements had reached a high state of operational 
effectiveness by late-1918 others lagged behind.46  Boff blamed ‘internal institutional 
constraints’ such as a lack of uniform training, different styles of command and 
inconsistent dissemination of lessons learned as being responsible for differences in the 
level of effectiveness across the Third Army.47  What has become clear from the study 
of learning at both the divisional and army levels of command is the fact that a lack of 
uniformity and standardisation of practice was still the norm at the conclusion of 
hostilities in 1918. 
 
In 2008, scholars began to reassess the concept of the learning curve.  Sheffield noted 
that the change in the British Army over the course of the war is ‘more accurately 
described as a learning process’, however he failed to explain the difference between the 
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two terms.48  The desire for a reappraisal was echoed by Sir Hew Strachan who 
criticised the learning curve as being too Anglo-centric an approach which put too much 
emphasis on Britain’s role in the Hundred Days campaign.49  The move away from the 
concept of a curve was also advocated by William Philpott who wrote that: 
 
‘curve’ implies far too steady a parabola for what was in reality a more up-and-down, 
dynamic process of adjustment to new technologies, more sophisticated and flexible 
tactics, novel operational doctrines, complex logistics and fundamental change in the 
systems of command, control, communication and intelligence.  Moreover, this dynamic 
encompassed competition with the enemy and symbiosis with an ally.  Even after three 
decades of study, our understanding of the nature and process of the transformation of 
warfare between 1914 and 1918, and the British army’s place therein, remains 
incomplete.50 
 
The concept of the ‘learning curve’ is now viewed as being too simplistic and has been 
partially replaced by the less rigid ‘learning process’ which emphasises the unevenness 
of the evolution of command and control on the western front.51  However, the most 
recent scholarship, while generally agreeing that the British army experienced a learning 
process over the course of the war, both in terms of individual commanders and 
formations, has acknowledged that the concept has its limitations.  For Peter Simkins the 
term learning curve ‘was mainly employed as a kind of shorthand to signify that one 
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rejected the “lions led by donkeys” and “butchers and bunglers” interpretations’ of 
British generalship.52  Stephen Badsey echoed this position by asserting that the term 
was a convenient way to describe a contentious issue which ‘has been taken much too 
literally and precisely’ and Jonathan Boff suggested that the idea of a learning curve is a 
‘metaphor rather than a formal hypothesis which has been embraced by a wide range of 
historians who each apply it differently’. 53  While the concept has proven to be a useful 
tool in moving the debate over British operational performance in the Great War away 
from ‘mud and blood’ studies towards a dynamic, primary source-based examination, a 
more critical approach is now necessary to understand the intricacies of learning on the 
western front. 
 
Two principal problems with the current historiography of learning in the British Army 
of the Great War remain.54  First, the 1915 campaign on the western front sits 
uncomfortably in the learning curve/learning process debate and is often excluded in its 
entirety.  Griffith suggested that ‘if we focus on the way the British fought their war 
between 2 July 1916 and 11 November 1918, we shall surely achieve a clearer vision of 
their tactical achievement - or lack of it - than if we cloud the issue’ with what came 
before, itself confined by Griffith to the ‘heroic passing of the old army in 1914’ or the 
‘initiation rights suffered by the fledgling New Army on the “first day” of the Somme’.55  
For Simkins, the learning process began with the promotion of Haig to the position of 
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commander-in-chief in December 1915, which suggests that it was Haig and his group 
of war managers at GHQ who acted as the catalyst for change, personally driving 
forward learning in the British Army.56  This focus on learning in the period of Haig’s 
command of the British Expeditionary Force abbreviates the learning process and 
neglects the valuable experiences drawn from the 1915 campaign which were influential 
in the battle planning process at later points in the war.   
 
In addition to the exclusion of the 1915 campaign, the traditional ideas of a learning 
curve or learning process do not address how the army learned and as such are now 
inadequate in furthering the study of learning in the Great War.  Recent work by Robert 
Foley has attempted to redress this balance by examining the belligerent armies as 
‘learning organisations’.57  Foley demonstrated that the British Army war managers 
made use of civilian expertise found through their personal connections to drive forward 
institutional change, and cites the logistical work of Sir Eric Geddes and the 
development of the tank as evidence.58  Jim Beach examined the writing of doctrine in 
the form of official publications produced by GHQ in the period 1917–1918 and 
concluded that the uneven method of doctrine creation prevalent at GHQ until mid-1918 
‘raises serious questions of the learning process within the BEF’.59  Aimee Fox-Godden 
employed a series of case studies to examine how knowledge was transferred between 
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the various British expeditionary forces and demonstrated the importance of the army’s 
pre-war ethos in enhancing its ability to learn and adapt.60  While these studies have 
been valuable in demonstrating how the British Army learned in the Great War, they 
largely concentrate on learning in the post-Somme period and again neglect the 1915 
campaign in the same way as earlier studies.  In order to understand how military 
institutions developed, studies of the British Army in the Great War should follow Foley 
and Fox-Godden’s lead, and avoid becoming bogged down in ambiguous concepts such 
as the learning curve and learning process and adopt a more robust framework in order 
to move the debate forward.  This thesis adds to the growing body of literature which 
seeks to look beyond the learning curve and critically examine how the British Army 
learned on the western front.61 
 
A New Approach to Learning  
Attempts to qualify how western armies learn have tended to focus on counter-
insurgency operations in the period after the Second World War.62  This new branch of 
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research has been termed ‘military innovation studies’ and is heavily influenced by 
theories such as knowledge management and organisational learning which are more 
commonly found in business management studies.63  Adam Grissom explained that 
military innovation has three constituent parts: first, an innovation must alter how 
formations operate in the field; second, the innovation must have significant scope and 
impact; and third, the innovation is equated with greater military effectiveness.64  Within 
the wider purview of military innovation studies lie four main schools of thought which 
attempt to evaluate how armies learn.  Barry Posen has been at the forefront of the 
school which suggests that military institutions innovate through the intervention of 
politicians, although his study focussed on interwar developments in France, Germany 
and Britain.65  Posen argued that innovation occurs when military doctrine, or ‘the set of 
prescriptions...[which specify] how military forces should be structured and employed to 
respond to organised threats and opportunities’, is influenced by civilian policy-makers, 
often in conjunction with ‘maverick’ senior military officers.66  The second school of 
thought in military innovation studies – that of inter-service rivalry spurring innovation 
– argues that the arms of the military compete for resources which then spurs innovation, 
the motivating factor being the receipt of additional resources.67  This school is more 
focussed on conflicts post-1945 and is of limited use in studying the western front as 
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army and navy operations in the Great War were largely kept separate. The third school 
argues that competition within the same branches of the military, for example the army, 
promotes innovation.  Stephen Rosen presented the argument that innovation occurs 
when senior officers realise ‘a new theory of victory’.68  Rosen argued that believers in a 
new theory – such as the British introduction of tanks to the battlefield in 1916 seek – to 
find mid-ranking officers to assist in the spread of the theory.69  Those mid-ranking 
officers are rewarded by promotion, often within a new arm of the military which is 
created because of the new theory of victory, such as the British Tank Corps in 1917.70   
 
The final school of thought examines the organisational culture of military institutions.  
Victoria Nolan described organisational culture as being ‘the institutionalised set of 
beliefs which are the accumulation of learning from historical experiences, visionary 
leaders, and broader national and social cultures’.71  In other terms, organisational 
culture is a ‘pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group’ such as 
soldiers ‘and has worked well enough to be considered valid and...taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems’.72  
Organisational culture is ‘strengthened through policy and procedures, and is embodied 
and reproduced in current practice, doctrinal documents, training and organisational 
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structure’.73  Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff identified three ways in which an 
institution’s culture can affect military innovation: first, senior leaders actively change 
the culture of the organisation to promote innovation; second, the culture is altered due 
to external shocks; and third, national militaries can change their culture through the 
emulation of other national militaries.74  Recent research by Aimee Fox-Godden has 
demonstrated that the British Army’s cultural ethos in the Great War enhanced its 
abilities to learn and adapt and influenced its approach to learning.75  Far from being a 
rigid bureaucratic system, Fox-Godden highlighted how the British Army’s flexible 
approach to overcoming organisational tensions encouraged change within defined 
institutional parameters.76 
 
According to this approach, innovation has three main characteristics.  First, it is a top-
down process initiated by senior political or military war managers with a view to 
altering an institution which is inherently resistant to change.77  Second, the changes 
implemented fundamentally alter the structure and capabilities of the institution.  And 
third, innovation largely occurs during peacetime learning when the difficulties caused 
by determining the success of change in a war zone are removed.78  While innovation is 
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a useful means of explaining change in military institutions, its characteristics do not 
reflect the learning process experienced by the British First Army in the 1915 campaign.  
This is made clear when evaluating Grissom’s three indicators of military innovation 
mentioned earlier.  In the first place, the 1915 campaign did not affect how the army 
functioned in the field.  Warfare on the western front at the start of the Somme campaign 
in July 1916 was of the same nature as that of previous year; artillery bombardments 
paved the way for mass infantry assaults of entrenched positions with the main 
difference being the scale of the attacks undertaken.  Second, the changes brought about 
by the 1915 campaign were relatively small in scope and were not uniform in nature; 
there were, for example, no wide-ranging shifts in operational planning methodology or 
tactics and no real institutional change was felt by the troops at the front.  Third, the 
performance of the BEF on 1 July 1916, in which 60,000 casualties were sustained, 
albeit not by the First Army, suggests that there was no wholesale force-wide increase in 
military effectiveness. 
 
The focus on top-down innovation led Grissom to call for further studies into the 
processes behind ‘bottom-up’ innovation, stemming from soldiers ‘at the sharp end’ 
rather than the military or political war management hierarchy.79  This bottom-up 
process of implementing change has, in recent years, become known in the field of 
military innovation studies as ‘adaptation’.80  Sergio Catignani suggested that adaptation 
is the ‘correction of errors leading to a change in prescribed practices’ whereas 
                                                 
79 Grissom, ‘Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 925. 
80 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War’, 567-94; Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 31; Foley, 
‘Dumb Donkeys’; Murray, Military Adaptation in War. 
45 
 
innovation ‘results in the institutionalisation of new structures, processes, routines and, 
most importantly, new conceptual and normative constructs within the organisation as a 
whole’.81  Robert Foley agreed that in the process of adaptation learning is incremental, 
minor in scope, and not as radical as that of innovation.82  In simple terms, ‘wartime 
adaptation is a process of adjustment from the war you planned for to the war you 
have’.83  Theo Farrell identified two distinct areas of adaptation: first, military 
organisations can refine their existing tactics, techniques or technologies; and second 
they can develop new ways of conducting operations.84  In order to function effectively, 
armies need to employ both innovative and adaptive forms of learning although in times 
of war adaptation is the more common form of institutional change.85   
  
It terms of Business Management Studies, institutional change can be viewed in terms of 
‘organisational learning’ although there is no widespread agreement on what that term 
constitutes.86  Catignani suggested that there are three key stages of learning.87  The first 
stage can be described as ‘data collection’, and involves the consideration of individual 
experiences, the creation and collation of formal after action reviews, and lessons 
learned reports requested from above.  The second stage of learning is ‘interpretation’ or 
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‘the process by which meaning is given to information’.88  This stage involves 
consideration of the material gathered in stage one and the communication of a shared 
understanding of the experience, be it a battle, trench raid, or logistical support.  
However, this stage is subject to the willingness of units or commanders to process, 
accept and act on that information.  The final stage in the process is a new response to a 
specific problem.   
 
Models of organisational learning tend to be limited to ‘formal’ learning systems within 
the military hierarchy.  Recent studies have shown that ‘informal learning’ also plays a 
crucial role in the development of military institutions.89  While Catignani noted the 
importance of social networks in promoting informal learning, Fox-Godden adopted a 
broader definition by describing it as being a highly personalised practice which is based 
on individual experience and is often unintended and opportunistic in nature.90  Indeed, 
informal learning can be equated with low-level information sharing which contrasts 
with the more structured and organised, centrally-driven formal learning processes such 
as the provision of training courses.  In the context of the British Army in the Great War, 
Foley has suggested that while the German Army made excellent use of formal learning 
procedures, the British were more effective at using informal learning processes to 
tackle ad hoc problems.91  Indeed, Foley argues that this arose due to the lack of a 
structure for collecting and disseminating new knowledge throughout the army.  This 
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thesis will demonstrate that the challenge for the British First Army was to find ways to 
incorporate new knowledge produced by informal learning systems into the institution’s 
organisational memory or ‘knowledge repositories’ – the intangible collection of 
individuals’ learned experiences – from where it could be processed, disseminated and 
institutionalised.92 
 
‘Adaptation’ tends to be viewed as a vertical process whereby learning is driven either 
from the top-down at the instigation of the war managers or from the bottom-up from 
commanders at lower points in the army hierarchy.  This involves the sharing of 
information up and/or down a pre-existing rigid hierarchal chain of command.  Foley 
has, however, identified a third means of knowledge-transfer – horizontal innovation – 
through which information is passed laterally across the hierarchy.93  This means of 
learning was driven by the staff and commanders of combat units at the front who 
sought to seek out and share their experiences with other similar formations without 
waiting for instruction from above.94  Foley’s study of the German Army in the period 
1916–1918, demonstrated that horizontal innovation allowed for a quicker pace of 
change than the traditional vertical models, however doubts have been raised over the 
extent to which Foley’s examples represent horizontal learning.95   
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This thesis demonstrates that the concepts used to analyse Twenty-First century military 
institutions can be successfully applied to study of the Great War.  In doing so, it looks 
beyond examining what the British First Army learned from its experiences in 1915 and 
establishes how its war managers learned.  The framework produced by this thesis – the 
Organisational Development Model – illustrates the different stages of the First Army’s 
learning process in the 1915 campaign.  The term ‘organisational development’ has been 
chosen over others such as ‘organisational learning’ to highlight the complex nature of 
institutional change in military units.  While organisational learning is the study of how 
learning processes work within an institution, learning by itself is the process by which 
new knowledge is acquired.96  As this thesis will show, learning was only one facet of 
organisational development in the British First Army in the 1915 campaign.  
Organisational development can be described as the process of formal or informal 
learning driven from the top-down, bottom-up and/or horizontally, which results in the 
creation, collation and dissemination of new knowledge, its ad hoc application, and its 
institutionalisation in doctrine and training by the organisation’s war managers.  The end 
product of organisational development is an increase in combat effectiveness through the 
incorporation of lessons learned into both the immediate battle planning process and the 
wider institutional structure.   
 
Figure 0.1: Basic Structure of the Organisational Development Model 
 
                                                 
96 Mark Easterby-Smith and Marjorie Lyles, ‘The Evolving Field of Organizational Learning and 
Knowledge Manangement’, in Mark Easterby-Smith and Marjorie Lyles (eds), Handbook of 





As this thesis will demonstrate, and Figure 0.1 illustrates, organisational development is 
best viewed as a five-stage process in which the stages are as follows: institutional 
inputs; experience of planning and conducting offensive actions; data creation and 
collection; consideration; and institutionalisation.  The first stage recognises that 
organisational development in the First Army was subject to a number of long and short-
term inputs which shaped war managers’ decision-making processes.  The experience of 
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The third stage involves the creation of new data and its collection with a view to 
identifying successes and failures in both the planning stage and in the operations 
themselves.  The fourth stage sees the lessons identified in stage three considered by the 
war managers and accepted or rejected.  In stage five, the lessons accepted by the war 
managers are institutionalised in doctrine and training and disseminated across the 
organisation.  Simultaneously, those lessons are incorporated into the war managers’ 
body of knowledge gained through experience – a crucial organisational input – and are 
used on an ad hoc basis to plan the next offensive. 
 
Sources 
Despite drawing on concepts which originate outside military history, this thesis uses 
traditional historical research methods to gather evidence from primary sources and uses 
them to ask new questions of the British experience in the 1915 campaign.    The 
majority of primary sources used in this thesis have been drawn from the collections of 
The National Archives in London.  In particular, War Office files such as the unit war 
diaries (WO95) and the papers of the military headquarters (WO181) provided much of 
the material analysed.  Each unit from the General Staff at General Headquarters down 
to individual infantry battalions and artillery brigades kept a war diary which detailed 
the movements and operations of the unit.  These diaries vary in quality depending on 
the author, typically the battalion adjutant or, for higher-level formations, an officer of 
the General Staff.  In some cases only the briefest of details are recorded while other 
files contain not only the war diary itself but operational orders, draft plans of attack, 
maps, correspondence, after-action reports and other official documentation.  The 
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official War Office papers are complemented by a wealth of testimony from private 
individuals in the form of diaries, letters and other personal papers which illuminate both 
the decision-making process and the wider experience of the 1915 campaign.  Many 
relate to learning, training and leadership at low levels of the First Army structure, 
whereas others were written by the First Army war managers and present invaluable 
information on the function of command: for example, the papers of Field Marshal Sir 
John French and General Henry Horne are held at the Imperial War Museum; those of 
the Chief of Staff, Sir William Robertson and Major-General Sir Thompson Capper at 
the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College in London; the papers of 
General Sir Henry Rawlinson are split between the National Army Museum and 
Churchill College, Cambridge; and those of General Sir Douglas Haig at the National 
Library of Scotland in Edinburgh.   
 
The diary of General Haig, the commander of the First Army in 1915, is a controversial 
document.  Three versions of the diary are in existence.  The first version was written by 
hand at the front; the second is a carbon copy of the first to which Haig made minor 
adjustments; and the third is a slightly revised version which was typed up in the post-
war period.97  The post-war typescript diary has been seem as ‘Haig’s attempt to re-write 
history to his own advantage’ however, close inspection of the two main versions of the 
diary reveal that there were few significant changes and no omissions relating to the 
                                                 
97 For a thorough analysis of the controversies surrounding Haig’s diaries see Sheffield and 
Bourne, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 2-10. 
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period of his command of the First Army.98  With this in mind, this thesis used the 
typescript version of the diary and its substantial accompanying papers.  Naturally, there 
are weaknesses in the use of personal testimony.  Letters, diaries and war memoirs 
present three different views of the events they describe.  Letters home from the front 
give the ‘purest, most unmediated view of war’ in which the boredom of trench life and 
the excitement of battle is reported to those at home.99  As the author and reader are one 
and the same, diaries of Great War soldiers tend to be more reflective than letters and 
often provide a more careful consideration of events.  Finally, memoirs were often 
written up after the war and present ‘the remembered war that persists in the mind 
through a lifetime’.100  Of course, memoirs could be written at any point following the 
war: Lieutenant Douglas Wimberley of the 1st Cameron Highlanders wrote his memoirs 
while convalescing at home during the later stages of the war, whereas Lieutenant Philip 
Christison of the 6th Cameron Highlanders waited until the late-1970s to commit his own 
recollections of his part in the war to paper.101  This raises questions of the possibility of 
finding genuinely truthful accounts and on the reliability of memory in constructing 
historical narratives. As Paul Fussell wrote, ‘it would seem impossible to write an 
account of anything without some “literature” leaking in’.102  Alistair Thomson 
expanded upon this, asserting that ‘the life story is, of course, never a perfect replay of 
                                                 
98 Sheffield and Bourne, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 6. 
99 Samuel Hynes, ‘Personal Narratives and Commemoration’ in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan 
(eds), War and Commemoration in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2000), 208. 
100 Hynes, ‘Personal Narratives and Commemoration’, 211. 
101 National Library of Scotland, Papers of Major-General Sir Douglas Wimberley, Acc.6119 
[afterwards NLS, Wimberley Papers], unpublished memoir, Scottish Soldier; Imperial War 
Museum, Private Papers of General Sir Philip Christison, Doc.4370 [afterwards IWM, Christison 
Papers], unpublished memoir. 
102 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford, 2013), 187. 
53 
 
experience, but is recreated through language and is partial, selective and purposeful’.103  
Each letter writer, diary keeper and memoir author had their own reasons, motivations 
and expectations when compiling the sources used in this thesis and analysis of these 
sources reveals not only the participant’s opinions on ‘what really happened’ but also 
provides written evidence of how they made sense of their experiences.  To counter the 
weaknesses in personal testimony, this thesis has been consistent in using contemporary 
official primary sources to look to confirm soldiers’ reminiscences.   
 
A further problem in using both personal testimony and some official files is the 
reluctance of some authors to admit liability for failures on the battlefield.  General Sir 
Douglas Haig, for example, does not admit any blame in either his private 
correspondence nor his personal diary for any of the defeats or limited successes in the 
1915 campaign although he was keen to point out when he believed others to be at fault.  
Similarly, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson does not admit any failure in his 
command decisions even when presented with evidence that he was at fault.  Preserving 
reputations was as important for war managers in the Great War as it was for individual 
units and formations.  Both primary and secondary sources regarding the latter usually 
lay the blame for operational failure on other formations on the left or right of the unit in 
question.104  As a result, both primary and secondary sources have been treated with 
caution and evidence corroborated. 
                                                 
103 Alistair Thomson, ‘ANZAC Stories: Using Personal Testimony in War History’, War & Society 
25.2 (October 2006): 3. 






This thesis is split into six chapters.  The first chapter examines three factors – 
institutional structure, organisational memory, and the use of formal and informal 
knowledge-transfer frameworks – which were crucial in shaping how the First Army 
learned in the 1915 campaign but which sit outside the Organisational Development 
Model.  This chapter demonstrates that the creation of the army level of command 
impeded organisational development by failing to consider who should take 
responsibility for the army’s professional development and by failing to establish a 
dedicated system for translating individual knowledge into institutional knowledge.  
This, coupled with the lack of a permanent corps structure, had important implications 
for the First Army’s organisational memory.  The lack of guidance from above put the 
onus on divisions to consider their own experiences and assume the role of ad hoc 
learning organisations; a process which was hindered by the high casualty rate of units 
in the First Army, particularly among officers, which reduced the maximum potential to 
identify lessons and create new knowledge.  Finally, the chapter demonstrates that war 
managers increasingly turned to informal methods of information sharing in lieu of a 
formal framework for data transfer.  These methods were most apparent at the level of 
inter-allied knowledge-transfer where the British senior war managers took the lead 
from their French counterparts in sharing information horizontally across the armies. 
 
Chapters two and three examine the organisational inputs which shaped the war 
managers’ decision-making processes; the experience of planning and conducting 
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offensive actions; and the methods they employed in data creation and collation, which 
form the first three layers of the Organisational Development Model.  Chapter two 
asserts that organisational development at the operational level of war was subject to 
five inputs: the prevailing institutional doctrine; organisational ethos; knowledge gained 
through experience and instruction; and the immediate strategic constraints which 
dictated the availability of manpower and resources.  Taken together, these present the 
paradigm in which war managers sought to make sense of their experiences and identify 
lessons.  This chapter demonstrates that there were three main ways in which the war 
managers created and collated new operational knowledge: they could identify lessons 
themselves; they could request information from subordinate formations; or information 
could be passed to them from outside their own structure.  Chapter three examines 
organisational development at the tactical level.  It demonstrates that the war managers 
made significant attempts to learn from their experiences by altering the force structure 
to incorporate dedicated teams of bombers, tunnellers and machine-gunners.  
Furthermore, this chapter studies the generation of information by low-level units and 
formations and demonstrates that in some instances, information was transmitted up the 
army hierarchy without request from above.  In this, it adds a fourth method to the third 
stage of the Organisational Development Model where new information was created and 
collated. 
 
Chapter four acknowledges that organisational development in war is a human process 
and is driven by the actions of individuals in key management positions.  In this, it 
highlights the importance of the war managers in promoting and inhibiting institutional 
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change.  This chapter examines the war managers as a group and demonstrates how the 
composition of the First Army high command changed over the course of the campaign.  
It asserts that the creation and collation of new knowledge is only one facet of 
organisational development and in order for organisational development to take place, 
war managers had to consider and accept or reject that new information. While many 
studies of institutional change in the Great War focus on learning as a cumulative 
process, this chapter demonstrates that managing the loss of knowledge is equally as 
important in terms of organisational development.  It finds that there were five main 
ways in which knowledge loss could happen: new information could be rejected outright 
as unchangeable; it could be identified but forgotten; it could be discarded but remained 
available for recall at a future point; it could be misinterpreted by war managers; and 
finally, it could be deliberately withheld from others through human agency.   
 
Chapter five examines what the war managers did with new knowledge they had 
considered and accepted.  In the short-term, newly identified and accepted lessons were 
used on an ad hoc basis and were applied to the subsequent battle planning process.  In 
the longer term, this chapter finds that there were three main ways in which new 
knowledge was accepted, disseminated across the force and institutionalised into formal 
doctrine and training: the creation and dissemination of formal pamphlets and 
publications and informal ‘best-practice guidelines’; the creation of schools of 
instruction; and horizontal knowledge-transfer through job-shadowing and secondments.  
This chapter demonstrates that First Army war managers attached increasing importance 
to the dissemination of new knowledge – both written and practical – as the campaign 
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progressed, although was still no centralised knowledge-transfer system by its end.  The 
mechanism for delivering training also developed markedly as the campaign progressed 
with a greater emphasis placed on mission-specific training appearing towards the end of 
the campaign.  However, despite the war managers’ awareness of deficiencies in 
transmitting battlefield lessons to units training at home, no attempts were made to 
rectify this situation.  This led to a substantial knowledge gap between units at home and 
units at the front which itself had a knock-on effect on operational performance in the 
1916 campaign. 
 
Chapter six examines the legacy of the 1915 campaign.  It does this in two ways.  First, 
it studies the actions of the First Army in the 1916 campaign at Fromelles in July to 
evaluate the extent to which the lessons of the battles of 1915 were applied to later battle 
planning.  It finds that while some lessons of the campaign were identified and applied, 
others were not.  Indeed, the key determinant in whether a formation learned from its 
experiences was the personalities of the key war managers.  Furthermore, the high 
turnover of units and staff within the First Army in the period November 1915–June 
1916 makes a comparison with the First Army of the 1915 campaign difficult.  Second, 
the chapter examines the subsequent actions of the First Army war managers from the 
1915 campaign who went on to other management positions within the BEF hierarchy.  
 
The conclusion draws these findings together and presents the complete model of how 
the First Army learned in the 1915 campaign.  It conclusively demonstrates that the 
‘learning curve’ concept which has dominated the British historiography of the Great 
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War for thirty years does not accurately describe the complex learning processes at work 
in the First Army in the 1915 campaign.  In doing so, it rejects the conclusions of earlier 
historians who asserted that any meaningful learning process began with the Battle of 
the Somme in 1916.  While the war managers failure to establish a formal system of 
knowledge creation, collation and consideration was a serious barrier to successful 
institutional learning, the largely informal processes at work – which have been 
discussed in this thesis – demonstrate the complexities of institutional change on the 
western front in the pre-Somme period.  Furthermore, this thesis provides a platform for 
future studies of institutional change in the Great War and, by establishing and applying 
the Organisational Development Model, suggests a template against which other 





Analysing Frameworks for Organisational Development 
 
Armies are more often ruined by dogmas springing from their former successes than by 
the skill of their opponents.1 
          J. F. C. Fuller 
 
At noon on 19 December 1915 General Sir Douglas Haig relinquished command of the 
British First Army and replaced Field Marshal Sir John French as the commanding 
officer of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the western front.  The previous 
campaign had seen little in the way of operational success; the fortified and entrenched 
German positions in northern France remained in situ and the strategic problems which 
defined the Great War on the western front continued.  It is, then, surprising that the end 
result of a disappointing and costly campaign was promotion for the chief operational 
planner.  Despite the lack of operational success, Haig had overseen the development of 
the First Army from a force of almost 93,000 officers and men on 4 January 1915 to 
over 285,000 officers and men on 14 November.2  Much as the size of Haig’s force had 
changed, so too had its composition.  When the First Army was created in late-
December 1914 it numbered some six British and Indian infantry divisions and one 
cavalry division; by the end of 1915, fourteen infantry divisions were under the control 
of First Army headquarters including regular army, Territorial Force, New Army and 
colonial formations. 
                                                 
1 J.F.C. Fuller, ‘The Tactics of Penetration: A Counterblast to German Numerical Superiority’, 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 59 (July 1914), 389. 
2 National Library of Scotland, Papers of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig [afterwards, NLS, Haig 
Papers], Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 4 January 1915, and Acc.3155.103, Typescript Diary, 




This chapter seeks to address three main questions.  First, how did the composition of 
the First Army change over the course of the 1915 campaign and what were the 
implications of those changes; second, how was the First Army’s ability to learn affected 
by mounting battlefield casualties; and third, what system existed for data creation and 
collection, information sharing and knowledge-transfer, both within the First Army 
hierarchy and across the wider British and Allied war effort.  The aim of this chapter is 
to provide the necessary context for the later analysis of the First Army’s organisational 
development.  The chapter is split into four main sections.  The first section adopts a 
broad approach and examines the formation of the First Army and its change in size and 
composition over the course of the campaign, before considering the impact of those 
changes.  The second section studies the impact of battlefield casualties on the First 
Army’s ability to make sense of its experiences.  The third and fourth sections 
acknowledge that the First Army did not exist in a command vacuum but as a constituent 
part of the larger British Expeditionary Force.  As such, these sections examine the 
formal and informal methods of knowledge-transfer available to and used by the First 
Army, General Headquarters (GHQ) and the Second Army, and then between the British 
and their French allies. 
 
Chad Serena’s study of the US Army during the Iraq War demonstrated that 
‘knowledge-transfer is vital to the process of improving the learning capacity of an 
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organisation’.3  In its simplest form, knowledge-transfer is ‘the means by which 
expertise, knowledge, skills and capabilities are transferred from the knowledge base...to 
those in need of that knowledge’.4  This suggests that the process of knowledge-transfer 
is linear with new knowledge gained through lessons learned being passed either 
vertically, as war managers seek to alter the operational practices of the constituent parts 
of their command, or horizontally as units share their experiences without waiting for 
direction from above, thus effecting change at the tactical level.  However, the 
hierarchical structure employed by the British Army in the Great War was not designed 
to facilitate the smooth flow of knowledge or information, rather it was created with a 
view to establishing a means of effective command and control over a large group of 
soldiers.  This chapter evaluates how the structure, organisational memory and 
frameworks for knowledge-transfer and information sharing adopted by the First Army 
developed over the course of the 1915 campaign. 
 
The Formation and Development of the First Army in the 1915 Campaign 
The structure of an organisation plays a crucial role in determining its institutional 
learning processes.  Structure can impede or facilitate the ability of the organisation to 
adapt to change and it determines how knowledge and information is collated and 
                                                 
3 Chad Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The US Army in the Iraq War (Washington 
DC, 2011), 16. 
4 The Innovation through Knowledge Transfer Organisation, quoted in Katarzyna Musial, Marcin 
Budka and Wieslaw Blysz, ‘Understanding the Other Side: The Inside Story of the INFER 




distributed throughout the organisation.5   This section examines the creation and 
expansion of the First Army in the 1915 campaign and highlights how the changes in 
organisational structure affected the First Army’s organisational development.  The 
decision to form two separate armies out of the BEF troops then in France and Flanders 
was taken after a meeting in London on 23 November 1914 between the Secretary of 
State for War, Lord Kitchener, and Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, then the 
commanding officer of the British I Corps.6  That the commanding officer of the BEF, 
Field Marshal Sir John French, was not included in these discussions is indicative of the 
informal nature of communication between British war managers in the early phase of 
the Great War, and provides an indication of the power politics which characterised the 
BEF in the 1915 campaign.  Sir John French initially resisted the introduction of a 
further layer of command between GHQ and the corps in the belief that it would result 
in delays in communicating orders and would create ‘an in-elastic organisation’ over 
which his control would be limited.7  In short, French wished to remain a battlefield 
commander who would not delegate responsibilities unless absolutely necessary.  
Despite this, French tentatively acknowledged that the rapid expansion of the BEF 
would require some form of administrative change in the war-management hierarchy.8  
His initial attempts to increase the number of divisions in each corps from two to three, a 
                                                 
5 Inocencia Maria Martinez-Leon and Jose Martinez-Garcia, ‘The Influence of Organisational 
Structure on Organisational Learning’, International Journal of Manpower 32.5/6 (2011), 537-66. 
6 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/99, Typescript Diary, 23 November 1914. 
7 Imperial War Museum, Private Papers of Field Marshal Sir John French [afterwards IWM, 
French Papers] JDPF 7/2 (2), Sir John French to Lord Kitchener, 1 December 1914.  Richard 
Holmes, in The Little Field Marshal, 156, gives the reference number of this letter and that of 17 
December as JDPF 7/2 (1), however they were located in File 2 as of 21 April 2015. 
8 IWM, French Papers, JDPF 7/2 (2), French to Kitchener, 1 December 1914. 
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prospect which would see French retain personal control of the corps, were rejected by 
the War Office who acquiesced to Haig’s desire for a more senior command position.   
 
 




At a lunch for senior officers on Christmas Day 1914, Sir John French announced the 
split of the BEF into two armies: the First Army would be commanded by Lieutenant-
General Sir Douglas Haig and would consist of the I, IV and Indian Corps; and the 
Second Army would be commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien 
First Army HQ 
(Haig) 
I Corps  
(Monro) 
 






















and would be comprised of the II, III and V Corps.  The Cavalry Corps would remain 
under the command of GHQ.  The changes came into effect at noon on 26 December.  
French viewed the implementation of the Army level of command as a measure to 
streamline administrative procedures, with commanders continuing to carry out the same 
operational roles.9  It was a view not shared by Haig, who sent his Deputy Quartermaster 
General (DQMG), Brigadier-General Percy Hobbs, to GHQ to present Haig’s proposals 
that the First Army staff would have the responsibility of planning operations while 
corps and divisions would take charge of their own administration.10  While GHQ saw 
the armies sitting outwith the operational command structure, First Army headquarters 
thought that ‘[i]t is important to avoid turning the Army Headquarters into a “Post 
Office” pure and simple.  GHQ will, therefore, deal direct with Corps on practically 
every subject except “operations”’.11  It is unsurprising that the senior war managers 
were unsure of the role of an army headquarters; prior to the Great War staff officers in 
the British Army had no experience of operating in such a formation, and the roles of the 
staff of army headquarters, from Haig to individual junior staff officers were ill-
                                                 
9 IWM, French Papers, JDPF 7/2 (2), French to Kitchener, 17 December 1914. 
10 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 26 December 1914. 
11 The National Archives [hereafter TNA], WO95/589, I Corps General Staff War Diary, 
Brigadier-General Sir John Gough, ‘Notes on Staff Duties’, 27 December 1914.  This document 
has also been referred to as ‘System by which Army Staff will carry out its work and to Regulate 
Relations between Corps, Armies and GHQ’ by Nick Lloyd in ‘“With Faith and Without 
Fear”,1056, although Lloyd gives the date of the document as 26 December and its author as 
GHQ.  Niall Barr refers to the document as ‘Notes regarding Staff Duties’ and gives the date as 
28 December 1914. The document is signed by Brigadier-General Sir John Gough, the Chief of 
Staff to the First Army, with the date 27 December 1914.  Barr’s recording of the date is that 
which the document was received by the headquarters of I Corps - see Niall Barr, ‘Command in 
the Transition from Mobile to Static Warfare, August 1914–March 1915’, in Gary Sheffield and 
Dan Todman (eds), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s 
Experience, 1914–1918 (Stroud, 2004), 31.  It seems that Lloyd was mistaken in both the date 
and the authorship of the document. 
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defined.12  This lack of ‘job descriptions’ is a clear indication of the absence of decisive 
command from GHQ in late-1914 and early-1915, and occurred despite several 
opportunities for the roles to be clearly defined, first when Hobbs met with GHQ staff to 
discuss the system of staff work on 26 December, and then three days later when Haig 
met with Sir John French to discuss the general situation of the war.13  First Army 
headquarters assumed that ‘[n]o doubt with a few days experience things will right 
themselves’, but in practice the question of leadership roles and responsibilities dogged 
the BEF throughout 1915.14  The lack of clearly defined roles in the new structure had a 
knock-on effect on the First Army’s organisational development.  The creation of a new 
layer of management did not vest anyone with the ultimate responsibility of managing 
the institution’s professional development and this, coupled with the absence of a formal 
army-wide learning framework, resulted in an inconsistent, piecemeal approach to 
learning. 
 
The absence of a defined role for Haig and the First Army meant that he had the 
opportunity to create his own niche in the new hierarchy.  This, combined with Sir 
John’s French’s admiration of Haig’s operational performance in the 1914 campaign, 
meant that in the event Haig was given considerable autonomy to conduct operations as 
he saw fit in the 1915 campaign. Underpinning this autonomy was the belief that the 
First Army and its commander were superior to their contemporaries, both friend and 
                                                 
12 Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919 (Westport, 1998), 77; 
Lloyd, “With Faith and Without Fear”, 1054. 
13 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 26 December 1914 and 29 December 
1914. 




enemy.  It was a point which was continuously reinforced to Haig.  In a meeting on 4 
April 1915, Lord Esher, Britain’s ‘roving ambassador to France’, told Haig of a 
conversation he had with an American who had met the German Kaiser in Berlin the 
previous winter.15  The Kaiser had reportedly said that ‘the First Army Corps under 
Douglas Haig is the best in the world’ and had emphasised Haig’s leadership as the key 
factor.16  In a telephone call to congratulate Haig on the ‘result’ of the first day’s fighting 
at Neuve Chapelle on 11 March, Sir John French admitted that ‘the fine state of First 
Army was due to [Haig’s]’ influence.17  
 
Much as the praise of First Army and its commander came from the top of the war 
management hierarchy, subordinate officers were also keen to lavish praise on the First 
Army and its commander in particular.    Major-General Henry Horne, the inaugural 
commander of First Army’s artillery and later commander of the 2nd Division, thought 
that Haig was ‘the best of all the Commanders out here’.18  Lieutenant-General Sir 
Aylmer Hunter-Weston believed that Haig was the man ‘to organise the nation for war’, 
citing his ‘power of clear thinking...power of organisation...study of [his] 
profession...experience of modern war...and strength of character’.19    There was some 
dissent over Haig’s ability in battle, however, with one senior officer commenting that 
Haig had ‘no imagination, and very little brains and very little sympathy’, but this aside, 
                                                 
15 David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905–1915 (London, 2013), 119. 
16 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/101, Typescript Diary, 4 April 1915. 
17 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 11 March 1915. 
18 IWM, Private Papers of General Lord Horne of Stirkoke [afterwards IWM, Horne Papers], 
Doc.12468, Diary, 30 December 1914. 
19 Aylmer Hunter-Weston quoted in de Groot, Douglas Haig, 198.   
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Haig’s reputation among his contemporaries in the BEF was overwhelmingly positive.20  
Supremely self-confident and continually bombarded with flattery despite First Army’s 
lack of operational success in the 1915 campaign, Haig exploited the autonomy given to 
him by GHQ and manouevred himself to the command of the BEF.  By the end of the 
1915 campaign, for Haig at least, the First Army was a ‘model of military 
management’.21 
 
The First Army which Haig left in December 1915 was markedly different in both size 
and composition to that created a year before.  On its creation, the First Army was 
comprised of three army corps – I, IV and the Indian Corps – which in turn each 
consisted of two infantry divisions.  The infantry division was considered to be the ‘real 
battle unit’, capable of independent tactical action.22  The war establishment of a typical 
regular infantry division was some 18,000 men, which consisted of approximately 
12,000 infantrymen and 4,000 gunners with the remainder being split among divisional 
engineers, medical and transport personnel, signallers and a small supporting cavalry 
unit.23  Of Haig’s troops, the British I Corps had crossed to France with the original 
incarnation of the BEF in August 1914 and had been his first command in the Great 
War.  The I Corps was comprised of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions; regular army 
formations which had been based in Britain at the declaration of war and had experience 
                                                 
20 Henry Wilson quoted in Keith Jeffrey, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier 
(Oxford, 2006), 165, original italics. 
21 de Groot, Douglas Haig, 197. 
22 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Typescript Diary, 7 November 1915. 
23 Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-
1918 (Stroud, 2006), 1. 
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of peacetime operations as a combined force.24  These units were familiar with Haig’s 
operational methodology and he believed their presence in his army gave it a cutting 
edge: 
 
I thought I had an advantage in having had 2 divisions under my command for 
over 2 years at Aldershot.  We had tried to arrive at a common “doctrine”, and 
my subordinate commanders realised the importance of discipline and had 
maintained it.  This was the 1st Corps which eventually set the standard for the 
1st Army in discipline, in system of command, and staff duties.25 
 
The I Corps had seen hard fighting throughout the 1914 campaign and had performed 
well, although its effectiveness had been eroded by its high casualty rate in battle during 
the retreat from Mons, fighting on the Aisne and Marne rivers, and during the First 
Battle of Ypres.  The 2nd Division was, for Haig, a group of ‘splendid fighting men’ and 
who, by July 1915, ‘were in a very highly efficient state’.26  The 1st Division was 
regarded as a similarly effective formation, and gained plaudits for an aggressive 
counterattack undertaken on 1 February which cleared German troops from the village 
of Cuinchy.27  The IV Corps consisted of the 7th and 8th Divisions and was created in 
October 1914 from units recently returned from overseas garrisons.  Used to plug a hole 
in the British lines at the First Battle of Ypres, the 7th Division was ‘battered almost out 
                                                 
24 For brevity, when infantry divisions are mentioned they will be referred to as the 1st Division, 
2nd Division, etc.  When cavalry divisions are mentioned it will be clearly stated, for example, 1st 
Cavalry Division, etc.   
25 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/101, Typescript Diary, 7 June 1915. 
26 Haig, quoted in George Barrow, The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, Bart. 
(London, 1931), 41; IWM, Horne Papers, Doc.12468, General Horne to Lady Horne, 25 June 
1915. 
27 Michael Senior, Haking: A Dutiful Soldier; Lt General Sir Richard Haking, XI Corps 
Commander, 1915-18, A Study in Corps Command (Barnsley, 2012), 35. 
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of existence’ in earning its nickname, ‘the Immortal Seventh’.28  Added to the four 
divisions of the I and IV Corps were two divisions of infantry (the Lahore Division and 
the Meerut Division) supplied by the Indian Army and organised as the Indian Corps.29  
On its arrival in France Haig thought that the Indian Corps ‘was not altogether in an 
efficient state’; his view changed little throughout the campaign.30  At the suggestion of 
the commanding officer of the Indian Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, 
Haig authorised that each Indian infantry brigade was to be augmented by a battalion of 
British infantry as the native battalions ‘were quite unable to face German troops’.31   In 
terms of absolute numbers, the divisions of the Indian Corps were under–strength when 
compared to their British counterparts, as Table 1.1 demonstrates. 
 
Table 1.1: ‘Return of Strength’ of the First Army, 4 January 1915. 
Corps Division Number of Officers Number of NCOs 
and Men 
I Corps 1st Division 440 14,852 
 2nd Division 492 16,817 
                                                 
28 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir 
Henry Rawlinson, 1914-1918 (Barnsley, 2004), 14; Richard Olson, ‘An Inspirational Warrior: 
Major-General Sir Thompson Capper’, in Spencer Jones (ed.), Stemming the Tide: Officers and 
Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914 (Solihull, 2013), 189-208. 
29 More correctly the Indian Corps was titled the Indian Expeditionary Force ‘A’, however 
contemporary sources within the First Army structure continually refer to the formation as ‘the 
Indian Corps’ and this thesis will use that name.  Interest in the Indian Corps has increased 
recently; for important studies see Gordon Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches: The Indian Corps 
on the Western Front, 1914-1915 (Stroud, 2006); and George Morton-Jack, The Indian Army on 
the Western Front: India’s Expeditionary Force to France and Flanders in the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2014).   
30 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/98, Typescript Diary, 29 November 1914. 
31 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/99, Typescript Diary, 20 January 1915. 
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IV Corps 7th Division 501 17,997 
 8th Division 609 17,335 
Indian Corps Lahore Division 386 10,883 
 Meerut Division 435 12,285 
Total First Army  2,863 90,119 
 
Source: NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 4 January 1915.  It should be noted that the 
officers of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions were white British officers either of the Indian Army or 
attached to it from the regular British Army. 
 
Experience of the 1914 campaign showed that more troops were required to defeat the 
German Army on the western front.  The main issue surrounding the expansion of the 
First Army in the 1915 campaign was the proposed introduction of the New Armies then 
being raised in Britain under the guidance of Lord Kitchener.32  From the declaration of 
war on 4 August until 31 December 1914, 1,186,357 men volunteered to join either 
Kitchener’s new armies or the Territorial Force (TF) and by the end of the following 
year a further 1,280,360 had enlisted.33  The incorporation of New Army formations into 
the existing BEF structure proved problematic in the opening weeks of the 1915 
campaign.  While Kitchener advocated that his New Armies be sent to the BEF as 
complete formations, Sir John French, Haig, Smith–Dorrien and other senior British 
commanders on the western front favoured sending the new units out by battalions and 
brigades to be attached to experienced formations for a period of practical instruction in 
                                                 
32 For a comprehensive account of the creation of the new armies see Peter Simkins, 
Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-1918 (Manchester, 1988). 
33 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-
1920 (London, 1922), 364. 
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trench warfare.34  To put the views of the BEF to Kitchener, Haig drafted a paper 
entitled ‘The Expansion of the Army in the Field’ in which he advocated not only the 
gradual incorporation of the new armies to the existing BEF structure but also the 
addition of a third infantry division to each corps.35  Haig proposed that one New Army 
brigade and a brigade from each existing division in the corps be joined to form an 
entirely new division rather than incorporating a complete inexperienced division.  The 
effect of these proposed changes would be to enlarge the First Army from six divisions 
to nine.  From this it is clear that Haig desired the expansion of his own command rather 
than allowing ‘new formations with rather elderly commanders and inexperienced staff 
officers’ to act at the same command level as his own First Army.36  Haig got his wish 
and, as a result, the strength of the First Army trebled over the course of the campaign.  
Figure 1.2 demonstrates the overall increase in the strength of the First Army in 1915.37 
 
There were four ways in which the strength of the First Army increased over the 
campaign.  First, at the battalion level, units received lightly wounded soldiers and men 
recovered from sickness along with drafts of reinforcements from regimental depots in 
Britain.  Second, battalions or divisions of the Territorial Force were added to the 
strength of the First Army prior to the arrival of the New Army divisions from May 
1915 onwards, which constitutes the third increase in strength.  The final increase was 
                                                 
34 Richard Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: A Life of Sir John French (London, 1981), 262; NLS, 
Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 4 January 1915. 
35 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, ‘The Expansion of the Army in the Field’, Typescript Diary, 
11 January 1915. 
36 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 4 January 1915. 
37 It should be noted that this is the “feeding strength” of the army which represents the total 
number of servicemen in all branches of the service with the First Army on that date rather than 
the “fighting strength” which was reserved for the number of infantrymen or rifles. 
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the attachment of corps from elsewhere in the BEF to the First Army.  In the first place, 
the number of soldiers received by any battalion depended, primarily, on the availability 
of reinforcements from the parent regiment.  In 21 Brigade in the 7th Division for 
example, the 4th Cameron Highlanders of the Territorial Force received 146 other ranks 
replacements in the period 1 October-31 December 1915.38  While this number was 
comparable with the 2nd Royal Scots’ Fusiliers, it was far below the 539 men received 
by the 2nd Yorkshire Regiment and the 430 men received by the 2nd Bedfordshire 
Regiment in the same period.39  The primary function of these regimental reinforcements 
was to replace the men who had been killed and wounded in battle or had been 
evacuated through sickness, rather than a conscious increase in the number of effective 
soldiers within a given battalion. 
 
Figure 1.2: First Army Feeding Strength, 1915 Campaign 
                                                 
38 TNA, WO95/1659, 4th Cameron Highlanders War Diary; Patrick Watt, Steel & Tartan: the 4th 
Cameron Highlanders in the Great War (Stroud, 2012), 110. 




Source: NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/99-103, Typescript Diary, January-December 1915; TNA, War 
Office, WO95/181, First Army Adjutant and Quartermaster-General War Diary, 1915. 
The first material increase in the First Army in terms of formations saw the attachment 
of individual battalions of the Territorial Force.  Despite being created as a home 
defence force, battalions of the Territorial Force volunteered for overseas service and 
were posted to the BEF on an ad hoc basis to augment the strength of the regular army 
divisions.  In January 1915, the First Army included eight battalions of Territorial Force 
infantry which had been in France since October and November 1914.  While some 
officers inclined towards a positive view of the Territorial Force battalions, others were 
less impressed.  Lieutenant-General Allenby wrote to Haig on 1 November to tell him 
‘how magnificently the London Scottish have behaved.  In discipline and tactical 
efficiency they have been up to the standard of the best regular troops’.40  However, 
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Brigadier-General Cecil Lowther, the commanding officer of 1 Brigade found the same 
battalion to be ‘in a rather sad state.  Poorly commanded, everything horribly dirty and 
about 90 men being seen sick by the doctor daily’.41  In January 1915, five battalions of 
the Territorial Force were attached to the Indian Corps to alleviate Lieutenant-General 
Willcocks’ worries of his native Indian troops not being able to withstand a German 
attack.  The following month, a further six Territorial Force battalions were attached to 
the infantry brigades of the I and IV Corps.  The effectiveness of these units differed 
between battalions.  As Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the commander of the 
IV Corps, wrote to Lord Kitchener in late February, ‘The [4th] Cameron Territorials 
arrived today, a thundering fine lot of men, full of fight and excellent physique; a great 
contrast to the [4th] Black Watch whom I have had to pull out of the line...they are 
children from the slums of Dundee, many of whom are not 17 years old’.42  While the 
quality of the Territorial Force battalions differed, their attachment to experienced 
brigades provided their first experience of in situ informal learning by giving them the 
opportunity to acclimatise to the conditions of warfare on the western front.   In practical 
terms it also freed up the regular battalions to take a more active part in offensive 
operations as the Territorial Force battalions were able to hold the line when the regular 
infantry units were withdrawn for training and rest. 
 
                                                 
41 IWM, Private Papers of Brigadier C. H. L. Lowther [afterwards IWM, Lowther Papers], 
Doc.7227, Diary, 23 November 1914. 
42 TNA, Papers of Herbert Horatio Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener, PRO 30/57/51/14, Rawlinson to 
Fitzgerald, 24 February 1915. 
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Figure 1.2 illustrates that March 1915 saw the largest growth, percentage-wise, as the 
strength of the First Army increased from 126,983 soldiers at the start of the month to 
169,389 officers and men by the end, despite the high casualties caused by the Battle of 
Neuve Chapelle.  This was in part due to the posting to the First Army of the first 
complete Territorial Force Division – the 47th (2nd London) Division – which served 
throughout the 1915 campaign, first as part of Monro’s I Corps and latterly as part of 
Rawlinson’s IV Corps.  At Loos, in September, that division was selected as one of the 
attacking units on the first day of the battle where they ‘did well...holding the ground 
gained with great tenacity’.43  They were followed, in April, by the 49th (West Riding) 
Division, and in early May by the 51st (Highland) Division.  As with the individual 
battalions of the Territorial Force, the divisions differed in quality and effectiveness.  
Despite Rawlinson’s reservations that the 49th Division ‘would not be of much value’, 
on their arrival he found that the brigadiers ‘seemed very keen and had their brigades in 
good order’.44   Rawlinson declared himself ‘not very satisfied’ with the 51st Division 
and commented that ‘they are very raw – they have no trained bombers yet and their 
artillery is not in a good state’.45  While Haig noted that the division was ‘in great 
spirits’ on its attachment to the First Army he also lamented its lack of training and 
efficiency.46  One officer went further and called the division ‘a danger’ to the units 
around it, suggesting that operational ineffectiveness had a knock-on effect in terms of 
casualties in action, not only for the unit in question but also for those in close 
                                                 
43 Churchill Archive Centre, Cambridge, Papers of General Lord (Henry S) Rawlinson 
[afterwards CAC, Rawlinson Papers], RWLN 1/3, Rawlinson Diary, 26 September 1915 
44 CAC, Rawlinson Papers, RWLN 1/1, Rawlinson Diary, 11 April 1915; NLS, Haig Papers, 
Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 23 April 1915. 
45 CAC, Rawlinson Papers, RWLN 1/3, Rawlinson Diary, 2 June 1915. 
46 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/101, Typescript Diary, 13 May 1915 and 20 May 1915. 
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proximity.47  Following a restructuring of the corps after the Battle of Loos in September 
1915, the 46th (North Midland) Division ‘were delighted to have joined the First Army’ 
for a proposed attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt.48  In the event, the attack failed, 
prompting Haig to comment that ‘some Territorial Force units still require training [and] 
discipline’.49  It is clear, then, that even after sustained experience of warfare on the 
western front major differences existed in the standard of efficiency among the 
Territorial Force units.  Haig’s role as the ‘managing director’ of the First Army was to 
ensure that these units were brought up to the standard of the regular army divisions.50  
That they had not improved in terms of operational efficiency was the result of the lack 
of importance placed on professional development by the First Army’s war managers 
and the absence of a framework for the considered, methodical improvement of units’ 
effectiveness both in-theatre and also prior to embarkation. 
 
The first New Army division was attached to the First Army in June 1915.  The 9th 
(Scottish) Division arrived in France on 10 May and spent three weeks under instruction 
by the III Corps of the Second Army, before being appointed to the general reserve of 
the First Army on 3 June.51  According to Haig, the first of the New Army units ‘seemed 
of good class and are very keen to fight’.52  The 9th Division were followed by the 15th 
(Scottish) Division, posted to IV Corps on 15 July; the 19th (Western) Division, posted 
                                                 
47 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/101, Typescript Diary, 22 May 1915.  The officer in question was 
Major-General Alderson of the 1st Canadian Division. 
48 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Montagu-Stuart-Wortley quoted in Typescript Diary, 7 
October 1915.  
49 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Typescript Diary, 27 October 1915. 
50 Sheffield, The Chief, 102. 
51 TNA, WO95/2/10, General Headquarters General Staff War Diary, 3 June 1915. 
52 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/101, Typescript Diary, 8 June 1915.  
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to the Indian Corps on 24 July; and the 20th Division who joined the newly arrived III 
Corps on 29 July.  Like their compatriots in the 9th Division, the Scots in the 15th 
Division were ‘very keen to fight’ and were ‘well found in brigadiers and COs of 
battalions’.53  The men of 57 Brigade of the 19th Division were ‘decidedly good’ and 
their officers had ‘pluck but not much practical knowledge of discipline or of what to do 
in the presence of the enemy’.54  Major-General Davies of the 20th Division was ‘most 
satisfied with his division’ however, Haig considered them to be not as ‘clean and smart 
as some of the other army divisions’.55  A further batch of three divisions, the 21st, 23rd 
and 24th Divisions, joined the First Army in early September, however, the poor 
performance of the 21st and 24th Divisions at Loos led to their removal from the First 
Army to undergo an intensive period of training and reorganisation, from 27 September.  
Finally, the 12th (Eastern) Division joined the First Army in late September and the 33rd 
Division joined on 2 December. 
 
Figure 1.3: The Changing Nature of the First Army by ‘Type’ of Infantry Division, 1915 
                                                 
53 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/102, Typescript Diary, 21 and 22 July 1915. 
54 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/102, Typescript Diary, 27 July 1915. 




Sources: NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100-104, Typescript Diary, 26 December 1914–29 February 1916; 
TNA, WO95/154-161, First Army Headquarters General Staff War Diary, December 1914–February 
1916; Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, Papers of Field Marshal Sir 
Archibald Armar Montgomery-Massingbird [afterwards LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingbird Papers], 6/5 
and 6/6, Notebooks on Administrative Structure of the BEF, August 1915 and January 1916. 
 
The final way in which the strength of the First Army increased in the 1915 campaign 
was with the introduction of new corps rather than divisions.  In July 1915, the 
formation of the British Third Army necessitated a restructuring of the corps of the First 
and Second Armies.  Sir William Pulteney’s III Corps moved to the First Army bringing 
with it the independent 19 Brigade and the regular 8th and 27th Divisions.  In 
September, units of the Guards regiments were removed from the 1st and 2nd Divisions 
















Divisions of the New Army to form the XI Corps which was also added to the strength 
of the First Army.   
 
Figure 1.3 demonstrates the changes in the composition of the First Army over the 
course of the 1915 campaign.  While the First Army moved from a predominantly 
regular army formation at the start of the campaign towards a New Army formation by 
the end, the number of regular infantry divisions remained largely the same throughout.  
There was, then, a core of experienced units such as the 1st, 2nd and 7th Divisions who 
remained with the First Army throughout the campaign.  For the majority of the 
campaign, colonial troops were used to augment the fighting power of the First Army.  
While the two divisions of the Indian Corps remain constant until the corps’ removal to 
Mesopotamia in November, the number of colonial troops twice peaked at three 
divisions, in March and June.  This was due to the arrival of the Canadian Division who 
held the line to the north of the main battlefield at Neuve Chapelle in March before 
being posted to the Second Army.  The Canadians returned to the First Army on 13 May 
and fought at Festubert and Givenchy before being permanently transferred back to the 
Second Army in June.  While the Territorial Force divisions were used as a stop-gap 
from April until the arrival of the New Army formations in the summer, the First Army 
retained a Territorial Force presence throughout the campaign.  The arrival of the New 
Army divisions in the summer of 1915 resulted in an increase in the overall fighting 
strength of the First Army and, by January 1916, New Army divisions comprised fifty 
per cent of the strength of the First Army and represented, for the first time, the largest 




Table 1.2: The Changing Composition of the IV Corps, 1915 




7 November 1914–1 March 1915 7th (Reg) & 8th (Reg)  
2 March–8 March 1915 7th (Reg), 8th (Reg) & Canadian  
9 March–9 April 1915 7th (Reg) & 8th (Reg) Neuve Chapelle 
10 April–31 May 1915 7th (Reg), 8th (Reg) & 49th (TF) Aubers Ridge, 
Festubert 
31 May–27 June 1915 7th (Reg) & 51st (TF) & Canadian Givenchy 
27 June–30 June 1915 7th (Reg) & 48th (TF)  
30 June–18 July 1915 1st (Reg), 47th (TF) & 48th (TF)  
18 July–end of campaign 1st (Reg), 15th (NA) & 47th (TF) Loos 
 
Source: LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingbird Papers, 6/5, Notebook on Administrative Structure of the 
BEF, 1915.  Reg = Regular; TF = Territorial Force; NA = New Army. 
 
The First Army of January 1916 contained only three divisions which had begun the 
previous year’s campaign.  In total, twenty-four divisions across five different corps 
served in the First Army at various points in 1915.  The composition of the corps 
changed continuously in response to the missions First Army headquarters asked them to 
undertake.  The changing nature of the composition of the IV Corps is a typical example 
of the changes which took place in the wider First Army.  Those changes are illustrated 
in Table 1.2.  The IV Corps had a different structure for each of its engagements in the 
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1915 campaign and, in total, underwent eight structural reconstructions in the space of 
five months, four of which lasted less than three weeks.  The constant changes in which 
divisions comprised the IV Corps had a knock-on effect on the formation’s ability to 
learn from its experiences.  As Catignani demonstrated in his study of Twenty-First 
Century counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, a key difficulty of learning in warfare is 
managing the knowledge loss which occurs when personnel or units change places in the 
institutional structure or cease to exist within the organisation.56  While the corps 
headquarters were able to attempt to draw lessons from their offensive operations, the 
divisions which had carried out the operations were no longer part of the corps structure 
and were subject to a different set of learning parameters at another point in the BEF 
hierarchy.  In short, in many cases, infantry divisions did not remain in the same place in 
the First Army hierarchy for long enough to create, collect and disseminate lessons 
learned.  For example, on 28 September the 9th Division, one of the best performing 
divisions at Loos, was removed from the I Corps structure and transferred to the Second 
Army at Ypres taking with it a wealth of operational experience which was then lost to 
the First Army.  Its replacement was the 28th Division, a formation which had spent its 
entire time in France as part of the Second Army or under the direct command of GHQ.  
The rotation of British divisions through corps was a practice which continued 
throughout the war and this failure to adapt to a permanent corps structure has been 
                                                 
56 Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 32. 
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viewed as ‘a major mistake; a gratuitously self-inflicted own goal’ which reduced the 
effectiveness of the corps.57   
 
Figure 1.4: First Army Structure, December 1915 
 
 
                                                 
57 Gary Sheffield, ‘How Even was the Learning Curve?: Reflections on the British and Dominion 
Armies on the Western Front’, in Yves Tremblay (ed.), Canadian Military History since the 17th 























































In contrast, the Canadian and ANZAC divisions of the BEF were kept together in 
distinct Dominion corps within the wider BEF structure.  The permanence of their 
structure not only allowed the creation of a distinct set of standard operating procedures 
based on their respective experiences, but also an increased trust between individuals – 
both staff and regimental officers – who were familiar with the inner workings of the 
corps hierarchy.58  By the end of the war, the dominion corps had emerged as some of 
the most effective fighting formations in the BEF.  While this was the result of a number 
of factors, including visionary, flexible, leadership and a dedicated training programme, 
the permanence of the corps structure materially affected the corps’ abilities to collate 
and disseminate information.  
 
While at the start of the campaign the First Army was largely comprised of experienced 
regular and colonial units, a mix of Territorial Force and New Army divisions joined 
throughout the year, increasing its firepower if not its effectiveness.  In theory, by the 
end of the 1915 campaign, the First Army could have been said to have been an 
experienced formation.  However, the reality was rather different.  Not only did the First 
Army war management hierarchy change with Haig’s promotion to commander-in-chief, 
but the experience levels dropped substantially as units, such as the 9th Division, were 
replaced by less experienced units after the Battle of Loos.  The First Army of the 1916 
campaign bore little resemblance to that of the 1915 campaign and the changes in 
structure affected the First Army’s ability to learn effectively.  In business management 
                                                 
58 Sheffield, ‘How Even was the Learning Curve?’, 131.  See also, Dean Oliver, ‘The Canadians 
at Passchendaele’, in Peter Liddle (ed.), Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of 
Ypres (Barnsley, 1997), 255-71. 
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theory, Kathleen Carley has shown that when individuals leave organisations without 
there being a mechanism in place for the sharing of personal experience among the 
decision-makers, knowledge disappears, the organisation’s memory is reduced and, 
consequently, institutional effectiveness decreases.59  There was no such framework 
within the First Army nor the wider BEF structure in 1915 which was designed to 
capture that knowledge.  This resulted in differing levels of efficiency across the force, 
which was exacerbated by the lack of a definition of what an army staff should do and 
the knock-on failure of war managers at either First Army or GHQ to take responsibility 
for the organisation’s professional development. The implication for organisational 
development, at the tactical level at least, was that the unofficial responsibility for active 
learning passed from army and corps command to the war managers of individual 
divisions.  These divisional war managers internalised their lessons learned, leaving 
corps commanders to plan the next battle with subordinate formations which did not 
possess the same knowledge base. 
 
The Impact of Casualties on Organisational Memory 
The removal of experienced units from the First Army hierarchy and the mass casualties 
sustained by the First Army pose questions regarding the institution’s organisational 
memory.  Research by Weick and Ashford has demonstrated that ‘organisations with a 
high turnover rate learned less and learned more slowly’ than those with a stable 
                                                 
59 Kathleen Carley, ‘Organisational Learning and Personnel Turnover’, Organizational Science 
3.1 (1992), 20. 
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structure.60  The question of where knowledge gained from lessons learned was stored 
has important implications for understanding the First Army’s organisational 
development.  Catignani demonstrated that armies are ‘repositories of knowledge’ in 
which knowledge is manifested and embedded in the army’s structures, rules, mental 
models and dominant thinking.61  The careful management of that knowledge is crucial 
to successful organisational development.  The creation of knowledge is, however, a 
human process, and organisational development is an agglomeration of the learning 
processes of multiple key stakeholders within the institution.  As Jim Storr asserted, 
warfare ‘is fundamentally human, and waged between complex human organisations’ 
rather than being based solely on strategic principles.62  While individual learning is 
necessary for organisational development to take place, it does not, in itself, effect 
institutional change.  For that to happen armed forces require a system to translate ‘tacit 
knowledge (the knowledge of individuals) into explicit knowledge (knowledge codified 
for sharing with others) and then to transfer this knowledge throughout the 
organisation’.63  In military institutions this is made more difficult by the loss of 
knowledge caused by the high turnover of personnel.  This section will examine how 
battlefield casualties affected the transfer of knowledge in the First Army and the 
implications they had on the formation’s organisational memory. 
 
                                                 
60 Karl Weick and Susan Ashford, ‘Learning in Organisations’, in Frederic Jablin and Linda 
Putnam (eds), The New Handbook of Organisational Communication: Advances in Theory, 
Research and Methods (Thousand Oaks, 2000), 718. 
61 Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 35. 
62 Jim Storr, The Human Face of War (London, 2011), 2. 
63 Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes’, 281. 
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The learning process is especially inhibited by traumatic experiences, such as conflict, 
where the opportunities to challenge and test lessons learned are not always available.64  
In the context of the Great War, the loss of personnel was profound, particularly among 
officers.  Indeed, between 4 August and 30 November 1914, the BEF lost 3,627 officers 
and over 86,000 men of the regular army killed and wounded leaving the average 
infantry battalion with only one officer and thirty men of the original contingent still 
serving with the battalion at the end of 1914.65  This meant that the regular army units of 
the First Army were depleted by the fighting of 1914 and were increasingly eroded of 
experienced personnel as the 1915 campaign progressed.  The place of experienced men 
were taken by recalled reservists and volunteers.  John Baynes’s study of the regular 2nd 
Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle showed that in the early period of the war 
reservists ‘found little difficulty in settling down again into a military life’ and the more 
mature among them were ‘quickly fitted into jobs where their experience and maturity 
outweighed any physical weakness’.66  However, the standard of volunteer 
reinforcements from the regimental depots lacked the efficiency of the pre-war regulars.  
Brigadier-General Charles Corkran noted, after reviewing recent drafts to 5 Brigade in 
the 2nd Division, ‘that the esprit de corps of the old units was lacking in battalions 
and...some of the battalions seemed to lack the fighting energy and morale which 
characterised the original units’ of the Expeditionary Force.67  In April 1915, Haig 
noted, after an inspection of a battalion of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, that their appearance 
                                                 
64 Nolan, Military Leadership, 12. 
65 Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys or Cunning Foxes’, 284. 
66 Baynes, Morale, 52. 
67 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/104, Typescript Diary, 23 October 1915. 
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‘was not good’ and that ‘some of the later drafts look very slack’.68  More worryingly for 
the war managers were drafts to the 69th Punjabis of the Indian Corps who, in 
September, were described by Haig as being ‘useless for fighting purposes’.69   
 
The five offensive operations of the 1915 campaign, coupled with the constant human 
attrition of trench warfare, proved costly for the First Army.  In total, the First Army 
suffered 5,927 officers and 134,579 other ranks killed, wounded and missing over the 
course of the campaign.70  Figure 1.5 highlights the casualties sustained in each battle 
undertaken by the First Army in the 1915 campaign.  In terms of casualties, the Battle of 
Loos in September and October was the most costly for the First Army with 59,242 
officers and other ranks killed, wounded and missing.71  However, when the number of 
casualties sustained per day of battle is ascertained, the Battle of Aubers Ridge with 
11,619 officers and other ranks killed, wounded and missing on 9 May alone, was by far 
the most costly.72  Indeed, in terms of the number of troops involved, that battle was one 
of the most bloody of the war for the BEF.73 The five planned offensive actions cost the 
First Army 72,865 out of their total 140,506 casualties.74  While the rigours of trench 
warfare proved as damaging as offensive operations, the large-scale, rapid change 
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69 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Typescript Diary, 9 September 1915. 
70 Edmonds, British Official History, 1915, Vol.2, 393. 
71 Edmonds, British Official History, 1915, Vol.2, 391. 
72 The other day rates are Neuve Chapelle, 3,887 casualties per day; Festubert 1,665 casualties 
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sustained nearly as many casualties as the First Army: in total 5,347 officers and 126,887 other 
ranks were killed, wounded and missing from the Second Army, including 2,150 officers and 
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caused by the latter proved to be more traumatic for the organisational development of 
infantry formations.  
 
Figure 1.5: Casualties in the Five Major Actions Undertaken by First Army, 1915 
 
Sources: Edmonds, British Official History, 1915 Vol.1, 151 (Neuve Chapelle); Edmonds, British Official 
History, 1915, Vol.2, 39 (Aubers Ridge), 76 (Festubert), 97 (Givenchy), 391 (Loos). 
 
Battlefield casualties and their replacement from the depots temporarily undermined unit 
cohesion and efficiency.75  For Lance Corporal Ian Andrew of the 6th Cameron 
Highlanders, the highly trained, disciplined and efficient battalion in which he had 
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served for a year ‘ceased to exist’ following its casualties at the Battle of Loos.76  After 
sustaining 560 casualties during the same battle, the 7th Cameron Highlanders of the 
15th Division were described by Lord Kitchener as being by ‘far the finest battalion of 
the new army’ on account of both the physical appearance of their men and their 
performance in capturing the strategically important position of Hill 70.77  However, the 
scale of the casualties had eroded the composition of the battalion to such an extent that 
few of the original members remained with the unit.  The reputation the original 
members established contributed to later judgements of battalion effectiveness even 
when the individual personnel had changed.  Following their high casualty rate at Loos, 
the 7th Camerons were given a month in reserve billets to rest and refit, however, on 
their return to the trenches on 26 October, ‘75% of the officers and men had never been 
under shell or rifle fire, and had not seen a trench’.78  As a result, the adjutant considered 
the battalion ‘new to its job’.  Despite its inexperience the new men of the 7th Camerons 
‘did very well.  Corpses [were] not appreciated by the younger members, but [there was] 
no wild firing or scares’.79 For the 9th Black Watch, the casualties caused by the Battle 
of Loos had necessitated the complete reorganisation of the battalion but, while the 
recruits brought the battalion up to strength, it was nowhere near the standard of 
efficiency it had been a month earlier.80   
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The second consequence of the high casualty rate was that the need to train and integrate 
the reinforcements removed units from the battle line.  Between 25 September and 31 
December, 44 Brigade, of which the 7th Cameron Highlanders formed a part, received 
over 2,000 replacements from regimental depots in the United Kingdom ‘who had not 
anything like the training [the original members of the 44 Brigade] had before coming 
out in July’.81  It was a similar story in the 7th Division where the Battle of Festubert in 
May led to the fourth reconstruction of the division since October 1914; a process which 
became more difficult as each offensive removed more trained officers, NCOs and 
men.82  The disorganisation caused by the battle led the divisional historian to conclude 
that the units which were reconstituted at the end of May were not worth as much in 
terms of efficiency as they had been when the battle opened two weeks before.83  
Opportunities for the training and integration of new recruits proved elusive for many 
units throughout the 1915 campaign and even when training was conducted in the 9th 
Gordon Highlanders, ‘junior officers and men did not often last long enough to absorb 
the training imparted or to pass on the experience of battle’.84 
 
The latter point highlights the importance of battlefield casualties on organisational 
development.  Casualties among infantry battalion officers were high throughout the 
campaign but particularly so at the Battle of Loos.  During the battle, battalions were 
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restricted to employing twenty officers with the attack; the remainder being left with the 
battalion transport to provide reinforcements.85  Table 1.3 highlights the extent of 
casualties in three infantry brigades: 21 Brigade of the 7th Division, 27 Brigade of the 
9th Division, and 45 Brigade of the 15th Division.  Of the five battalions of 21 Brigade 
which attacked on 25 September, four – the 8th Devons, 9th Devons, 2nd Gordon 
Highlanders and 6th Gordon Highlanders – lost their commanding officer killed or 
wounded, and the 8th Devons and the 6th Gordon Highlanders also lost their battalion 
adjutant.  Officer casualties in the 8th Devons were exceptionally high.  All but three of 
the battalion’s officers were killed or wounded before reaching the German front line 
trench and they all became casualties before nightfall.86  The five officers who remained 
as a first reinforcement only reached the battalion during the night of 25-26 September.  
As a result of the high casualties the battalion after-action report was written by Captain 
G. D. Roberts, an officer who had not taken part in the attack.87  While the report 
included some prescient information regarding the employment of machine-gunners and 
signallers, Roberts admitted that, with respect to the original advance ‘for some reason 
which I am unable to ascertain the second and third companies seem to have started off 
before the first’.88  The reason why he could not ascertain this rather basic point was due 
to the 100 per cent casualty rate among the 8th Devons’ officers who had attacked on the 
morning of 25 September.  The high casualty rate among officers was replicated in the 
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majority of attacking battalions in the I and IV Corps at Loos.  The loss of officers who 
had planned and experienced the battle meant that knowledge gained through their 
experiences was lost to their unit with their removal through death or wounds. 
 
Table 1.3: Officer Casualties (Killed, Wounded and Missing) at the Battle of Loos 
(selected brigades) 
Rank 21 Brigade 27 Brigade 45 Brigade 
Lieutenant-Colonel 4 3 2 
Major 3 3 3 
Adjutant 2 2 3 
Captain 12 13 17 
Lieutenants (1st & 2nd) 55 24 39 
Support Officers 1 0 0 
Total 77/100 47/80 64/80 
 
Sources: TNA, WO95/1652, 20 Infantry Brigade Headquarters War Diary, September–December 1915; 
TNA, WO95/1769, 27 Infantry Brigade Headquarters War Diary, May 1915–December 1916; TNA, 
WO95/1942, July 1915–December 1916. 
 
A key step in the creation and transfer of data in the First Army was the dissemination of 
after-action and lessons learned reports.  The former consisted of narrative accounts of 
operations, typically at company, battalion or brigade level, and the latter were more 
analytical documents which sought to identify areas of unit offensive operations which 
were successful and should be replicated and those which failed and should be 
reconsidered. However, particularly in the early stages of the campaign, there was often 
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some crossover between the two types of report.  This occurred because there was no 
centrally controlled system of knowledge management and no army-wide guidelines 
which stipulated what should be included in the reports.  Foley has shown that in the 
German Army between 1914 and mid-1916 units created reports on an ad hoc basis 
which were sometimes disseminated by the high command but were more often used 
within formations for training purposes.89  Analysis of British Army unit war diaries 
from the 1915 campaign reveal similarities in approach.  While some battalion reports 
found their way to divisional headquarters, many did not and that knowledge was 
retained within and used by the lower-level tactical formations.  John Lee suggested that 
the creation of these reports shows that the army was constantly looking to learn lessons 
from its experiences, however this oversimplifies the process of organisational 
development.90  Identifying lessons was one step in the wider process but a crucial factor 
in determining whether that new knowledge would be transferred was the ability of the 
war managers to give consideration to reports which originated at the bottom of the 
command structure. 
 
At the regimental level, new knowledge gained from battlefield experiences resided with 
the officers or group of officers who compiled the after-action report.  However, the 
nature of casualties in the 1915 campaign, in which many experienced officers at the 
level of battalion command, company command and the battalion adjutant were killed or 
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wounded, meant that the officers who had planned and executed a battalion attack were 
often not able to record and pass on their experiences.  A good example of this is the 
case of the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, a part of 26 Brigade in the 9th (Scottish) Division 
during the Battle of Loos.  The battalion attacked the Hohenzollern Redoubt at 6.30am 
on 25 September with twenty officers and approximately 800 men.  Three hours later the 
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Gainsford was killed and the battalion adjutant 
wounded.  Command devolved onto Captain Bennitt who was wounded some minutes 
later.  As the four company commanders had been killed or wounded before or shortly 
after leaving the British trenches, a junior captain named Henderson took over command 
of the 7th Seaforths until he was killed on 27 September.  The battalion now came under 
the command of Major Pelham Burn, an officer who had not taken part in the attack.  As 
Burn’s knowledge of the battalion’s experiences during 25–27 September was second-
hand, it was left to a junior platoon commander, Lieutenant Wyndham-Green, to 
compile the after-action report as he was the only officer remaining with the battalion 
who had survived the three days’ fighting unscathed.91  While this was, undoubtedly, a 
sensible decision, it highlights the difficulty in obtaining a true picture of the battalion’s 
experiences.  As a platoon commander who had volunteered in September 1914, 
Wyndham-Green was an inexperienced officer who had not been in action before the 
battle.  Additionally, he had no input into the planning of the battalion’s actions on 25 
September and, as such, was not particularly well-placed to judge the actions of his 
battalion.  As a result, his after-action report is a factual record of what he witnessed 
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rather than a detailed analysis of the successes and failures of the battalion attack.  It was 
a similar story with the after-action report of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles after the Battle 
of Aubers Ridge where Captain A. J. Ross, who had not been permitted to join the attack 
as he only joined the battalion on the morning of the battle, was forced to consult 
surviving non-commissioned officers to provide a statement of operations as all twenty-
three officers who had attacked with the battalion were casualties by the close of 
operations.92 
 
Casualties among battalion officers affected the potential to create and collect data at a 
local level; the fewer casualties a battalion sustained in an offensive operation the larger 
pool of knowledge it could consolidate and transfer.  However, the degree to which 
battalion officer casualties had an effect on the learning process was affected by one 
crucial factor: input from higher up the chain of command.  As much as Wyndham-
Green’s report was a factual account of the battalion experience from his perspective, so 
were those provided by the other battalions of 26 Brigade.93  Indeed, among the seven 
officers who remained with the 5th Cameron Highlanders in the evening of 27 
September were the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron of Lochiel, the 
second in command and the battalion adjutant, all of whom had joined the attack.94  
Lochiel’s report to 20 Brigade headquarters was written on the same day as Wyndham-
Green’s and, content-wise, was of little difference; a factual rather than an analytical 
report.  The survival of the senior officers of the 5th Cameron Highlanders did not alter 
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the type of report sent to 26 Brigade.  The inexperienced battalions of 26 Brigade at the 
Battle of Loos adhered to a top-down system of knowledge-transfer in which they 
responded to limited brigade and divisional requests for information with facts rather 
than analysis.  This suggests that the consideration of newly-created data took place at a 
level higher than battalion command.  The impact of casualties on the learning process 
could be tempered by both time and initiative.  Following their recovery from wounds 
received at Loos, Captains Crichton and Dewar of the 5th Cameron Highlanders rejoined 
the battalion by the end of 1915, bringing with them knowledge of operations and 
increasing the battalion’s effectiveness.95  With regards to initiative, the orderly-sergeant 
of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles copied down a report dictated by the battalion adjutant as 
the latter was being sent to hospital wounded.96  This quick thinking meant that key 
lessons identified by a planner of the battalion’s operations were not lost from the wider 
unit learning process. 
 
While casualties among battalion officers affected the potential for learning from the 
bottom-up, casualties among officers at a higher level of command had a more wide-
ranging impact on the First Army’s organisational development.  Although the death of 
Brigadier-General Lowry Cole created an immediate command confusion among the 
battalions of 25 Brigade at Aubers Ridge in May, the overall impact of his death on the 
brigade learning process was minimal as he was replaced by an officer promoted from 
within the 25 Brigade structure and whose staff was able to draw up an accurate record 
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of the brigade’s experiences to pass on to the 8th Division headquarters for analysis.97  
Over the nineteen days of the Battle of Loos, three divisional commanders, Major-
General Capper of the 7th Division, Major-General Thesiger of the 9th Division and 
Major-General Wing of the 12th Division became casualties.  In each of these instances, 
and the capture of Brigadier-General Clarence Bruce of 27 Brigade, officers of the 
general staff were also killed or wounded alongside their divisional commanders.  
However, crucially, at no point were the divisional senior staff officer (GSO1) and the 
divisional commander rendered ineffective at the same time.  In the 9th Division, while 
Thesiger was killed on 27 September, his GSO1, Lieutenant-Colonel Hollond produced 
a thorough analysis of the division’s performance and sought to seek out lessons for 
future operations.98  Similarly, at 7th Division headquarters, Capper’s GSO1, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gathorne-Hardy took the initiative in issuing a letter calling for the 
brigade commanders and divisional specialists to ‘consider the late operations and report 
fully as to any lessons which you can deduce from them’.99  This highlights the 
importance of a unit or formation’s senior officers in the process of organisational 
development.  While the loss a member of the divisional war managers was a blow to 
operational planning consistency and leadership and represented a loss of potential 
knowledge in the same way as at battalion command, the efficiency of the wider 
divisional staff was a more telling factor in promoting the creation, acquisition and 
transfer of knowledge.  
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As Catignani demonstrated, ‘at any stage of the learning process, new knowledge can be 
lost or discarded’.100  At the battalion level the overwhelming infantry officer casualties 
in the 1915 campaign ensured that the maximum potential knowledge of operations and 
lessons learned which could be transferred was significantly diminished.  As the 
example of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles at Aubers Ridge demonstrates, in some cases no 
officers who could evaluate the effectiveness of battalion operations remained with their 
units to pass on knowledge.  While this could be tempered by the return of wounded 
officers and the capture of officers’ knowledge prior to medical evacuation, the loss of 
knowledge potential was heavily affected by battlefield casualties.  Inasmuch as Nolan 
has suggested that a battalion’s officers were its ‘gatekeepers of organisational culture’ 
with regards to tradition, history and standard practice, the survivors of an offensive 
action became the gatekeepers of knowledge management for the battalion at that 
point.101 In terms of tactical effectiveness, the crucial post-battle knowledge at the 
decision-making level resided with a battalion’s surviving officers.  However, input 
from further up the army’s hierarchy directly affected what those officers did with their 
newly acquired knowledge.  In an organisational structure which lacked a formal, 
standardised system for gathering and transmitting knowledge gained through 
experience, some units were content to submit narrative accounts rather than operational 
analyses.  While knowledge was created by front-line officers, mid-ranking officers at 
brigade and divisional headquarters retained more power in influencing how learning 
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occurred in their part of the organisation.  Indeed, divisional senior officers and their 
staff were key in the collection and transfer of knowledge, even when faced with the 
deaths of the commanding officer.  The informal and uneven system of data collection 
was spurred by the general staff at divisional level who then replaced the battalion 
officers as the gatekeepers of knowledge management. 
 
Knowledge-Transfer in the BEF Hierarchy 
While the tactical effectiveness of divisions was affected by their internal learning 
processes, it is important to recognise that the First Army existed as part of the wider 
British Expeditionary Force and was influenced by knowledge and input from outwith 
its own structure.  In the 1915 campaign this occurred in three ways.  First, the war 
managers of the First Army transmitted and received knowledge in a formal manner 
from British General Headquarters (GHQ).  This represents the traditional top-down 
command structure of the British Army in which information and orders are passed from 
senior to subordinate officers.  Second, the First Army could transfer information to and 
receive information from the Second and Third Armies, then also parts of the BEF in 
France and Flanders.  This level of knowledge-transfer is more akin to Foley’s ideas of 
‘horizontal military innovation’ albeit at the level of high command rather than 
individual front-line units.102  Finally, the war managers of the First Army could be 
affected from outwith the military hierarchy completely by the intervention of politicians 
and civilians on an informal basis.  This section will examine the extent to which these 
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three factors influenced the organisational development of the First Army in the 1915 
campaign. 
 
As the first section of this chapter demonstrated, in many ways British GHQ was content 
to stand back from the First Army’s operational planning in 1915.  Indeed Simon 
Robbins has shown that GHQ was a ‘hastily and imperfectly improvised’ institution 
which did not ‘function properly as the “brain” of the army’ during the 1915 
campaign.103  A contributing factor to this was the influence of the commanding officer, 
Sir John French, a soldier of ‘undisciplined intellect and mercurial personality’ whose 
strategic and tactical ideas remained firmly entrenched in a nineteenth-century ideal of 
warfare.104  French was assisted at GHQ by a war management team split into three 
sections: the Quartermaster-General’s branch which had responsibility for the supply of 
the army; the Adjutant-General’s branch with responsibility for the management of 
military personnel; and the General Staff whose duties involved the planning and 
implementation of offensive actions.105  The most influential of these divisions was the 
General Staff whose commander (the CGS) was the BEF’s senior administrator.  When 
Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson took over as CGS on 25 January 1915 he 
chose to alter the structure and personnel of GHQ to increase efficiency and spread the 
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overwhelming workload caused by the expansion of the army.106  In addition, Robertson 
brought a new, more forceful attitude to GHQ which was manifested in ‘a mixture of 
rigorous attention to detail leavened by creative strategic thinking’.107  His appointment 
was popular among the officers of the First Army.  Haig considered that in talking to 
Robertson ‘one gets a feeling of confidence that he will be thorough and practical in 
whatever plans he takes in hand’, while Rawlinson at IV Corps headquarters thought the 
appointment of Robertson ‘will be a vast improvement [which] augers well for the 
future’.108   
 
Knowledge was transferred and information was shared between GHQ and the First 
Army in three main ways.  First, formal communication by means of orders and written 
and verbal correspondence between the respective headquarters continued throughout 
the campaign.  While Haig retained significant freedom in planning offensive actions, 
GHQ was able to influence First Army’s plans by dictating the date, and in some cases 
location, of the First Army attacks.  Thus, the plans for the Aubers Ridge offensive in 
May were postponed by GHQ after consideration of the French inability to register their 
artillery on the German trenches; those for Givenchy in June were postponed twice to 
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conform with French attacks; and GHQ ordered the First Army to concentrate their 
offensive efforts south of the La Bassee Canal following the failure of the Festubert 
offensive.109  The role of GHQ in determining the parameters of offensive action is an 
important factor when constructing the Organisational Development Model, discussed 
further in chapter two, which demonstrates how the First Army learned in the 1915 
campaign. 
 
Second, information was shared between GHQ and First Army in person through formal 
visits and conferences and informal lunches and dinners.  Analysis of Haig’s diary 
shows the personal interactions of French, Haig and Robertson as the 1915 campaign 
progressed.  Over the course of Haig’s tenure as the commander of the First Army there 
were eighty-eight instances when the war managers of the First Army met with those 
from GHQ.110  The majority of the meetings happened in the first five months of the 
campaign with April and May 1915 seeing seventeen meetings between French and 
Haig alone, as they grappled with the planning of the Aubers Ridge and Festubert 
offensives.  The meetings between the two men tailed off dramatically from June 
onwards, save for a peak in September during the planning of the Loos offensive.  
Conferences including all three senior war managers peaked in March, May and 
September and reflect their use as a forum for the discussion of impending operations.  
In February, March, June, October and November, Haig spent more time in meetings 
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with Robertson than with Sir John French.  This reflects the changing dynamic between 
First Army and GHQ over the course of the 1915 campaign.  Haig’s relationship with 
French began to sour in late-March when Haig returned to First Army headquarters 
following a period of leave in England.  He found that GHQ had ordered Sir Richard 
Butler, Haig’s chief of staff, to amend the official despatch on the battle of Neuve 
Chapelle, substituting French’s name for Haig’s ‘so the report now reads as if the action 
was taken on the orders of GHQ rather than First Army’.111  In private Haig thought that 
‘the whole thing is so childish...it seems unmanly to wish to take the credit which really 
belongs to others!’.112   
 
Figure 1.6: Monthly Meetings between First Army and GHQ War Managers, 1915 
 
Source: NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100-103, Typescript Diary, 26 December 1914–21 December 1915.   
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Relations deteriorated further with the controversy surrounding the handling of the 
reserve XI Corps during the Battle of Loos.  Confusion over whether command of the 
corps resided with GHQ or First Army meant that the 21st and 24th Divisions did not 
manage to exploit the initial break-in to the German positions; when they eventually 
arrived on the battlefield on 26 September, they were overwhelmed by the reinforced 
German defences and the chance of a breakthrough was lost.113  The argument which 
resulted increased a simmering tension between the two men, and Haig concluded that 
French was ‘incapable of realising the nature of the fighting which has been going 
on’.114  Robertson, himself sidelined by French in favour of the counsel of Sir Henry 
Wilson, became increasingly frustrated with French’s command style which ‘chopped 
and changed every day and was quite hopeless’.115  Following the Battle of Loos, 
communication between GHQ and First Army increasingly excluded Sir John French, as 
Haig and Robertson both lobbied for French’s removal from the position of commander-
in-chief.  As Figure 1.5 shows, Haig and French met only once in October and once in 
November before Haig succeeded French as commander-in-chief and Robertson was 
promoted to Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London. 
 
The third means of information sharing between GHQ and First Army can be described 
as informal ‘back-channel’ communication in which officers acted outwith the formal 
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command structure.  As Sir John French’s position at GHQ became more isolated from 
late-August onwards, Robertson in particular used back-channel communication to pass 
information to the First Army.  On 4 September, Robertson arrived at First Army 
headquarters to let Haig know ‘very secretly and at once’ that the Loos offensive had 
been postponed for another ten days, rather than wait for Sir John French to 
communicate the same information.116  Ten days later, at GHQ, Robertson provided 
Haig with information regarding discussions from the Inter-Allied conference at 
Chantilly on 14 September.  As Haig recorded, ‘the information I now got from the CGS 
was given to me privately and he begged me not to mention to the CinC that he had 
discussed the matter at all!’.117  Nor was Robertson the only member of GHQ staff who 
used back-channel communication; on 31 October, Colonel Frederick Maurice, 
Robertson’s head of operations, wrote a ‘personal and secret’ letter to Haig regarding 
French’s discussions on the despatch of troops to the Balkans.118  In this manner, GHQ 
staff circumvented their commander-in-chief and shared information with the First 
Army which was not shared with the Second and Third Armies.  In a similar fashion, 
Haig learned of French’s removal from command informally from Robertson, rather 
than from the War Office or from French himself.119  In the most part, information 
shared between GHQ and First Army existed at the political and strategic levels with 
commentary on operations at a minimum save for wishes of luck and expressions of 
thanks.  As such, the top-down method of information sharing had little impact on the 
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organisational development of the First Army.  However, as this section has shown, 
GHQ was able to influence the operational practices of the First Army in selecting the 
time and place of offensive actions.  High-level communication breakdowns culminated 
in the senior war managers seeking back-channel rather than formal communication 
towards the end of the campaign, as the war managers jostled for position for the 1916 
campaign. 
 
Analysis of Haig’s personal diary and the First Army war diary also reveals that 
communication between the different armies of the BEF was conspicuously absent 
throughout the 1915 campaign.120  Haig met with Smith-Dorrien of the Second Army 
three times between the formation of the First Army on 25 December 1914 and 11 
January 1915, and on each occasion the main topic for discussion was the employment 
of Kitchener’s new armies, then training in Britain but soon expected as 
reinforcements.121  Thereafter, Haig met with Smith-Dorrien only once more, 
immediately prior to the opening of the Neuve Chapelle offensive.  Haig shared Sir John 
French’s poor opinion of the troops of the Second Army, and described them as having 
‘no initiative or real offensive spirit’.122  His opinion was shaped by a professional 
rivalry but also from experience; Kitchener selected Haig to inspect the Second Army in 
July to ensure their defensive arrangements were satisfactory – they were not, according 
                                                 
120 On 4 October 1914, Smith-Dorrien sent Haig ‘a few salient lessons of the war’.  There is no 
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to Haig.123  There appear to have been no attempts by either the First Army to learn from 
the defensive efforts of the Second Army at Ypres or, conversely, by the Second Army 
to learn from the multitude of offensive actions undertaken by the First Army in the 
campaign.  However, once Haig was installed as commander-in-chief in late December 
1915, weekly conferences between the First, Second and Third Army commanders and 
their staff were instituted to ‘ensure mutual understanding and closer touch’.124  These 
conferences established a forum for high-level horizontal learning which had been 
absent in the 1915 campaign.  Meetings in early-1916 focussed on the necessity for the 
uniformity of training, the supply of high-quality equipment to all parts of the BEF and 
the dissemination of lessons from recent fighting at Ypres.125  The idea that information 
should be shared at army commander level was Haig’s and was one which he could only 
implement when in command of the BEF.  The need for a standardisation of knowledge 
and its transfer throughout the wider organisation seems to have been a key lesson that 
Haig learned in war management from his experiences in the 1915 campaign. 
 
While information was shared between GHQ and First Army both formally and 
informally, and there was little information shared between the armies, there was a third 
way in which knowledge-transfer in the First Army was affected from outside its own 
hierarchy.  Chief among Haig’s external correspondents was the King.  During a visit to 
London in July 1915, Haig was invited to Buckingham Palace to give his opinion on the 
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tension between Sir John French and Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War.  
Haig noted that the King hoped correspondence could be continued ‘and said that no-one 
except he and W[igram, the King’s private secretary] would know what I had written’.126  
It was a correspondence Haig would cultivate as the campaign developed.  In October, 
Robertson urged Haig to ‘write to friends in government’ to ensure that troops meant for 
the western front were not diverted to the Balkans.127  While Haig stated that he ‘hate[d] 
intriguing in such a way’, he did agree to raise the topic with the King with whom he 
dined that evening.128  Sir John French was acutely aware of Haig’s cordial relations 
with the British political establishment and was ‘evidently pleased’ when Haig informed 
him that he [Haig] ‘had seen no one of the Official world’ during a recent trip to 
London.129  Similarly, French warned Haig not to speak to Lord Kitchener about 
forthcoming operations during the latter’s visit to the front in August.130  Besides the 
King, Kitchener and Asquith, Haig also hosted Lord Esher, Viscount Haldane and 
members of Lloyd George’s ammunitions committee at First Army headquarters.  It is 
clear that Haig was particularly politically well-connected and he used those connections 
to his advantage throughout the 1915 campaign.  However, information largely flowed 
from First Army to other interested parties rather than their patronage influencing the 
operations of the First Army directly.   
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This section has demonstrated the extent to which the First Army was affected from 
outwith its own structure.  It has shown that the largest input came from GHQ which 
was able to influence the planning of First Army’s offensive actions by selecting the 
time and place of attacks to coordinate British and French battle plans.  Communication 
between GHQ and First Army took three forms: the traditional transfer of knowledge 
through the issue of formal operational orders, normally of a general nature, the 
organisation of formal conferences and visits and informal lunches and dinners which 
provided platforms for the discussion of policy and plans; and informal back-channel 
communication which provided a useful way of circumventing formal command 
structures.  As the campaign progressed, and the relationships between Haig and 
Robertson on one hand and Sir John French on the other deteriorated, face-to-face 
communication between GHQ and First Army lessened and back-channel information 
sharing increased.  Secondly, this section has demonstrated that no attempts were made 
to transfer knowledge or share information between the First, Second and Third Armies 
within the BEF structure in the 1915 campaign.  This style of high-level horizontal 
learning only began with Haig’s elevation to commander-in-chief in December 1915.  In 
the third place, the section has shown how actors from outside the military hierarchy 
communicated with First Army.  External influence and the transfer of knowledge from 
outside the First Army hierarchy occurred at the political and strategic levels and while 
this had important implications for the overall running of the BEF, it had little real 
impact on the organisational development of the First Army, in terms of its operational 






The Anglo-French Framework for Knowledge-Transfer 
Studies of the relationship between the British and French war management hierarchies 
in 1915 tend to focus on political and strategic decision-making regarding the opening of 
alternative fronts in Salonika and Gallipoli, and their influence on the timing of 
offensives on the western front.131  Despite the special instructions issued to Sir John 
French upon his departure from Britain in August 1914, which stated that the BEF was 
to ‘support, and cooperate with, the French Army against our common enemies’, the 
commander of the BEF tried to retain as much strategic independence from the French 
as his orders allowed.132  The early part of the 1915 campaign was characterised by 
confusion over French strategic plans.  Sir William Robertson, writing shortly after the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March, was aware that the French were planning offensive 
actions but noted that the British had been given ‘no clear idea as to the scope of the 
operations, nor of the general strategic conception upon which they are based’.133  
Problems at the strategic level were compounded by entrenched views of the military 
capabilities of the other.  The French high command thought that the British were 
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‘lacking imagination, creatures of habit, slow to change [and] suspicious of all things 
foreign’, whereas the British looked down on the French due to their tendency to select 
officers from the middle rather than upper classes.134  However, despite these 
unfavourable views, British war managers acknowledged early in the 1915 campaign 
that the best military results could only be achieved by the British and French armies 
working in close cooperation.135 
 
Elements of that cooperation can be viewed in terms of learning and knowledge-transfer.  
Communication between the British First Army and the French Tenth Army on their 
flank occurred in two main ways.  First, knowledge was passed formally between high-
level units through conferences and meetings; and second, knowledge was passed 
informally through visits, tours of trenches, and lunches.  At a formal level, First Army 
was one step removed from the information sharing process.  The passing of information 
between British GHQ and the French Grand Quartier General (CQG) was coordinated 
by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson and Colonel Victor Huguet, the heads of the 
respective missions at CQG and GHQ, respectively.  Haig had a dislike of both men, 
describing Wilson as ‘the wicked intriguer’, who was inclined to side with the French 
during disputes, and he replaced Huguet when he took command of the BEF in 
December.136  Perhaps as a result of this discord, neither Haig, nor any other First Army 
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war manager was present at formal Allied conferences in March, July, September or 
December.  Rather, following a meeting with the French high command, Sir John 
French personally briefed Haig on proceedings.  While this could be viewed as 
following the correct chain of command, by shutting out Haig the Allied conferences 
lost the input of an operational planner with considerable experience of the strategic 
conditions of the war, especially towards the end of the campaign.  With Haig and the 
rest of the First Army staff excluded from the formal knowledge-transfer forum, the 
potential for learning through the experiences of others was severely limited. 
 
To make up for this deficiency in the formal knowledge-transfer framework, the Allies 
increasingly used informal methods of communication to increase learning potential.  In 
the planning phase of the Neuve Chapelle battle in late February, Haig liaised personally 
with General de Maud’huy, the commander of the French Tenth Army, positioned to the 
immediate south of the British First Army.137  When the two men met, Haig was 
‘warmly received’ with de Maud’huy commenting that the two ‘were old friends’.138  As 
a result of the meeting with de Maud’huy, Haig managed to secure support of the Tenth 
Army’s artillery to protect the flank of the British attack at Neuve Chapelle.  One factor 
greatly aided Haig’s relationship with the French officers – his command of the French 
language.  While Sir John French was notoriously bad at conversing in French and Foch 
and Weygand, his chief of staff, could not speak English, Haig proved remarkably 
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proficient in communicating with French officers in their own language.139  This was 
true to the extent that Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, a British staff officer attached to CQG, 
recalled that Haig was able to discuss things with the French first hand without anyone 
else present to assist with translation; John Charteris, Haig’s chief of intelligence, went 
as far as to suggest that Haig could converse better in French than he could in English.140  
Haig realised that one of the keys to operational success was clear communication with 
the French.  From July 1915 Haig began to develop his skills in the French language 
through daily, two-hour lessons with his liaison officer, Captain Gemeau; a practice 
which continued into Haig’s tenure as commander-in-chief.141  De Maud’huy’s 
successor as commander of the Tenth Army was General Victor d’Urbal.  He too was 
impressed by Haig’s attitude towards the French and expressed gratitude that Haig chose 
to discuss matters of cooperation with him direct rather than to involve GHQ and 
CQG.142  The ties between the two armies were solidified in May when the French were 
forced to postpone their attack on the Vimy Ridge, which was to be coordinated with the 
British battle at Aubers Ridge.  In the face of Sir John French’s anger on the matter, 
Haig backed d’Urbal’s standpoint and diffused a tense situation.143   
 
As a result of the near success of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the level of informal 
communication between Haig and the French increased.  As early as a week after the 
battle, Haig heard that the French general staff were ‘much impressed’ by the First 
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Army’s methods of attack in breaking in to the Neuve Chapelle defences.144  The 
following month, Marshal Foch, commander of the French Northern Army Group, and 
General Weygand visited Haig to learn first hand the methods First Army had used in 
the attack and what lessons they had subsequently drawn from it.  Haig produced a 
written report which was forwarded to Marshal Joffre who, in turn, disseminated it to 
each of his corps commanders.145  The lessons which the French learned from Haig were 
applied practically in the opening phase of the Second Battle of Artois (9–11 May) and 
were also included in French Army doctrine through the drafting and dissemination of a 
paper known informally as ‘Note 5779’.146  This document contained early drafts of key 
concepts which would shape French offensive policy not only for the rest of 1915 but 
also for subsequent campaigns.  The conclusions drawn by Marshal Petain from the 
Second Battle of Artois – and enshrined in Note 5779 – highlighted that a breakthrough 
was possible given sufficient preparation and a predominance of artillery, which echoed 
the conclusions of the British First Army war managers based on their experience of 
Neuve Chapelle.147  Indeed, Petain’s report specifically mentioned that the British 
experience at Neuve Chapelle provided lessons of how a trench-to-trench attack would 
unfold.  As both Krause and Greenhalgh have shown, in the 1915 campaign the French 
were keen to learn lessons quickly at both the operational and tactical levels.148  This is a 
key example of information sharing and knowledge-transfer affecting the organisational 
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development of the French Army.  As a result of the lack of a formal system for Inter-
Allied knowledge-transfer, French commanders sought out the most recent information, 
considered it, disseminated it, incorporated it into a battle plan and then enshrined it into 
official doctrine.   
 
Despite the successes of the information sharing between Haig, Foch and Joffre in April, 
the British made no attempt to replicate the endeavour nor to actively seek out French 
advice from their experiences.  On 22 July, Joffre asked that Haig spend the day with 
French staff officers at CQG, suggesting that he was keen to cultivate the relationship.  
Haig acknowledged that he needed Sir John French’s approval for such a visit and, as no 
visit occurred, it is reasonable to assume that permission was denied.  While this could 
have been a manifestation of Sir John’s determination to maintain strategic 
independence as per his orders of August 1914, by denying information sharing between 
the allies he reduced the potential for reciprocal learning.  Despite this, elements of 
French lessons learned were passed to the British high command.  In June 1915, GHQ 
published translations of French doctrinal documents in the form of both a version of 
Note 5779 from 16 April and an amended version from 20 May.149  However, while the 
intended audience of this document and the extent to which it was disseminated 
throughout the BEF cannot be ascertained, there are similarities between the lessons 
drawn from it and changes in Haig’s thoughts on future operations.  The 20 May 
amended version of Note 5779 (published by GHQ as SS.23) alluded to the necessity of 
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‘simultaneous and coordinated attacks, delivered on a broad front’.150  In a meeting with 
Robertson on 18 June, Haig used the same terminology for the first time and suggested 
that Robertson ‘did not seem to understand the necessity for attacking on a broad front in 
order to make sure of breaking through’.151  By the first week of July, Haig’s chief of 
staff, Major-General Sir Richard Butler, had drafted a paper entitled ‘Memorandum on 
the Strength of Force required for an Attack on a Front of 25 miles’ which anticipated 
making an attack on a scale far larger than anything the BEF had previously 
undertaken.152  The subsequent Battle of Loos in September 1915 saw the BEF adopt 
these principles and attack on a wider front as part of a larger allied action.  Inter-Allied 
knowledge-transfer was a largely informal process, which was driven by the desire of 
French high command to learn from the British experience.  This and the subsequent 
incorporation of knowledge into both French and then British strategic thinking 
illustrates that horizontal learning was not restricted to front line units as suggested by 
Foley but also occurred in a meaningful way at higher levels of the war management 
hierarchy and between national militaries within a wider alliance. 
 
Conclusion 
In examining the formation and development of the First Army over the course of the 
1915 campaign, this chapter has highlighted three areas which affected the First Army’s 
organisational development: institutional structure, organisational memory, and the use 
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of formal and informal knowledge-transfer frameworks.  The study of the creation of the 
First Army supports Martinez-Leon and Martinez-Garcia’s conclusions that an 
organisation’s structure plays an important role in its learning process.  The insertion of 
a new layer of management into the existing BEF hierarchy actively impeded the 
organisational development of the First Army by failing to consider who should take 
responsibility for the army’s professional development and by failing to establish a 
formal system for knowledge capture.  These problems were exacerbated by the decision 
to rotate divisions through different corps.  When lessons were identified, the movement 
of divisions from their place in the structure meant that the lessons they had identified 
were carried with them and were lost to the higher formation.  This put the onus on 
divisions to consider their own experiences outside the wider First Army structure and 
assume the role of ad hoc learning organisations.  The failure to establish a formal 
framework for creating, collating and disseminating new knowledge had important 
implications for the First Army’s organisational memory.  This chapter has 
demonstrated that the potential to create new knowledge resided with the officers who 
survived a particular battle and were tasked with the creation of after-action and lessons-
learned reports.  In several cases the casualty rate in individual battalions was so high 
that no officers remained who were able to consider their experiences and share their 
conclusions.  Catignani’s study of the British Army in the Helmand Campaign in 
Afghanistan found that at any stage of the learning process new knowledge can be lost.  
This chapter has shown that the loss of knowledge played an important role in the 
organisational development of the First Army in 1915 not only in terms of the changes 
in organisational structure but also through the challenges of managing that knowledge 
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within the army’s institutional memory.  Indeed, the high casualties suffered by the First 
Army increased the difficulties in turning individual knowledge into institutional 
knowledge by reducing the maximum potential to create new knowledge.   
 
In lieu of a formal framework for data capture and information sharing the war managers 
of the First Army increasingly turned to a variety of informal methods for knowledge-
transfer.  The 1915 campaign was characterised by political gamesmanship and poor 
communication within the BEF.  Throughout the campaign Sir John French was 
removed from much of the operational planning and was content with setting the 
parameters for offensive action in terms of time and place of attack.  When constructing 
a model of how the First Army developed over the campaign instruction from GHQ 
represents an important short-term input to the First Army’s battle planning process.153  
Inasmuch as there was no formal system for creating and collecting new data in the 
BEF, there was no formal attempt to transfer knowledge between the other British 
armies on the western front until Haig became Commander-in-Chief in December 1915.  
By then, Haig appeared to have realised, at least in part, the benefits of information 
sharing between army commanders, although his creation of formal weekly knowledge-
transfer meetings could be seen as being designed to keep a tighter control on his 
subordinates.  At the level of inter-allied knowledge-transfer, the exclusion of the First 
Army war managers from the information sharing process encouraged more informal  
methods of knowledge-transfer.  Indeed, the visits of French general and staff officers to 
First Army headquarters to study Haig’s battle planning methodology and to learn from 
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his experiences of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle marked the origin of their attempts to 
learn from the British experience.  That the French quickly published and disseminated 
these lessons indicates that they understood that the institutionalisation was a crucial part 
of organisational learning.  The British also appear to have realised this, albeit belatedly 
and partially, and only sought to publish their own version of documents once they had 
been received back from the French.154  However, the example of the British and French 
war managers sharing information extends the horizontal learning concept to include not 
only the low-level front line units identified by Foley for the German Army, but also 
senior Allied war managers who sought to learn from each other’s experiences.  
Additionally, while Foley’s idea of horizontal learning was limited to a formal 
knowledge exchange system, this chapter has demonstrated that horizontal learning also 
occurred on an informal basis. 
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Organisational Development at the Operational Level 
 
One would think our commanders had enough experience now to know what is 
practicable and what is not, but if they do know this, they do no act on their knowledge.1 
      Major-General Sir Henry d’Urban Keary 
 
Learning in large institutions, such as national armed forces, takes place at a number of 
different levels.  Millett, Murray and Watman identified four levels of military activity: 
political, strategic, operational and tactical.2  The political level involves the cooperation 
of the military and civilian elites in obtaining financial, manpower and munitions 
resources and converting them into military capabilities and the strategic level sees the 
use of national militaries to achieve the goals defined by the political leadership.3  This 
thesis follows the example set by Jonathan Boff’s study of the British Third Army in the 
Hundred Days campaign of 1918 in not addressing the grand political and strategic 
questions on the conduct of the Great War.4  Rather, this thesis contends that analysis of 
the organisational development of the First Army is best served by studying institutional 
change at the operational and tactical levels.  This chapter examines how the First Army 
learned from its experiences at the operational level of war.  Delineating the various 
levels of war is not a straightforward matter: Millett, Murray and Watman concluded 
that the four categories overlap; and Milan Vego asserted that the boundaries between 
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the levels of war are not constant inasmuch as the relationship between them depends on 
the circumstances of a particular war.5  However, in broad terms, the operational level of 
war sees available resources used to attain strategic goals through the analysis, planning 
and conduct of offensive operations in a specific campaign.6  In terms of the army 
hierarchical structure, the split between the operational and tactical levels of war occurs 
between the levels of corps and divisional command.7  Andy Simpson asserted that for 
the soldiers of the Great War the operational level of war normally referred to corps or 
army-level operations.8  This thesis follows the broad acceptance that the operational 
level of war concerns large-unit operations undertaken by corps and armies, whereas 
smaller actions – such as the ‘Affair at Cuinchy’ in February 1915 in which the British 
2nd Division recovered ground lost the previous month – are better termed ‘tactical 
actions’. 
 
Over the course of the 1915 campaign the First Army planned and conducted five large 
offensive operations: Neuve Chapelle in March, Aubers Ridge and Festubert in May, 
Givenchy in June, and finally Loos in September and October.  Analysis of these 
operations forms the basis of this chapter.  It focuses on the activities of the headquarters 
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of the First Army headquarters and the I, IV and Indian Corps which were responsible 
for planning and undertaking offensive operations in the campaign.9  The chapter 
addresses two main questions.  First, what factors shaped the war managers’ decision-
making processes in the 1915 campaign?  Second, what methods did they use for data 
creation and collection and how did this change over the course of the campaign?  
Finally, this chapter presents the first three layers of the Organisational Development 
Model for the operational level of war and highlights how the First Army’s senior war 
managers – at corps and army level – learned in the campaign.  In terms of structure, the 
chapter first evaluates the ‘organisational learning inputs’, which formed the base for 
subsequent operational activity before considering how learning occurred during the 
campaign. 
 
Identifying Organisational Learning Inputs 
Serena’s work on US military adaptation in Iraq has shown that ‘organisational inputs 
help shape how the army conducts operations in pursuit of its institutional missions and 
goals’.10  For the British First Army in the 1915 campaign five linked inputs can be 
identified.  Taken together these represent the first stage in the Organisational 
Development Model.  These inputs are both institutional and personal in nature and 
occur in the long, medium and short term.  The first two inputs recognise that for the 
British war managers the processes of organisational and individual learning did not 
                                                 
9 During the Battle of Loos the III and XI Corps were also involved in offensive actions, however 
their activities were limited to a diversionary attack on 25 September and a follow-up attack on 
26 September, respectively. 
10 Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation, 44. 
123 
 
begin with the 1915 campaign on the western front.  Rather, their decision-making was 
based on an accumulation of knowledge which was split into that gained through formal 
instruction and knowledge gained through consideration of their own experiences of 
warfare both in the medium-term prior to the Great War and also in the short-term as the 
conflict progressed.  The third and fourth inputs are linked, being the prevailing 
institutional ethos of the British Army and the existing doctrine which set the parameters 
for offensive operations.  The final input to the Organisational Development Model for 
the First Army is the short-term immediate strategic conditions of battle as set by GHQ, 
both in terms of the provision of resources and by determining the date and location of 
offensive actions. 
 
The war managers’ existing knowledge base can be said to constitute the platform upon 
which their future learning was built.  On a formal level, the war managers’ ability to 
adapt were influenced by knowledge gained through instruction during their initial 
officer training at either Sandhurst or Woolwich, and then, for some, from their 
experiences of the staff college at Camberley.  From 1892, the staff college became a 
‘school of thought’ in which the Professor of Military Art and History, Colonel G.F.R. 
Henderson sought to use military history as a means through which future staff officers 
could draw ‘valuable lessons on every aspect of tactics and strategy’.11  During 
Henderson’s tenure at the staff college he focussed on teaching the lessons of the 
American Civil War, in particular the strategy of Stonewall Jackson, and concluded that 
                                                 
11 Field Marshal Lord Roberts, ‘Memoir’ in Neill Malcolm (ed.), The Science of War: A Collection 




that war had demonstrated that ‘a superiority of fire...decides the conflict’.12  However, 
it has been suggested that officers learned the wrong lessons from Henderson’s 
teachings, becoming ‘captivated by the romantic elan’ of Jackson’s campaigns rather 
than learning the tactical lessons of the increase in firepower.13  Henderson’s teachings 
left a lasting impression on Haig, who graduated from the staff college in 1898 with a 
belief that the key to modern warfare was the decisive defeat of the main enemy army.14  
The continued importance of the early professional eduction of the war managers was 
demonstrated at a conference at First Army headquarters on 6 September 1915, when 
Haig noted that the planning process for the Battle of Loos was based on the ‘principles 
which were taught by the late Colonel Henderson at Camberley’.15  By the start of the 
1915 campaign, the officers who occupied the senior war management positions in the 
First Army, with the exception of Sir James Willcocks of the Indian Corps, were all 
graduates of the British staff college.  The junior staff officers in 1915 - brigade majors 
and staff captains - were usually graduates, either of Camberley or of the new staff 
college in Quetta.  Indeed, at the end of the 1914 campaign some 93% of the members of 
the British General Staff ‘G’ Branch, who had responsibility for offensive planning, 
were graduates of one of the staff colleges; by the end of the 1915 campaign the number 
                                                 
12 G. F. R. Henderson, ‘Tactics of the Three Arms Combined’, in Neil Malcolm (ed.), The Science 
of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures 1891-1903, by the late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson 
(London, 1912), 71. 
13 Keith Simpson, ‘Capper and the Offensive Spirit’, Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute 118.2 (June 1973), 52. 
14 Douglas Scott (ed.), The Preparatory Prologue: Douglas Haig, - Diaries and Letters 1861–
1914 (Barnsley,  2006), 60; De Groot, Douglas Haig, 50-1. 
15 TNA, WO95/711, IV Corps General Staff War Diary, ‘Notes on First Army Conference on 
Monday, 6th September 1915’.  This document is also found in the private papers of Major-
General Sir Richard Butler, the chief of staff of the First Army in 1915.  See IWM, Private Papers 
of Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, Doc.14150, I/1.   
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had fallen to 71% as the pool of trained staff officers was eroded by war service.16  
While over the course of the Great War the number of officers who had passed the staff 
college course diminished significantly, in the 1915 campaign the knowledge gained 
through formal instruction remained an important influence in planning offensive 
actions. 
 
The second form of knowledge with which the war managers began the 1915 campaign 
was knowledge gained through consideration of their own professional experiences.  
This can be broken down into two sections: knowledge gained in the campaigns before 
the war and knowledge gained through fighting in 1914.  In the fifty years prior to the 
Great War the British Army was largely employed in ‘imperial policing duties’ which 
often involved the fighting of ‘small wars’ against a technologically inferior enemy.17  
The fighting of these wars represented the war managers’ only practical experience of 
war prior to 1914: of the war managers who crossed to France in August 1914, 88% had 
seen active service in one of more of Britain’s small wars.18  While 69% had seen 
service in the Boer War, 53% had also gained experience in fighting colonial wars 
across Asia and Africa in the late-nineteenth century.19  The Boer War had proven to be 
a catalyst for change in the British Army by demonstrating the challenges in attacking a 
                                                 
16 Paul Martin Harris, ‘The men who planned the war: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on 
the Western Front, 1914–1918’, unpublished PhD thesis, King’s College London (2014), 199. 
17 Nolan, Military Leadership, 45; Charles Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice 
(Lincoln, 1996). 
18 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, Appendix 9, 209. 
19 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, Appendix 9, 209. 
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well-armed and tactically astute enemy across the fire-swept zone of battle.20  It 
highlighted that the initiative in battle had passed to those who stood on the defensive, 
protecting their troops and forcing the enemy to attack them over open ground.  
Establishing a superior base of firepower from machine-guns, artillery and well-aimed 
rifle fire became the dominating principles, with the bayonet rendered largely obsolete.21  
This meant that for the British war managers successful future offensives would involve 
the concentration of troops against the weakest point of the enemy position from which 
‘long and exhausting’ attacks in the form of ‘methodical progression from point to point, 
each successive advance being deliberately prepared and executed’.22  The main lesson 
taken from the Boer War, then, was that fire-power had become the decisive factor in 
battle. 
 
While this lesson of war was identified, or rather remembered, by Sir William Robertson 
in February 1915, events between the Boer War and Great War caused it to be forgotten.  
The battles of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) demonstrated that victory could still 
be achieved through frontal bayonet attacks on prepared positions, albeit at the cost of 
extraordinarily high casualties, as long as the troops were imbibed with the spirit of the 
offensive and displayed strong moral qualities.23  Some British observers reported that 
the Russians lost the war despite having the advantage in terms of number of soldiers 
and quality of artillery and concluded that offensive elan was the key to operational 
                                                 
20 Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902–1914 
(Norman, OK, 2013), 23. 
21 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-power, 47; Simpson, ‘Capper and the Offensive Spirit’, 52. 
22 Simpson, ‘Capper and the Offensive Spirit’, 52. 
23 Simpson, ‘Capper and the Offensive Spirit’, 51, 53. 
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success.24  However, more astute commentators, typically from the British Army’s 
artillery and engineering corps maintained a focus on the importance of a firepower 
advantage and identified alternative lessons such as the need to increase the number of 
howitzers, machine-guns, mortars and grenades, and suggested that alternative methods 
of offensive action, such as night attacks, should be incorporated into British operational 
thinking and training.25  In practice, the former position dominated.  Speaking at the 
annual staff college conference in 1910, the then Director of Staff Duties Brigadier-
General Launcelot Kiggell, commented that ‘everyone admits’ that firepower was not 
the decisive factor in battle and asserted that ‘victory is now won actually by the 
bayonet, or by the fear of it’.26  The practical experience of the Boer War and the 
theoretical experience of the Russo-Japanese War created the base of knowledge with 
which the British war managers went to war in 1914.  
 
The outbreak of the Great War interrupted the wider institutional learning process which 
had been gaining momentum in the British Army in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries as a result of its participation in imperial small wars.27  Despite this, 
the war managers were quick to react to the challenges of a continental war, modifying 
tactics and readily incorporating new technology to improve the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
24 Philip Towle, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and British Military Thought’, Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute 116 (December 1971), 65. 
25 Towle, ‘Russo-Japanese War’, 65.   
26 Launcelot Kiggell, quoted in Tim Travers, ‘The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in 
British Military Thought, 1870–1915’, Journal of Contemporary History 13 (1978), 531. 
27 Nolan, Military Leadership, 45-6. 
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BEF.28  Brigadier-General Henry Horne, the artillery commander (CRA) of I Corps 
noted in 1914 how the BEF achieved ‘good results’ in using observers in aeroplanes to 
improve ‘the efficiency of our artillery’ and to ‘compensate for the superiority in 
armaments of the Germans’.29  Horne took the lead in seeking to learn lessons from the 
opening campaign, concluding as early as September 1914 that ‘this war is really an 
artillery war’.30  While this stance is perhaps unsurprising given Horne’s background as 
an artilleryman it does demonstrate a willingness to engage with his experiences, 
identify lessons and incorporate them into operational planning.  At a lower level of 
command, the experiences of Major G. V. Horden, GSO2 of the 8th Division, led him to 
suggest, in January 1915, that ‘to attack the line by a general advance in force along the 
whole front had been proven by previous experience to be a method to be avoided if 
possible’.31  Horden’s assessment, while astute, was not adopted as standard practice by 
the formation’s war managers.  Elements of the Indian Corps sought to utilise their 
‘north-west frontier training’ to conduct small localised attacks aimed at infiltrating the 
German lines, a tactic more commonly associated with the German Army in the post-
Somme period or the British in the Hundred Days campaign in 1918.32  Attempts were 
also made to consolidate and disseminate the lessons learned from the 1914 campaign, 
even as they were occurring.  A series of pamphlets entitled Notes from the Front was 
                                                 
28 Nikolas Gardner, The Beginning of the Learning Curve: British Officers and the Advent of 
Trench Warfare, September–October 1914 (Salford, 2003), 1. 
29 IWM, Horne Papers, Doc.12468, Henry Horne, ‘Notes on Artillery during the attacks of 13th 
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Generalship during the Great War, 65-6. 
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31 TNA, WO95/707, IV Corps General Staff War Diary, Major G. V. Horden, ‘Memorandum on 
the Attack of Neuve Chapelle’, 23 January 1915. 
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produced by GHQ from November 1914.33  The first of these informal publications, 
written by ‘a General Officer at the front’ and augmented with the comments of various 
contributors of different ranks, emphasised the necessity to screen defensive positions 
from the enemy’s artillery, the concealment of important positions from the enemy’s 
aircraft, and cooperation between British ground and air forces.34  However, those 
drafting the ‘Notes’ still retained elements of pre-war thinking in late-1914, through the 
passing on of advice on the most effective means to cross rivers, a skill which was 
rendered obsolete from November 1914 with the onset of trench warfare.  For Haig, as 
the general officer commanding the I Corps, the experiences of the 1914 campaign were 
mixed.  While his performance in the retreat from Mons was subject to some scrutiny, 
his leadership during the First Battle of Ypres was considered to have been instrumental 
in saving the position.35  However, in considering his own experiences of the 1914 
campaign, Haig concluded that ‘there seems to be nothing new to be learnt, only [to] pay 
attention to [the] old principles’ of war.36  Those principles paid more attention to the 
British army’s institutional ethos and operational doctrine than to practical lessons 
drawn from the opening campaign of the conflict. 
 
                                                 
33 IWM, GHQ, CDS.2 - Notes from the Front - Part 1, November 1914; IWM, GHQ, CDS.3 - 
Notes from the Front - Part 2, December 1914; IWM, GHQ, CDS.4 - Notes from the Front - Part 
3, January 1915. 
34 IWM GHQ, Notes from the Front - Part 1, November 1914. 
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Force in 1914 (Wesport, 2003). 
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Institutional ethos represents the third input to the first stage of the Organisational 
Development Model.  Ethos can be described the prevailing character of the British 
Army, through which the institution’s members interpreted the nature of the war, 
identified problems and posed solutions, and implemented change.37  In general terms, 
the ethos of the British war managers was manifested through a sense of fair play, 
gentlemanly conduct, obedience, loyalty, and self-sacrifice.38  For Tim Travers, the 
ethos of the British Army shaped the paradigm of war in which the war managers 
operated by emphasising the importance of discipline and morale, conducting a 
vigourous offensive and continously seeking out the decisive war-winning blow.39  It 
was fostered through the regimental system in which a soldier’s regiment became his 
family and his bravery and stoicism in battle added to regimental traditions.  This ethos 
was displayed by Brigadier-General Edward Bulfin, the commander of 2 Brigade, at a 
meeting with Haig on 20 September 1914 when he remarked that during the Battle of the 
Aisne his brigade ‘never asked to be relieved...we would have held our trenches until we 
were all destroyed’.40  This bravery and self-sacrifice was, according to Haig, the display 
of ‘fine soldierly qualities’.41  Similarly, when the 2nd West Yorkshires retreated from 
their trenches in the face of a German attack on the same day Haig asked them to 
immediately attack in order to ‘regain their good name and reputation’.42  For Haig, a 
failure of courage in battle stemmed from a loss in morale and discipline and which was 
                                                 
37 Fox-Godden, ‘Putting Knowledge into Power’, 28.   
38 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 1-17; Fox-Godden, ‘Putting Knowledge 
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brought about by prolonged periods on the defensive.43  In senior officers, this failure 
was often characterised by a loss in ‘offensive spirit’.  For Major-General Sir Thompson 
Capper, who would go on to command the 7th Division in the 1915 campaign, the basic 
ethos for all ranks was the ‘determination to conquer or die’ in the attempt.44  This ethos 
was also displayed by Major-General Sir Richard Haking, the commander of the 1st 
Division and then XI Corps in the 1915 campaign.  Haking, in a lecture to his division in 
April 1915 announced that ‘I can tell you that nether I nor my brigadiers will stop until 
we have used up every man we have got to drive these Germans from the field of 
battle’.45  The British focus on the offensive was underpinned by the example of the 
Japanese victory over the more defensive, firepower-driven Russians in 1905 and was 
reinforced by the failure of the Germans to press home their offensives during the First 
Battle of Ypres in November 1914.46 
 
The fourth input – the existing, albeit rather limited, doctrine of the British Army – 
overlaps with the institutional ethos.  Doctrine provides large military institutions with a 
common outlook and a uniform basis of operations through the provision of approved 
principles and methods.47  In short, it is ‘the institutionalised beliefs about what works in 
war and military operations’ based on an organisation’s past experiences and predictions 
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for future conflict.48  The British Army of the Great War was inherently suspicious of 
formal rules and proscribed practices, preferring to maintain a flexible approach 
appropriate for the diverse nature of British global military commitments.  This 
pragmatism was allied to a tendency towards of anti-intellectualism among senior war 
managers, which rejected theory and doctrine and promoted experience, initiative, 
intelligence and common sense.49  The anti-intellectual approach was typified by Major-
General Sir Thompson Capper who asserted that ‘war is an art, and not a science’.50  The 
prevailing opinion in British military thinking prior to 1914 emphasised that the next 
war would be won in a single campaign rather than a protracted engagement.  This 
meant that not only did Britain lack a strategy for fighting in the long-term, its army did 
not have the inclination nor apparatus to continually evaluate and formulate doctrine.51  
While the British Army eschewed a formal doctrine in the Great War, the closest thing 
was the Field Service Regulations (FSR), a two-part publication from 1909 drawn up 
under the auspices of Haig in his then role as Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, 
and a development which represented an ‘important advance in British military 
thinking’.52  
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Sheffield has described the FSR as being ‘an organisational and administrative manual 
for the army in the field that also served as a rudimentary doctrine’.53  It was a flexible 
and adaptable document which emphasised decision-making based on the experience 
and best-judgement of the commander on the spot.  Throughout the campaign, and 
indeed the war, Haig viewed the FSR as the basis of the BEF’s operations.54 The FSR 
viewed battle as a structured, four-stage process in which the enemy was engaged on a 
wide front, his reserves were forced to be drawn in and exhausted, the decisive blow was 
dealt and finally a sweeping cavalry charge routed the defeated enemy.55  Andy 
Simpson, in his work on corps command, highlighted the importance of FSR on the 
thinking of senior war managers and demonstrated that they consistently applied the 
regulations to battle planning, albeit his work focussed more on the post-Somme 
period.56  That the senior British war managers considered their actions in terms of the 
FSR in the 1915 campaign can be demonstrated by examining Sir William Robertson’s 
lessons learned report following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915.  In the 
report, Robertson concluded that the battle split into two distinct phases – the 
preparatory action and the decisive attack – and noted that they corresponded with the 
textbook style attack as presented in the FSR.57  In a letter from GHQ to First Army 
Headquarters  during the same time, Robertson explained how the concept of the four-
stage battle related to the entrenched conditions on the western front.  Following the 
experience of Neuve Chapelle, Robertson noted that ‘It is however always understood 
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that in trench warfare the first infantry attack takes the form of what our regulations call 
the final assault in a battle’.58  In a widely-circulated memorandum from early April, 
Major-General Richard Butler, the Chief of Staff at First Army Headquarters drew on 
the lessons identified from the fighting at Neuve Chapelle.  Butler noted that in future 
battles ‘all ground gained must be secured’ and highlighted the relevant section from the 
FSR – Part I, Section 105 (5) – which reinforced the lesson.59  This section of the FSR 
had also been mentioned specifically by Haig in his diary entry of 28 March 1915.60  
The importance of FSR in the eyes of the war managers persisted through the campaign; 
at an army commander’s conference in January 1916, Haig stressed ‘the need for 
adhering to the principles of FSR’ when planning and conducting operations.61  Haig 
viewed the FSR as providing regular army officers with ‘a sound framework for 
decision-making’ and while that may have been the case, he failed to recognise that the 
First Army in the 1915 campaign – and the entire BEF after his promotion to C-in-C in 
December 1915 – was not an exclusively professional force.62  Rather, the collection of 
regular, volunteer, Territorial Force and colonial soldiers described in chapter one 
required a more basic, prescriptive doctrine which was found lacking throughout the 
1915 campaign. 
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These four general organisational development inputs – knowledge from education and 
experience, institutional ethos, and operational doctrine – formed what Tim Travers 
described as the ‘mental horizons’ of British war managers.63  This was the paradigm of 
war in which they took decisions, considered their experiences and identified lessons.  
However, the Organisational Development Model has one further, more specific, input 
which shaped the abilities of the war managers to conduct offensive operations.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the war managers of the First Army were affected by 
decision-making from outside their own structure, mainly through GHQ setting the date 
and place of offensive actions and though the provision of resources – particularly 
artillery weapons and ammunition – to assist in those attacks.  
 
The expansion of British industry during the opening months of the war did not match 
the speed of the expansion of the British military.   As a result, ammunition for the 
British artillery was at a premium.  At Neuve Chapelle, the First Army used up a third of 
the BEF’s total ammunition stock in three days’ fighting, a state which led to the 
premature closure of that battle.64  A shortage of shells had affected the capabilities of 
the BEF since the declaration of war: Sir John French noted that as early as September 
1914, that ‘the maintenance of the supply of Artillery Ammunition was already causing 
the gravest anxiety, owing to the fact that receipts from home were greatly below the 
expenditure’.65  The shells expended at Neuve Chapelle represented seventeen days’ 
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worth of British ammunition production in March 1915.66  The supply of ammunition to 
the First Army was further hampered by the need to support the Dardanelles expedition.  
As Haig noted on 16 March, ‘[t]his lack of ammunition seems serious.  It effectively 
prevents us from profiting by our recent success and pressing the enemy before he can 
reorganise and strengthen his position’.67  Haig was pressured by Robertson into being 
economical with the ammunition supplies, and in turn Robertson was pressed by 
Kitchener.  ‘It is not possible to judge over here how you expend this most valuable 
adjunct’, Kitchener wrote to Robertson on 16 March, ‘but we hope that everything 
possible is being done to economise the principal means at your disposal to enable you 
to attack the enemy or to advance with any success’.68  This was something of a 
paradox.  The Secretary of State for War told the Chief of the General Staff not to use 
too much ammunition to attack the German positions as it may be needed to attack the 
German positions. 
 
The Battles of Aubers Ridge and Festubert in May further exposed the shortages in 
ammunition.  While at Neuve Chapelle First Army was able to expend 1,546 tons of 
ammunition over six days, at Aubers Ridge the army attacked on a wider front and 
expended 1,800 tons of ammunition in twelve days.69  The majority of that ammunition 
was used on 8 and 9 May in the preliminary bombardment of the Aubers Ridge.  
Immediately, GHQ became concerned with the amount of rounds being fired by First 
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Army’s artillery.  Sir William Robertson wrote to Haig on 10 May that ‘if yesterday’s 
expenditure is kept up we shall run out of ammunition on the lines of communication 
after 3 days’.70  The ensuing ‘shells scandal’ marked a low point in the British war effort 
and exposed significant problems in Britain’s war policy.71  However, as much as the 
shortage of shells and other war matériel did affect British military effectiveness in the 
1915 campaign it must be noted that resources alone do not win wars; rather, those 
resources are manipulated by senior commanders to achieve specific operational and 
tactical goals.72  While the provision of resources affected the First Army’s ability to 
take the offensive, it did not directly affect the learning process of the First Army as an 
institution.  It is fair to suggest that the First Army war managers did not have the 
resources to fight the war they wished in the 1915 campaign, however they continually 
sought to fight battles in a manner which sat outside the parameters established by GHQ 
and the political war management hierarchy and which eclipsed their own capabilities.  
 
These five inputs shaped how the First Army war managers thought about battle 
planning in the 1915 campaign.  In terms of the organisational development of the First 
Army, these inputs represent the first level of the Organisational Development Model, as 
shown in Figure 2.1.  The second level of the model can be described as the ‘Planning 
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and Execution Level’ where the inputs came together and set the war managers’ 
parameters for battle planning. 
 
Figure 2.1: Stages One and Two – Inputs to Learning 
 
 
The remainder of this chapter examines how the war managers sought to make sense of 
their experiences over the course of planning and executing the five major offensive 
actions of the 1915 campaign and introduces the third level of the Organisational 
Development Model.  This third level can be described as the ‘Data Creation and 
Collection Level’ where experiences are considered, new knowledge is created and 
collated, and lessons are identified.  Analysis of official unit war diaries and 
supplementary papers and the letters and diaries of senior officers has revealed that there 




















experiences in the 1915 campaign.  In the first place, war managers considered the 
immediate experience of battle and were proactive in identifying lessons themselves.  
The second means of data collection was identified by Catignani with respect to the 
British Army in Afghanistan and consists of the war managers’ formal requests for after-
action reviews and lessons learned reports from their subordinate formations.73  This 
corresponds with Grissom’s ideas of change in military institutions originating from the 
top-down.74  The third means of data collection was through the receipt of lessons 
learned reports from members of the general staff who sat outwith the First Army’s 
operational planning hierarchy.  The following sections examine each of these means to 
assess their relative importance in the wider Organisational Development Model. 
 
Self-Identification of Lessons  
This section examines the extent to which war managers at First Army headquarters and 
those at the headquarters of the constituent corps attempted to draw lessons from their 
experience of battle.  As the war managers were necessarily removed from the fighting 
‘on the ground’, this section evaluates decisions made during the planning and review of 
offensive actions and the incorporation of self-identified lessons into future battle plans.  
This process hinged on the ability and willingness of war managers to analyse their 
experiences and create a body of what Foley described as new ‘tacit knowledge’ from 
which future policy can be developed.75  This section necessarily examines learning 
from the perspective of a small group of individuals: one army staff and three corps 
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staffs across the campaign.  While Haig’s staff at First Army headquarters numbered 
some 33 members, only his chief of staff Brigadier-General Sir Richard Butler and his 
assistant Lieutenant-Colonel John Davidson, his head of intelligence Major John 
Charteris and his artillery advisor Major-General Mercer were actively involved in the 
planning process.76  Over the course of the 1915 campaign data collection and creation 
was largely reliant on the identification of lessons by the war managers themselves and 
then their ad hoc incorporation into the wider battle planning process.  This was driven 
primarily by war managers at First Army headquarters and the first part of this section 
analyses changes in operational methodology in attempting to overcome the deadlock of 
trench warfare.  The second sub-section examines the application of firepower, 
specifically the lessons which could be drawn from preparatory artillery bombardments.  
The third sub-section examines the processes of data creation and collection at the level 
of corps commanders. 
 
There is an historiographical disagreement over the extent to which the war managers 
sought to learn from their experiences.  Paul Harris suggested that following the Battle 
of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915, the First Army war managers made little attempt to 
examine the reasons for the failure to break through the German lines.77  This position 
has been countered by Gary Sheffield who asserted that Haig carefully incorporated the 
lessons of Neuve Chapelle into the planning of the next battle at Aubers Ridge.78  Prior 
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and Wilson believed that Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the commander of 
IV Corps, ‘strove to divine the lessons’ of the battle of Neuve Chapelle and tried ‘to 
derive from them a coherent theory for further trench-warfare battles’.79  Finally, Nick 
Lloyd asserted that following the Battle of Loos in September 1915 at the operational 
level ‘a number of key lessons remained unlearnt by a number of senior British 
commanders’, which would later have disastrous implications for the planning of the 
Battle of the Somme in the 1916 campaign.80  It is important to note here, however, that 
the identification of lessons by war managers did not equate to a critical examination of 
their own conduct and capabilities either in the planning phase nor in the actual 
execution of offensive actions, rather it was an attempt to view the experience of battle 
at the macro level and formulate subsequent battle plans based on their own 
observations.  The Battle of Neuve Chapelle affords the first opportunity to examine the 
extent to which the war managers used their initiative to identify lessons from their 
experiences in the campaign.  At this stage in the campaign the learning process 
involved the identification of things which succeeded and should be replicated and the 
identification of things which went badly and which should be improved.  In this, the 
learning process of the war managers at the start of the 1915 campaign aligns itself with 
Catignani’s view of adaptation which sees formations correcting errors within the 
current system of institutional norms, and also the first of Farrell’s two key components 
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of military adaptation, namely that units refine or modify their existing tactics, 
techniques and technologies as a campaign progresses.81   
 
The Battle of Neuve Chapelle was the first large-scale planned British offensive of the 
Great War.82  As such, the experience was ‘in the nature of an experiment’ in how to 
confront the deadlock of trench warfare.83  Drawing on the organisational development 
inputs of ethos and doctrine described in section one, Haig envisioned the Battle of 
Neuve Chapelle in the model of the decisive four-stage action as exemplified in the FSR.  
The intended operation was described by Haig as ‘a serious offensive movement with 
the object of breaking the German line, and consequently our advance is to be pushed 
vigourously’.84  Haig further elaborated that, ‘the idea is not to capture a trench here or a 
trench there, but to carry the operation right through; in a sense surprise the Germans, 
carry them right off their legs...and exploit the success this gained by pushing forward 
mounted troops forthwith’.85  This mode of thinking also aligned with Haig’s education 
at Camberley which promoted the power of the offensive and emphasised that war 
would end with a decisive victory.  His general aim at Neuve Chapelle was to break 
through the German trench system, pour cavalry through the gap, restore mobility to the 
battlefield and end the war.  To do so, Haig selected objectives for the attacking troops 
which were situated some 6,000 yards behind the German front line on the strategically 
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significant Aubers Ridge.  The original battle plan saw the British operations as part of a 
wider Allied breakthrough attempt in which the British 8th Division of the IV Corps and 
the Meerut Division of the Indian Corps would attack alongside the French to the south.  
However, on 28 February, the French withdrew their support for the operation thus 
ensuring that the Battle of Neuve Chapelle would be undertaken solely as a British 
endeavour.  This, coupled with limitations placed on artillery expenditure by GHQ on 
the same date, was a serious blow to Haig’s hopes of achieving a decisive breakthrough, 
as ‘even if [the First Army was] successful at first, a point will be reached in a very short 
time, i.e., in two or three days at most when we will have to re-establish our line’.86  
Haig, then, acknowledged that ‘the scope of the operation was [now] limited’ but chose 
to press on with planning a decisive breakthrough battle regardless.87 
 
In the event, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle laid the foundations for British offensive 
planning not only for the remainder of the 1915 campaign but also for the battles of 
1916 and 1917.  It was characterised by the use of new technologies and careful 
preparation, including the use of aerial photography to create detailed maps of the 
Germans positions, the withdrawal of attacking battalions for rest and training, the 
creation of forming-up trenches close behind the front line, and the use of artillery 
timetables to ensure maximum destruction of the German front line positions.88  The 
initial attack, made by the IV and Indian Corps on 10 March, captured a front of 4,000 
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yards to a depth of 1,200 yards but broke down once the initial German trench lines had 
been captured.  One reason for this was the extent of the aerial photography; the trench 
systems were photographed only for a depth of 700–1,500 yards in front of the British 
lines and encompassed only the attacking battalions’ primary objectives.89  As Haig’s 
breakthrough battle plan hinged on an advance of 6,000 yards to capture the ultimate 
objective of the Aubers Ridge, this methodology was fundamentally flawed.  While 
Sheffield has suggested that a line of obstacles had been missed in the photographic 
reconnaissance, it is clear that the aerial photography had never been intended to map 
out the rear areas.90  As a result the attacking battalions of the IV and Indian Corps were 
left blind once they had captured their first objectives and encountered a line of 
fortifications which had not been marked on their trench maps and which they had not 
been trained to attack.  Despite repeated attempts until the end of 12 March, no further 
ground was gained.  While Haig was undoubtedly open to the idea of incorporating new 
technologies as part of a general battle plan, it is also apparent that he was sometimes 
unclear about how to apply these new technologies to his operational idea of the four-
stage breakthrough battle.  Nevertheless, he realised their worth, and the use of air 
reconnaissance which originated at Neuve Chapelle was, by 1918, a staple of the British 
battle plan.   
 
The main methodological lesson in battle planning which Haig identified from First 
Army’s experience at Neuve Chapelle was that ‘given sufficient ammunition and 
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suitable guns we can break through the enemy’s line whenever we like’.91  In Haig’s 
opinion his breakthrough battle-plan was vindicated by the successes of the morning of 
10 March.  Haig believed that for several hours there existed an opportunity to pour 
troops through the gap made in the German trenches; this view was backed up by at least 
one battalion commander from the 8th Division, who had participated in the attack and 
had witnessed the opportunity himself.92  According to Haig, the First Army’s failure to 
secure the objectives on the Aubers Ridge was not due to a faulty plan, but to poor 
execution by his subordinate commanders, Henry Rawlinson of the IV Corps and James 
Willcocks of the Indian Corps, who he deemed guilty of mishandling their reserves and 
halting their advance, thus allowing the Germans time to regroup and reinforce their 
lines.93  Indeed, Haig later asserted that for five hours British troops were ‘walking about 
in and beyond [the primary objectives] without being fired upon at all‘ but, because 
leadership from their corps commanders was missing and training in ‘infiltration 
techniques’ had not yet been adopted, no concerted advance was organised.94   
 
In terms of First Army Headquarters’ reflection on the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Butler 
drafted a briefing note entitled ‘Memorandum on the Attack on Neuve Chapelle by First 
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Army’ which was passed to GHQ on 22 March.95  This document is far from being 
introspective and is primarily a narrative summary of operations with a heavy focus on 
the detailed planning undertaken by the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery.  One 
factor which inhibited the First Army’s war managers from drawing the maximum 
potential lessons from Neuve Chapelle was Haig’s desire to press on and conduct the 
campaign at a high tempo.  As early as 12 March, the First Army began planning an 
attack to the north of Neuve Chapelle to be undertaken by the 7th Division of the IV 
Corps and by the newly arrived Canadian Corps and supported by the 2nd Cavalry 
Division.96  This desire to immediately renew the offensive matched with Sir John 
French’s own operational ideas in which the attack on Neuve Chapelle was the first step 
in a larger ‘Battle of Lille’ which, like Haig’s own methodology, was a to be fought as a 
decisive breakthrough battle.97  In the event, GHQ was forced to call off First Army’s 
attack due to the diversion of ammunition away from the western front, a decision 
which, wrote Haig, ‘effectively prevents us from profiting by our recent success and 
pressing the enemy before he could strengthen his position’.98  Following Neuve 
Chapelle, the general plans were in place, at least at the operational level, to fight a high-
tempo style of war more akin to that of the Hundred Days campaign in 1918, however 
the lack of key resources meant that it remained unachievable.   
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Scrutiny of the First Army official war diary and Haig’s personal diary affords an 
opportunity to examine the extent that the war managers at First Army headquarters 
altered their perception of battle based on their own assessments of Neuve Chapelle.  
The first evidence of Haig’s thinking post-Neuve Chapelle appears in his comments on 
draft attack plans created in late March and early April by the staff of the 7th and 
Canadian Divisions and the Indian Corps and which would evolve into the plans for the 
Battle of Aubers Ridge.  Haig’s intention was that planning should ‘be worked out by 
Corps and Divisions...on the same lines as those for the attack on Neuve Chapelle’ 
although it was hoped that they would ‘lead to more far reaching results’ than the first 
battle of the campaign.99  This reiterates Haig’s belief that the plan for Neuve Chapelle – 
his plan – had not been responsible for the failure to break the German lines.  The plan 
for the Battle of Aubers Ridge followed that of Neuve Chapelle in the originality of its 
design; a two-pronged attack some 6,000 yards apart was to converge on the Aubers 
Ridge, the same final objective as the battle two months previous.  For Haig, in the early 
stages of planning, the objective of the attack was ‘not a local success and the capture of 
a few trenches or even a portion of the hostile position on a more or less extended front, 
but is to employ the entire force at our disposal and fight a decisive battle’ and cause a 
‘general retirement’ of the enemy’s line.100  As in the planning stage at Neuve Chapelle, 
Haig identified that flaws existed in his plan and that the results might be limited.  At a 
meeting with Sir John French, Haig informed him that in his opinion ‘we had not 
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enough troops and guns to sustain our forward movement, and reap decisive results...[Sir 
John French] wished me to attack and do the best I could with the troops available’.101  
Again, as at Neuve Chapelle, Haig chose to continue with his plan even against his 
better judgement and, at a conference of senior war managers on 6 May, reiterated his 
orders that the corps were to break through the German lines.102 
 
The Battle of Aubers Ridge, undertaken on 9 May 1915, failed to replicate even the 
initial successes of Neuve Chapelle.  Again, Haig strove to maintain a high tempo to 
operations, even in the face of an overwhelming defeat, and planned to concentrate his 
next attack back at Neuve Chapelle, from where the I and Indian Corps had attacked on 
9 May.103  By the following day, Haig was ‘carefully investigating the causes of the 
failure’, but was hampered by the slow flow of information from subordinate formations 
to First Army headquarters.104  Reflecting on the experiences of Aubers Ridge, Haig 
deduced three main lessons, the first of which related to operational methodology and 
the others to specific artillery preparations.  Haig asserted that the improved strength of 
the German positions meant that a long and methodical bombardment carried out by 
both field guns and howitzers would be required before the infantry attack began.105  
After consideration of his options, Haig decided that ‘it is necessary to recourse [sic] to 
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more deliberate methods’ of attack.106  This marked the first occasion in the war that 
Haig considered an operational methodology other than the decisive breakthrough battle.  
While Haig had expressed doubts over his plans at both Neuve Chapelle and Aubers 
Ridge, these were quickly dismissed and replaced by a renewed confidence in the model 
of warfare which Haig had been conditioned, through education and experience, to 
believe offered the greatest chance of strategic success.  That Haig swifty changed focus 
following the defeat at Aubers Ridge demonstrates at least a willingness to assess his 
own experiences and alter his perceptions based on his observations. 
 
Haig’s assertion that a more deliberate methodical approach was necessary was agreed 
to by Sir John French, who believed that the results of the Battle of Aubers Ridge 
showed that the First Army should aim at a more limited objective than those which had 
characterised the earlier breakthrough attempts.107  Rather than being a decisive attack, 
the next operation should be, according to GHQ, ‘deliberate and persistent...the enemy 
should never be given complete rest either by day or night, but be gradually and 
relentlessly worn down by exhaustion and loss until his defence collapses’.108  The First 
Army planned the next battle – the Battle of Festubert – with this in mind and selected a 
position only 1,000 yards away as the objective for the attacking troops.109  The battle, 
launched on 15 May, succeeded on the front of the I Corps but the Indian Corps became 
bogged down amid stubborn German resistance.  Applying a lesson learned from earlier 
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battles, Haig chose not to reinforce the failure of the Indian Corps’ attack and 
concentrated on supporting the localised successes of the I Corps.  Operations at 
Festubert continued until 25 May when low ammunition stocks and a reinforced German 
trench system forced the cessation of the battle.  The net gain for this first limited attack 
was an advance of an average of 600 yards on a front of four miles.  The limited success 
of the Battle of Festubert reveals a change in the nature of learning in the First Army.  
Between Neuve Chapelle and Aubers Ridge the operational plan remained largely the 
same save for the incorporation of certain tactical lessons.  This mirrors Farrell’s first 
example of adaptation in which tactics were refined given the same strategic situation.  
Between Aubers Ridge and Festubert the change in methodology from a decisive 
breakthrough to an attritional wearing down battle represents the second of Farrell’s 
means of adaptation, in which a new means of conducting operations was conceived.110 
 
At the conclusion of the fighting at Festubert, the First Army was told by GHQ to limit 
itself to small aggressive threats that would not requıre much ammunition or many 
troops.111  Accordingly, Haig ordered the IV Corps to attack the German positions on the 
Rue d’Ouvert near Givenchy with the 7th, 51st and Canadian Divisions.  While Haig 
approved of a deliberate artillery bombardment of the type employed at Festubert, the 
timing of the attack was subject to coordination with the French, who had proposed to 
attack near Arras.  After several postponements, the attack commenced at 6pm on 15 
June.  At its conclusion the following day no ground had been gained and the IV Corps 
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had sustained over 3,500 casualties.  The battle was the smallest of the five undertaken 
by the First Army in 1915 but its repercussions were large and long-lasting.  The failure 
of an attack by a single corps to break through the enemy trenches was seen by Haig as 
an indication that more was required.  Success would come with more guns, more 
ammunition and more men. Indeed, with the dispatch of the first of the new armies to 
France and the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions in the summer of 1915, this 
looked more likely.  In a letter to Clive Wigram, the King’s private secretary, Haig 
opined that ‘In order to be successful in breaking the lines in our front, it is necessary to 
attack on a much wider front than has hitherto been possible’.112  This opinion was laid 
out in a general staff memo from early July which advocated an artillery bombardment 
of several days across the whole front followed by an advance on a wide front, estimated 
to be some twenty-five miles.113  The plans showcased therein showed a return to the 
planning of the decisive battle laid out in the FSR.  The main lesson that Haig identified 
from the first four battles of the 1915 campaign reinforced his conclusions from the 
1914 campaign – that the old principles of war still applied and only the scale of the 
operations needed to change.114  This was the germ of the idea which formulated into the 
operational plans for the Battle of Loos in September. 
 
The prospect of launching an offensive in coordination with a proposed French attack on 
the Vimy Ridge to occur in the summer was first mooted to Haig in late May.  Until 
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early August, Haig’s and GHQ’s preference was for a renewed attack to capture the 
Aubers Ridge however, on 7 August GHQ informed First Army that the area of the 
attack would be decided by the French.115  It was decided that the attack would take 
place on 25 September and that the British I and IV Corps would attack towards the 
strategically important Hohenzollern Redoubt and Hill 70, respectively.116  The 8th 
Division of III Corps and the Indian Corps were ordered to mount diversionary attacks at 
Bois Grenier and Mauquissart, to the north of the main attack.117  The plan included the 
use of poisonous gas which would be released from the British trenches prior to the 
infantry attack.  The scale of the battle of Loos was in line with the change in Haig’s 
operational methodology and was larger than anything the First Army had attempted 
before; at Loos the front to be attacked was 11,200 yards, compared to 1450 at Neuve 
Chapelle, six months earlier.118  Despite the limited success of the more cautious 
approach taken at Festubert, Haig again reverted back to attempting a decisive battle.  At 
a conference of war managers on 6 September, Haig outlined that ‘It is not enough to 
gain a tactical success…the questions is how to turn our tactical success into a 
strategical [sic] victory’.119  His conclusions were that decisive results would be obtained 
through a rapid advance pressed home ‘with the necessary vigour and strength’ using 
‘initiative amongst all ranks’ and would culminate in a ‘vigourous pursuit’ using 
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cavalry.120  In preparation for this breakthrough, four aeroplanes from Royal Flying 
Corps (RFC) attached to First Army were designated for aerial reconnaissance in 
cooperation with the Cavalry Corps.  The RFC were ordered that this duty was to take 
precedence over all other work assigned to them.121  The Battle of Loos began on 25 
September and lasted until 13 October.  In some places, notably on the front of the 15th 
(Scottish) Division in the IV Corps sector, the troops nearly succeeded in breaking 
through the German lines.  However, once surprise was lost the Germans were able to 
reinforce their positions and the advance ground to a halt.  Despite repeated attempts 
over the next two weeks, territorial gains were few and far between. 
 
The Battle of Loos, much like Neuve Chapelle, reinforced Haig’s belief that his 
operational methodology was sound.  A memorandum of November 1915 drafted by 
Richard Butler, Haig’s chief of staff, further demonstrated First Army headquarters’ 
willingness to consider their experiences and develop policy accordingly.  Butler’s work 
drew certain conclusions from ‘a study of all the various attacks carried out by the First 
Army since Neuve Chapelle’.122  Experience during the 1915 campaign had shown that 
attacks had to be made with a minimum of five waves of attacking troops to have best 
chance of success.  In order to maximise the power of the attack, it should be delivered 
on a front of eleven miles using at least twenty-two infantry divisions.  Above all, ‘the 
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most important point is to break the line’.123  Following his rise to command the BEF in 
December, Haig set out to develop his operational methodology for the 1916 campaign.  
He recognised that operations ‘intended merely to cause loss to the enemy, at a less cost 
than ourselves’ should not be pushed beyond the limits of artillery support.  While 
operations which were ‘designed to wear down the enemy’ appeared a prudent course of 
action, Haig thought of them as a way to ‘prepare the way for a decisive offensive effort 
later on’ rather than a strategy in themselves.124  In this, Haig dismissed a more limited 
attritional methodology and persisted with his favoured principle of fighting the decisive 
breakthrough battle. 
 
The decision to continually revert to the breakthrough battle, although on a far larger 
scale than before, is evidence of Haig’s failure to adapt his critical thinking to the 
strategic conditions of trench warfare.  Catignani’s study of organisational learning in 
the British army in Afghanistan demonstrated that until there were significant changes in 
institutional data creation and collection processes, the identification of lessons learned, 
and training and education provision, commanders were bound to revert to what they 
had been trained to do.125  The same process is evident in the First Army in 1915.  The 
absence of a formal system for data capture and collation gave increased importance to 
the learning process of the senior war manager, in this case, General Haig.  The 
operational methodology of the First Army was dictated by what Haig thought best and 
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Haig heavily leaned on his own formative experiences when devising operational 
procedure.  While he demonstrated a willingness to consider his experiences and identify 
lessons, this reversion to a breakthrough battle at Loos shows that a willingness to think 
does not necessarily mean that the correct lessons are identified or applied.  It follows, 
then, that at the ‘Data Collation and Collection Level’, the Organisational Development 
Model must make no judgement on the correctness or success of a specific lesson which 
has been identified by war managers.  Indeed, generating ideas only makes learning a 
possibility, and it is the continual process of identifying, evaluating, selecting and 
implementing these ideas which defines the process of organisational development.126  It 
also follows that some lessons may remain unidentified by the war managers. 
 
When examining organisational development at the operational level it would be 
incorrect to focus solely on Haig, although he did have the greatest influence on First 
Army’s battle planning process.  In total, seven corps commanders – Monro and Gough 
at I Corps, Pulteney at III Corps, Rawlinson at IV Corps, Willcocks and Anderson at the 
Indian Corps, and Haking at XI Corps – all contributed to the wider learning process.  
Following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Sir James Willcocks, GOC of the Indian Corps, 
was content to produce only a loose narrative of operations which drew more attention 
to units he felt worthy of praise rather than a consideration of his experiences and 
recommendations for future best practice.  After the Battles of Aubers Ridge and 
Festubert, Willcocks did not think it necessary to submit a corps report detailing the 
action of the Indian Corps in those battles.  Rather, he was content to forward the report 
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of the GOC Meerut Division which was ‘very full and contains every possible 
information’.127  It is clear that Willcocks did not view his role as a corps commander as 
having any involvement in considering his experiences nor trying to discern lessons 
from the work of others.  Instead, he saw himself as the guide of the Indian Corps, 
protecting their interests and largely leaving the planning of offensive actions to his 
chief of staff, Brigadier-General Hudson.128  Lieutenant-General Charles Monro, GOC 
of I Corps, was also content to submit a report created by a subordinate to First Army 
headquarters, however that report was different in content to the narrative account of the 
Meerut Division.  Created by Major-General Sir Richard Haking of the 1st Division, and 
‘based on notes taken down by [him] as each event occurred during the course of the 
battle’ the report was a blend of narrative and lessons Haking had identified based on 
things he had witnessed.129  It was a detailed account including recommendations on the 
future selection of the ground to be attacked, the effect of shell-fire on enemy trenches, 
and the necessity of neutralising machine gun position, among others.  There is no 
question that this document was created by Haking based on his own consideration of 
the battle rather than those of his subordinates as the 1st Division headquarters only 
received reports from their brigadiers on 17 May, the day after the report was written by 
Haking and passed to I Corps.  The speed of passing the report, from the 1st Division 
through I Corps to the First Army in one day meant that the contents had the potential to 
influence operations undertaken by First Army during the Battle of Festubert.  
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The overriding opinion following the opening phase at the Battle of Loos was that a 
breakthrough had almost been achieved.  For Rawlinson, the battle reinforced his 
opinions from Neuve Chapelle, that ‘experience teaches us that in these attacks one does 
not make much progress after the first day’.130  The learning process was dominated by 
attempts to discover why an attack by the reserve XI Corps was delayed and made no 
impact on the battle.131  The forensic examination that followed had important 
implications for the handling of reserve forces in battle but, in the short term, had more 
of an impact on the war management hierarchy of the BEF.  Following a protracted 
disagreement which drew in individuals from across the political and military spectrum, 
Sir John French was relieved of his duties and replaced as commander-in-chief by Sir 
Douglas Haig.  In terms of the corps commanders involved in the opening phase of the 
battle, Rawlinson again reverted to forwarding a narrative report of operations to First 
Army for their information.132  The wider IV Corps war management team did, however, 
attempt to evaluate their experiences, although what they then did with the information 
is uncertain.  Rawlinson drafted an unofficial paper that identified the specific artillery 
lessons which could be drawn from the preparatory bombardment while his CRA, 
Brigadier-General Budworth, examined the role of corps artillery staff in the planning 
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process, infantry-artillery cooperation, and the role of howitzers in the bombardment.133  
First Army headquarters were also keen to focus on the artillery lessons and produced a 
separate report in November detailing their findings.134  Rawlinson’s chief of staff, 
Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Montgomery, was more proactive, creating a lecture 
from his observations which he then presented to the Second and Third Armies, the 
GHQ Intelligence Course at Bethune, and at a variety of army training schools, in the 
period between the close of the Battle of Loos and the opening of the Somme offensive 
in July 1916.135  Following the final operations at Loos in October, Haig asked Haking 
‘to let him know as soon as possible’ what lessons could be learned from XI Corps’ 
attack on 13 October.136  Haking responded the following day, even though ‘the full 
details…are not yet available’.  While some of Haking’s judgements in battle planning 
in 1915 have been criticised, his ability to identify lessons himself and quickly transmit 
them up the chain of command is evidence of his willingness to consider his 
experiences.137   
 
The identification of lessons by war managers themselves represented the most 
influential means of data creation and collection used in the First Army in the 1915 
campaign.  On a formal level, this took the form of narrative accounts and occasional 
lessons learned reports although this varied substantially between the individual 
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commanders involved.  As has been shown, of the corps commanders, Haking was quick 
to consider and transfer lessons he had identified himself while Willcocks gave little 
credence to identifying lessons, preferring to pass the reports of his subordinate officers 
up the chain of command with little or no comment and after a substantial delay.  
Rawlinson, the most operationally active of the corps commanders in the campaign, 
demonstrated a willingness to consider the bigger picture and suggest changes to 
operational methodology.  The lack of a formal system of data capture and collation 
meant that there was no standard method of sharing information or deducing what 
information should be shared.  This inadvertently gave Haig as the GOC an increased 
importance in the organisational development of the First Army.  As a result, the 
organisational development of the First Army as an institution was inextricably linked 
with the learning process of its most senior war manager.  While Haig was willing and 
able to identify lessons himself over the course of the campaign, little changed in his 
mindset to alter his preferred operational methodology.   
 
Top-Down Requests for Lessons 
While the identification of lessons based on their own experiences represented by far the 
greatest means of data creation used by the First Army war managers, other methods of 
data capture were employed.  John Denton asserted that in large institutions, 
‘organisational learning is invariably introduced in a top-down senior-management-led 
manner’.138  Foley’s studies in understanding how learning occurred in the German 
Army of the Great War demonstrated the importance of lessons-learned reports to 
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organizational learning.139  The German system for data capture directed that on leaving 
the front lines, each corps or division was required to complete a report which contained 
practical lessons based on their experiences in the previous period of combat.140  While 
there was no standard formula for creating a lessons-learned report, each was an 
analytical document rather than the narrative reports which characterised the British 
approach to recording the experiences of battle.  This process can best be described in 
terms of ‘feedback loops’ in which information was systematically relayed to 
commanders to keep them appraised of operational performance.141  Because the British 
Army of 1915 did not have a formal system of data capture, ‘feedback loops’ were 
employed on an ad hoc basis at the discretion of senior war managers.  As the previous 
section has shown, some higher commanders were adept at analysing experiences and 
transmitting this information up the chain of command, while others were less effective.  
This section examines the extent to which the war managers sought out new information 
from subordinate units in order to achieve greater operational effectiveness.  This took 
two main forms: in the first place, war managers could formally request lessons-learned 
reports to augment their own observations; and second, they could seek out new 
information through informal means to assist with the specifics of battle planning. 
 
Formal requests for information from below, beyond the production of the expected 
narrative report of operations which followed the close of hostilities, were uncommon in 
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the First Army in the 1915 campaign.  At the highest level, Haig rarely formally sought 
out lessons identified by subordinate officers, although by the end of the campaign he 
appears to have become more open to the idea as his urgent letter to Haking seeking for 
a lessons-learned report ‘as soon as possible’ after the action of 13 October 
demonstrates.142  Other members of the First Army war management group were more 
flexible; Major-General Rice, the CRE at First Army headquarters wrote to the CREs of 
the IV and Indian Corps, requesting their observations on the engineering difficulties 
identified at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle.  When he had collated them and considered 
the content, he added his own observations and passed them for circulation to the rest of 
the First Army headquarters general staff officers.143  Following the use of poison gas as 
an offensive weapon at the Battle of Loos, requests were made to infantry divisions for 
‘brief reports on the effect of our gas on the enemy’, as ‘information is required on 
which to base suggestions likely to make a gas attack more effective in future’.144  These 
requests were, however, informal in nature and were initiated by the ‘gas advisor’ at 
GHQ rather than from First Army headquarters.  That it was the engineers and 
technological specialists who were more proactive in identifying lessons from below is 
in-keeping with the pre-war attitude that the technical branches of the army were more 
open to considering their experiences. 
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For the most part, the responsibility of formal data collection from subordinate units 
resided with officers of the general staff posted to individual infantry divisions.  Thus, 
following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins, chief of staff of the 
7th Division, sent a request to the three infantry brigade commanders, plus the CRE and 
CRA, asking for their recommendations on how to ‘improve our training and 
arrangements for battle, what modifications in our formations for attack should be 
adopted, and generally what lessons we can we deduce from our experiences’.145  
Hoskins’ replacement as chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Gathorne-Hardy, was 
also proactive in requesting information from subordinate formations.  In writing to the 
infantry, artillery, signals and engineer commanders after the Battle of Loos, Gathorne-
Hardy noted that ‘it is important that the causes which led to failure as well as those 
which led to success should be carefully analysed, so that one may be avoid one in the 
future, and exploit the other’.146  While written reports were more common, Major-
General Hubert Gough, also of the 7th Division, interviewed commanders involved in the 
Battle of Givenchy to ascertain the reasons for the failure of the attack prior to receiving 
their formal reports.147  The 7th Division is something of an anomaly in terms of its 
ability or desire to seek out analysis from its constituent parts.  Examination of the war 
diaries and supplementary papers from the other ten divisions which planned and 
conducted offensive operations with the First Army reveals that there was no general 
practice of collection of analytical data from subordinate formations in the 1915 
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campaign.  Indeed, only two examples deviate from the production of a standard 
narrative account of battle.  After the Battle of Loos, Major-General Arthur Holland 
circulated his own findings into why the 1st Division failed to capture Hulluch to his 
brigadiers; and in the 9th Division, Lieutenant-Colonel S E Hollond, prepared a lecture 
based on the reports he had collated from his formation’s brigades, batteries and 
battalions.148  In the absence of any evidence of the desire of divisional war management 
teams to request analytical reports from their subordinate formations, it may be 
suggested that there existed an informal culture at 7th Division headquarters that 
encouraged its war managers to actively seek out new information from below.  The 
examples highlighted in this section took place across the campaign, were initiated by 
different senior staff officers, and occurred under the supervision of different divisional 
commanders. 
 
The second means by which war managers requested information from subordinates 
occurred on a more informal level.  In developing the artillery plan at Neuve Chapelle, 
Haig consulted with the First Army CRA, Major-General Freddy Mercer, and Brigadier-
General Arthur Holland, the then CRA of the 8th Division.  The main problem he 
identified in the planning stage was that ‘none of the artillery commanders seem to be 
able to agree as to the amount of ammunition or time required to destroy a given length 
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of hostile position’.149  To counter this Haig sought the counsel of artillery specialists 
who were not involved in the official planning for the battle.  Among these were Major-
General the Lord Horne, the commander of the 2nd Division who had served as the CRA 
of I Corps in 1914 when Haig was the commanding officer.  Horne was consulted 
because he had drawn up the scheme for the capture of a German position at Cuinchy on 
6 February which ‘was a very well arranged and well carried out attack’ in which ‘the 
guns…did extremely well’.150  As a result of the success of the ‘Affair at Cuinchy’ as the 
action became known, Haig instructed Mercer, to visit the 2nd Division to consult with 
the commanders of the six-inch howitzers who had ‘the latest and most practical 
experiences of any’ in the First Army.151  This suggests that as early as the start of the 
1915 campaign Haig was prepared to engage with the thinking of his subordinate 
officers if they had practical technical experience of which he knew little.  
 
Haig’s willingness to consult with ‘subject experts’ from outside the armed forces led to 
significant reform of the British systems of logistics and the development of new 
technology.152  In the 1915 campaign, Haig was equally willing to consult with 
technological experts who were beneath him in the army structure in order to incorporate 
their expertise into battle plans.  Of particular importance was the input of specialists in 
air power and chemical warfare.  During the planning of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Trenchard, the commander of the First Wing of the Royal 
Flying Corps (RFC), was one of the first people to be taken into Haig’s confidence 
regarding the battle plans, and he lobbied for the RFC to undertake a prominent role in 
the coming offensive.153  The RFC’s use of photography in the creation of the trench 
maps on which the offensive was planned, received significant criticism from some 
artillery officers.   Haig informed these officers that ‘he was going to use the air in this 
war, and they had to use it’ too, adding that he would not tolerate any ‘early Victorian 
methods’.154  The relationship between the two men grew as the campaign progressed as 
Trenchard found Haig willing to take expert advice on aviation matters.155  This 
progressed to the stage that Haig adopted Trenchard’s suggestions that the RFC could be 
used to bomb strategic targets in the German rear positions and then incorporated them 
into the battle plan for Aubers Ridge.156  Haig was similarly open to consulting with 
specialists over the use of poisonous gas prior to the Loos offensive.  By the start of the 
battle Haig was of the opinion that by using gas ‘decisive results were to be expected’.157  
While Haig’s relationship with Lieutenant-Colonel Foulkes, the commander of the 
Royal Engineers’ ‘Special Brigade’ – the unit responsible for preparing the chemical 
attack at Loos – was rather strained in the run-up to the battle over the delivery of 
enough gas cylinders for his proposed offensive, this did not stop him from consulting 
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Foulkes on matters regarding gas as an offensive weapon.  While the use of gas at Loos 
was not the success Haig envisioned, it did not hinder the BEF’s development of a 
chemical warfare strategy.  Indeed, Foulkes was given considerable leeway to 
experiment in new methods of delivery and production, the lessons of which Haig used 
in battle planning later in the war, albeit on a smaller scale than at Loos.158 
 
Transfer of Lessons from GHQ 
While on operational matters GHQ was largely content to allow General Haig a free 
hand in planning offensive actions, they did attempt to consider the experiences of the 
First Army independently.  As such, the lessons identified by war managers at GHQ also 
represent a method of data creation and collection in the third level of the Organisational 
Development Model.  In terms of operational methodology, officers at GHQ also 
attempted to think in terms other than Haig’s breakthrough battle concept.  In early 
January 1915, Lord Kitchener advanced the view that ‘the German lines in France may 
be looked upon as a fortress which cannot be carried by assault and also cannot be 
completely invested’.159  Sir William Robertson was of a similar opinion.  On 8 
February 1915, Robertson authored a memorandum in which he described that the 
fighting on the western front had now reached a point where ‘the principles of fortress 
warfare rather than those of field warfare apply’.160  With that being the case, the 
Germans could only be beaten ‘by a process of slow attrition, by a slow and gradual 
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advance on our part, each step being prepared by predominant artillery fire and a great 
expenditure of ammunition’.161  This echoed the approach suggested by Capper in 
February, and Rawlinson in March, and indicates that the prevalence of alternative 
methodologies extended further than divisional and corps commanders within the First 
Army.   
 
As chief of the general staff at GHQ, Robertson was quick to examine the First Army’s 
experiences at Neuve Chapelle.  Robertson’s first paper on the subject was passed to Sir 
John French on 14 March, two days after the close of the battle.  He asserted that the 
fighting at Neuve Chapelle had not changed the strategic situation but, by attacking, the 
BEF ‘gained certain definite tactical and moral advantages’ over the Germans and ‘the 
next step is to consider how these advantages can be turned to account’.162  His thinking 
on the latter is demonstrated in his comments on Haig’s draft proposals for the rapid 
follow-up action to Neuve Chapelle.  In asserting that ‘the whole question is one of the 
best way of using the available ammunition’, Robertson hit upon the key to operational 
methodology in the 1915 campaign.163  Both Haig’s wide-fronted breakthrough battle 
plans and Rawlinson’s idea of ‘bite and hold’ demanded the use of artillery ammunition 
that was not available to the BEF in 1915.  Robertson’s suggestion involved taking the 
ammunition supply as the base and then building an offensive plan on top of it, rather 
than the First Army method of devising a plan and then attempting to procure the 
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ammunition.  Interestingly, Robertson’s comments also include a deleted passage in 
which he noted that ‘the question arises…whether the Aubers–Bois du Biez line could 
not be reached by a succession of comparatively small attacks supported by a limited 
number of guns’.164  His reasons for deleting the passage are unclear, however it does 
suggest that the experience of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle did little to alter Robertson’s 
operational outlook. 
 
A later, more considered, memorandum identified a number of lessons which stood out 
from the recent fighting.  Robertson drew many of the same conclusions as war 
managers within the First Army structure.  His report, prepared for Sir John French, 
highlighted the careful preparation of the artillery attack, the use of what he termed a ‘tir 
de barrage’ to stop German reinforcements reaching the battle zone, and the commonly 
identified theme that further attacks on fortified positions would not succeed without a 
preparatory bombardment.165  Although staff officers at GHQ considered the lessons 
from the First Army’s experience at Neuve Chapelle, the extent to which this 
information was transmitted to the First Army war managers is unclear.  While 
Robertson and Haig corresponded both formally and informally, copies of Robertson’s 
reports on the Battle of Neuve Chapelle are only found now in the GHQ General Staff 
file and not in the First Army war diary or the official First Army file on Neuve 
                                                 
164 IWM, French Papers, JDPF 7/2 (2), Robertson, ‘Notes on 1st Army Proposals’, 18 March 
1915. 
165 TNA, WO158/17, General Staff: Notes on Operations, Sir William Robertson, ‘General Staff 
Notes on the Offensive’, March 1915. 
169 
 
Chapelle.166  The reports were passed to Sir John French and it is conceivable that they 
were never forwarded to the First Army headquarters for analysis.   
 
Brigadier-General John DuCane, the artillery advisor at GHQ, was ordered by Robertson 
to write a further memorandum on the battle of Neuve Chapelle, which was also 
presented to Sir John French.  However, the presence of that paper in the IV Corps 
reports on the battle suggest that the lessons identified therein may have been formally 
disseminated down the army hierarchy.167  Alternatively, their presence in the IV Corps 
file might mean that they were shared informally between DuCane and his friend Sir 
Henry Rawlinson, the commander of IV Corps.  The version of the report in the IV 
Corps file is dated 31 March and Rawlinson certainly received DuCane at IV Corps 
headquarters on 4 April to discuss the artillery situation for the upcoming Aubers Ridge 
attack.168  DuCane asserted that ‘it is desirable to examine as closely as circumstances 
permit the tactical lessons of the battle of Neuve Chapelle, and to consider their bearing 
on the strategical problem that confronts us.169  The main lesson identified by DuCane 
was that once the first assault had been delivered on the German trenches, the attacking 
troops ‘got beyond the scope of [the] system of communications’, meaning that the 
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impetus of the attack rested on the initiative of junior commanders who, once the system 
of artillery observation broke down, were held up by fortified locations which had not 
been bombarded. DuCane advocated that by the concentration of superior resources in 
men, guns and ammunition an attack would proceed in stages ‘each step in advance 
being consolidated before the next step is taken’. This ‘more methodic mode of 
progression’ he contended, fit better into the tactical conditions of the war ‘than the 
more violent method of attack as illustrated by Neuve Chapelle’.170  It is clear, then, that 
some officers at GHQ demonstrated a willingness to adapt their outlook and seek 
alternate solutions to the operational problems of trench warfare. 
 
DuCane’s memorandum of 15 March has been the subject of some recent 
historiographical confusion.  It was first mentioned by Prior and Wilson as evidence that 
Henry Rawlinson was not the only officer who considered that limited ‘bite and hold’ 
attacks would be the most successful operational methodology for future offensive 
actions, however the memorandum itself was not analysed by the authors.171  The 
memorandum was also mentioned by Niall Barr, although he appears to have failed to 
recognise that DuCane was its author, attributing it to ‘one far-sighted staff officer’.172  
Prior and Wilson and Barr used two different versions of the same report; the first being 
the version contained in the GHQ General Staff file and the second being the version in 
Sir John French’s personal papers which has been annotated by Sir William Robertson.  
The version of the memorandum from the GHQ General Staff file was also used by Paul 
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Harris and Sanders Marble, who described its contents as ‘a sensible solution to the 
problem of attacking on the western front’.173  Harris and Marble used DuCane’s 
memorandum to suggest that there existed a school of thought at GHQ – including 
Robertson, DuCane and Frederick Maurice, Robertson’s deputy – which had developed 
a competing theory to Rawlinson’s ‘bite and hold’ method.  Gary Sheffield also picked 
up on DuCane’s memorandum but rather than using it as a rebuttal of Haig’s 
breakthrough plans, Sheffield emphasised DuCane’s quotes that the breakthrough was ‘a 
good plan that failed’ because of the failures of subordinate commanders to push on 
rapidly after the initial successes on the morning of 10 March.174  This marks a 
significant departure from earlier interpretations of DuCane’s memorandum.  The reason 
for this is that Sheffield used the version of the report which is located in the IV Corps 
reports on the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and dated 31 March, rather than the one held in 
the GHQ General Staff file or in Sir John French’s papers which dates from 15 March.  
These are two fundamentally different papers.   
 
The memorandum used by Prior and Wilson, and Harris and Marble, constitutes the first 
draft of DuCane’s personal investigation into the lessons of the Battle of Neuve 
Chapelle.  The copy he passed to the CGS, Sir William Robertson, on 15 March is the 
paper contained in the GHQ General Staff file.  Robertson’s comments on that draft, 
including a rejection of DuCane’s claim that ‘we failed to penetrate the enemy’s front’ is 
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the copy of the document found in Sir John French’s personal papers.  Presumably once 
Robertson commented on the memorandum it was returned to DuCane for further 
consideration and redrafting and was re-submitted to Robertson in late-March.  In the 
intervening period, Sir Henry Rawlinson’s reputation had diminished in the eyes of Sir 
John French.  This occurred because Rawlinson placed the blame for the failure to break 
through the German lines at Neuve Chapelle on Major-General Francis Davies, the GOC 
8th Division, rather than admit to his own failures of command.  This, coupled with Haig 
informing French of his belief that the plan would have succeeded without Rawlinson 
and Willcocks delaying operations after the initial break-in, meant that an unofficial 
narrative had been created in which the breakthrough methodology was completely 
vindicated.  It appears there was little room or appetite for alternative solutions.  
Robertson passed DuCane’s second report to French on 31 March.  Sir John French’s 
comments on the revised papers reveal much about his critical thinking at the time.  
While DuCane asserted that cavalry was of limited use in the conditions of the western 
front, Sir John French erased that paragraph from the report commenting that while he 
agreed, the role of cavalry ‘is so far open to argument that I should prefer to mind these 
remarks’.175  In addition, DuCane advocated that all ranks should press on and advance 
irrespective of others around them and all ranks should hold to the principle that ‘ground 
gained should never be abandoned except under compulsion, as it may prove to be of 
much greater importance than is apparent at the time’.  According to French, this 
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recommendation would ‘inculcate a somewhat dangerous doctrine’ into the British 
operational methodology.176 
 
Far from viewing DuCane’s findings as backing up his own methodology articulated on 
8 February, Robertson chose to amend the paper prior to sending it to Sir John French.  
While the reasons for this are unclear, a comment made by Robertson on DuCane’s 
memorandum of 15 March may shed some light.  In referring to DuCane’s methodical 
mode of advance, Robertson commented that ‘this is the French method; I prefer 
ours’.177  The French Army began the First Battle of Champagne in February 1915 and 
experience from this action had shown that small-scale limited attacks had failed and 
suffered terribly from German enfilade fire.178  It seems that Robertson had paid 
attention to the experiences of the French Army and consideration of those experiences 
led him to reject the wisdom of his own, and subsequently DuCane’s, operational 
methodology.  In place, he chose to present to Sir John French a paper which focused on 
the tactical lessons from Neuve Chapelle and erased all operational lessons.  The result 
was that DuCane’s conclusions were never presented to a audience wider than a few 
members of the General Staff at GHQ.   
 
For the most part, Sir John French and GHQ did not actively attempt to share lessons 
they identified from First Army’s offensive actions with the army’s war managers.  The 
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exception was following the opening phases of the Battle of Loos.  On 6 October 1915, 
GHQ staff passed a memorandum written by Sir John French to the commanders of the 
First and Second Armies.  From there, the memorandum was cascaded down through 
corps headquarters to the headquarters of individual divisions.179  Based on the 
experience of the 1915 campaign, Sir John French asserted that the main lesson he 
deduced was that the extra power that modern weaponry had conferred on to the side 
who sat on the defensive meant that limits were placed on the power and endurance of 
each offensive movement.  French also noted that isolated attempts to retake lost 
positions by ‘energetic divisional and brigade commanders’ should be discouraged 
unless there was a supporting artillery bombardment.  He also mentioned that that he had 
frequently pointed out the futility of local counterattacks delivered hours after the 
Germans had captured a position but, in an indication that few listened to his comments, 
he asserted that those exact tactics had been recently carried out by the 28th Division at 
Loos.180  At the close of the campaign, GHQ issued a general staff note which set out 
their plans for the 1916 campaign.  In it, the general staff announced that the lessons 
identified from the Battle of Loos conformed to that of all other offensives the First 
Army had undertaken in the 1915 campaign: ‘that given adequate artillery preparation, 
or some form of surprise such as a gas attack, there is no insuperable difficulty in 
                                                 
179 TNA, WO95/711, IV Corps General Staff War Diary, Sir John French, ‘Memorandum on the 
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overwhelming the enemy’s troops in the front line and in support’.181  The operation 
which the general staff proposed for the coming campaign was something of a hybrid 
attack.  It began with an operation with limited objectives intended to exhaust the 
enemy’s reserves paving the way for a decisive attack once those reserves had been 
committed.  On one hand, this type of attack could be seen as adapting to the strategic 
conditions and applying lessons identified by analysis of the First Army’s five offensive 
operations in which the decisive breakthrough battle failed to achieve its objectives.  
However, it could also be seen as being an application of the principles of the 
preparatory and decisive attacks as described in the FSR.  Indeed, as the staff note 
offered, ‘it cannot yet be admitted that [the conditions of trench warfare] have materially 
altered the basic principles upon which battles have been fought in the past.  What we 
need to do is to apply these principles correctly, rather than think of casting them 
aside’.182   
 
Analysis of the First Army war managers’ operational methodology and decision-
making over the course of the 1915 campaign allows for the addition of another layer to 
the Organisational Development Model. While the first stage of the model represented 
the five inputs which created the paradigm of war in which the war managers operated, 
the second layer represented the process of planning and conducting offensive actions, 
the third layer demonstrates how the war managers sought to make sense of their 
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experiences and shows how they could identify create and collate new knowledge in the 
post-battle period.  The result of this layer was a body of new knowledge based on the 
collective experiences of the surviving participants of that battle.  Figure 2.2, below, 
illustrates this layer of the Organisational Development Model.   
 
Figure 2.2: Stage Three – Methods of Identifying Lessons 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer three main questions: what factors shaped the decision 
making processes of First Army’s war managers; what methods did they use for data 
creation and collection; and what factors were responsible for inhibiting or aiding the 
learning process.  In the first place, this chapter demonstrated that there were five 
organisational learning inputs which created the framework in which the war managers 
considered their experiences and made decisions.  The war managers, especially Haig, 
were heavily influenced by their pre-war military education and their previous 
experiences of warfare both prior to the Great War and during the 1914 campaign.  The 















prevailing institutional ethos and current doctrine to create the mental parameters in 
which the war managers considered the nature of the war.  By dictating the amount of 
firepower and manpower the First Army could use in undertaking offensive operations, 
the general staff at GHQ added physical operational parameters to the mental dimension 
detailed above.  These five inputs represent the first phase of the Organisational 
Development Model. 
 
The second question addressed in this chapter examined the methods First Army’s war 
managers used to create and collect new information.  It demonstrated that there were 
three such methods: lessons could be identified by war managers themselves; war 
managers could request information from subordinate formations; and lessons could be 
passed to the First Army from outside its structure.  The first method represented by far 
the most common practice, although there was no standardisation of operational 
procedure. Catignani’s examination of the British Army in Afghanistan in the twenty-
first century found that without a formal system for knowledge capture and evaluation 
commanders reverted to what they were conditioned to do.  This chapter demonstrated 
that the same was true for the war managers of the First Army in the 1915 campaign.  
Faced with a style of warfare with which none were familiar, and with no system in 
place for understanding it, the war managers tended to revert to viewing the operational 
problems of the western front in terms of the existing Field Service Regulations.  The 
reversion to the ‘old principles of war’ meant that Rosen’s idea of a ‘new theory of 
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victory’ was absent at the operational level of war in the 1915 campaign.183 While some 
war managers were willing and able to seek out information from below, this was not 
standard practice, and occurred as often on an informal basis as it did formally through 
the army hierarchy.  The majority of war managers demonstrated a general willingness 
to consider their own experiences and to attempt to draw lessons from them.  However, 
this willingness to learn did not necessarily mean that they identified the correct lessons 
from their experiences.  As a result, the Organisational Development Model makes no 
judgement on the success or impact of the identified lesson.  Overall, the experience of 
the First Army’s war managers in the 1915 campaign showed that while the 




                                                 




Organisational Development at the Tactical Level 
 
A true understanding of the evolution of the British Army’s operational method during 
the Great War must be sought not only below the level of high command but also below 
that of army and corps, principally at the level of the division.1 
         John Bourne 
 
Chapter two asserted that military activity takes place at a number of different but 
overlapping levels.  This chapter builds on the study of learning at the operational level 
of war by examining organisational development at the tactical level.  A modern 
interpretation defines this as ‘the level of war at which battles and engagements are 
planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units’.2  As 
chapter two suggested, there is a great degree of crossover between the operational and 
tactical levels of war.  For the purpose of this thesis, the tactical level will be taken as 
being concerned with the actions of units no larger than an infantry division which Haig 
himself described as ‘our real battle unit’.3  This agrees with Millett, Murray and 
Watman’s definition which describes the tactical level in terms of the techniques used by 
combat units to fight localised engagements rather than the fighting of a specific 
campaign which characterises the operational level.4  By this definition, tactical 
superiority on its own cannot overcome poor planning and performance at the 
operational level, and a tactical concept will not lead to victory if it is not part of a wider 
                                                 
1 John Bourne, ‘British Divisional Commanders during the Great War: First Thoughts’, Gunfire: A 
Journal of First World War History 29, nd, 22. 
2 United States Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military Terms (New York, 2009), 538. 
3 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Typescript Diary, 7 November 1915. 
4 Millett, Murray and Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organisations’, 19. 
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operational concept.5  The study of the tactical level gives insight into a different kind of 
institutional change than that discussed in chapter two.   
 
Studies of British operational performance have tended to focus on the infantry division 
as the main battle unit.6  Stuart Mitchell, in his examination of the performance of the 
32nd Division, found that, by 1918, the divisional war managers had implemented a more 
sophisticated system of information feedback which consisted of interviews and formal 
after-action reports including evidence-based evaluations of how German soldiers in the 
divisional zone were killed.7  Mitchell found that institutional change in the 32nd 
Division was driven by an increase in battle wisdom, decentralisation of decision-
making, effective structure and efficient leadership.8  Alun Thomas’ study of the 8th 
Division also highlighted that ‘cultural factors’ such as morale, leadership and esprit de 
corps increased the effectiveness of the formation, which, by the Hundred Days 
campaign, was able to adopt a sophisticated approach to battle planning based on the 
specific tactical situation with which it was confronted.9  Furthermore, Thomas 
demonstrated that while many of the basic tactical ideas remained pertinent throughout 
the war, the main advances occurred in the specific techniques used and the firepower 
available to support infantry formations.10  Craig French’s evaluation of the 
development of the 51st Division demonstrated that changes in the divisional structure 
                                                 
5 Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice (Washington, 2009), I-10. 
6 The exception being Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front. 
7 Mitchell, ‘Learning in the 32nd Division’, 117-20. 
8 Mitchell, ‘Learning in the 32nd Division’, 272-6. 
9 Thomas, ‘British 8th Infantry Division’, abstract, np. 
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and firepower capabilities were key to its increasingly successful operational 
methodology.11  While divisional studies are useful in presenting a snapshot of change 
over time in a particular formation, two problems can be identified through analysis of 
existing works.  First, studies rarely evaluate how change occurred in the subject 
division, preferring to describe what the changes were and relating them to the wider 
debate on learning in the British Army.  Second, the focus of many of these divisional 
studies have been on the second half of the war, leaving the 1915 campaign relatively 
neglected in comparison.12  Despite this, in 1915 the BEF did begin to make tactical 
adaptations, so much so that by the first day of the Battle of the Somme the formations 
of the British Army had, as suggested by Griffith, ‘discovered most of the key points of 
modern warfare’.13 
 
This chapter examines how institutional change affected tactical formations in the 1915 
campaign. It is split into three sections each of which focuses on a significant area of 
institutional change and learning which was manifested at the tactical level of war.  The 
first section concerns what can be termed tactical data creation and knowledge-transfer.  
It examines how the process of organisational development differed at the tactical level 
when compared to the operational level with respect to the creation, collation and 
                                                 
11 Craig French, ‘The 51st (Highland) Division During the Great War’, unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Glasgow (2006),  
12 The exceptions to this are French’s thesis on the Highland Division which includes a brief case 
study of the Battle of Givenchy and Thomas’ work on the 8th Division which examines that 
formation’s performance at both Neuve Chapelle and Bois Grenier.  Oddly, Kathryn Snowden in 
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to ignore that battle in her analysis, arguing that to include it ‘might not have led to the most 
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13 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, 53, 62. 
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transfer of new knowledge.  The second section examines technological adaptation and 
demonstrates how the war managers sought to incorporate new inventions into their 
battle plans.  The third section examines how the divisions and battalions of the First 
Army adapted their structure in response to the lessons they learned from their 
experiences in the 1915 campaign.  It focuses on the structural changes that increased 
the firepower of the First Army’s tactical units and formations. The conclusion evaluates 
the importance of these changes and demonstrates how they alter the overall 
Organisational Development Model. 
 
Tactical Data Creation and Knowledge-Transfer 
In terms of organisational development, there was no fundamental difference in the 
learning processes of divisions, brigades and battalions when compared to those of 
higher-level formations.  War managers at these lower levels were subject to the same 
five inputs as those war managers who commanded corps and the First Army itself; 
namely, knowledge from education and experience, prevailing institutional doctrine and 
ethos, and the immediate strategic parameters as defined by GHQ.  Similarly, the war 
managers at the tactical level used the same three main methods of data creation and 
collection as their counterparts at the operational level; they identified lessons 
themselves, they requested lessons from subordinate formations, and lessons were 
transferred to them from outside their immediate structure.  There is, however, one key 
difference in data collection at this stage of the Organisational Development Model.  
Practitioners at the tactical level, from platoon commanders and specialist officers 
through to divisional commanders and their staffs, were sometimes proactive in 
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identifying lessons and transmitting them informally up the chain of command without 
waiting for official orders from above.  The learning process being driven from below 
has been described as bottom-up adaptation, to distinguish from the more traditional top-
down approach normally associated with institutions with rigid hierarchical structures.14  
Adaptation from the bottom-up is viewed as representing small-scale institutional 
change in which errors in current practice are identified and corrected and new tactics, 
techniques and technologies are created, tested and implemented in and by combat units.  
Despite its small scope, adaptation at the tactical level represents an important facet of 
organisational development in the British Army during the Great War. 
 
Analysis of the war diaries and supplementary files of the units and formations which 
made up the First Army reveal instances where junior officers took the initiative in 
passing reports up the chain of command without waiting for orders from above.  
Among the first of these reports was one authored by Lieutenant Francis Nosworthy of 
No.6 Company, 1st King George’s Own Sappers and Miners, then attached to the Indian 
Corps.  During the portion of the 1914 campaign commonly known as the ‘race to the 
sea’, elements of the BEF attacked the village of Neuve Chapelle. Lieutenant 
Nosworthy’s report on that action – written on 30 October 1914 – was a particularly 
valuable document for a number of reasons.  In the first place, Nosworthy was the only 
British officer who had knowledge of the specific positions in Neuve Chapelle, having 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Grissom, ‘The Future of Military Innovation Studies’, 920-4; Farrell, 
‘Improving in War’, 567-73; Murray, Military Adaptation in War; Catignani, ‘Coping with 
Knowledge’, 31; Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys’, 279-82. 
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spent several hours examining strongpoints, trenches and the enemy’s dispositions.15  
Second, Nosworthy included a number of recommendations for the future ‘if an attack 
on the village becomes necessary’.16  These included the best preparation point for an 
assault, the need to effectively shell the strong German trenches he encountered in the 
village, and the necessity of withholding the attack until specific machine-gun positions 
had been destroyed.  Finally, Nosworthy produced a detailed sketch map on which he 
marked a number of positions in the village of Neuve Chapelle including the position of 
trenches, fortified houses, snipers and machine gun emplacements.  The exact paper trail 
of Nosworthy’s report is unclear, however, as he specifically described that he ‘ventured 
to send this’ up the chain of command it can be demonstrated that the transfer of 
knowledge happened on his initiative.17  This is a clear example of data being created at 
the bottom of the command hierarchy and being passed up the chain of command 
without requests from above.  While the degree to which war managers consulted 
Nosworthy’s report in the planning phase of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in February-
March 1915 is unclear, its presence in the First Army operations file shows that it was 
transferred to the very top of the army structure. 
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Following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, some reports which were created by junior 
officers were transferred upwards to the top of the institutional hierarchy.  On 4 April, 
Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, GOC Indian Corps, forwarded a diary kept 
during the Neuve Chapelle operations by an engineer officer of the Indian Corps.  The 
original handwritten copy was typed up at Indian Corps headquarters as ‘it contain[ed] 
some interesting notes’ on the battle that Willcocks ‘was sure’ Haig would like to see.18  
The author of the diary was Captain Basil Condon Battye of No.21 Company, 3rd 
Sappers and Miners.  During the Indian Corps’ attack on the Bois du Biez on 10 March, 
Battye and his company were posted in an abandoned brewery, which afforded an 
excellent view of the battlefield, and from where Battye was able to send progress 
reports back to the headquarters of the Jullunder and Sirhind Brigades.19  Battye laid out 
a series of observations from the battle, including specific thoughts on engineering 
methods and on more general principles regarding the infantry and artillery components 
of the attack.  He noted that while the first objective was taken on the morning of 10 
March it was done so with heavy casualties from German machine-guns; if the infantry 
advance had taken place during the bombardment, then the same position would have 
been taken with no casualties, as British officers had walked freely around no-mans-land 
while the artillery bombardment was taking place.  Battye also advocated a reappraisal 
of artillery objectives; in his opinion the failure to neutralise or destroy enemy positions 
on the flanks of the attack enabled the Germans to enfilade the British advance.  In terms 
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of engineering, he advocated a shift in policy away from building and concealing 
strongpoints known as ‘keeps’ in the British defensive lines to working out how to 
locate and destroy them in the German trenches.  A theme evident in Battye’s thoughts 
is the necessity of incorporating other firepower weapons and techniques into the 
infantry and heavy artillery attack plan; he suggested that the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 
emphasised ‘the great importance of developing the high angle short range mortar and 
the machine gun in the assault’.20  Battye’s diary, like Nosworthy’s report, was 
transmitted from the bottom of the army hierarchy to the top. Here, however, the 
knowledge-transfer pathway is more clear; the covering letter demonstrates that it was 
sent to Haig because Willcocks thought it would interest him.  The presence of the 
document in the IV Corps war diary shows that for Haig, or his staff, the report was 
important enough to retain and to transmit to other corps of the First Army.  This 
demonstrates not only that Willcocks was proactive in sending on reports written by 
subordinate officers, it shows that Haig was happy to receive them and to forward them 
to other parties. 
 
While Nosworthy’s report presented ideas which could be used in future attacks and 
Battye’s diary presented lessons based on his eyewitness account, another type of report 
also originated at the tactical level.  In the two days following the failure of the Battle of 
Aubers Ridge, a staff officer, Major Grant, took it upon himself to consult with ‘various 
                                                 
20 TNA, WO95/708, IV Corps General Staff War Diary, Diary of Neuve Chapelle by Capt. Battye’, 
nd. The emphasis is original. 
187 
 
officers in the 1st Corps’ to collect their thoughts on the recent operations.21  Once 
completed, Grant forwarded the report to the chief staff officers at I Corps headquarters. 
Grant noted that at Neuve Chapelle the German parapet had been completely destroyed 
whereas at Aubers Ridge gaps had only been made in the front line defences, indicating 
that they had been strengthened to protect dugouts or machine-gun emplacements.  
Furthermore, the guns situated in those emplacements were so placed to enfilade any 
British assault on the German positions.  Reporting on the artillery bombardment, Grant 
noted that it was a failure and found that the Germans were able to open a heavy rifle 
and machine-gun fire on the British trenches during the preliminary bombardment.  To 
counter this, Grant recommended that in future assaults the bombardment should be 
directed onto a smaller front and continued until the parapets were completely destroyed 
rather than firing until a pre-determined time.  In agreement with Battye’s observations 
from Neuve Chapelle, Grant noted that during the assault an intense shrapnel barrage 
should take place on the flanks of the attack to suppress enfilading machine-gun fire.22 
In drawing together his conclusions, Grant found that while the ‘leaders and staff…had 
foreseen everything that could have been thought of beforehand’ the Germans ‘had been 
able to profit by their experiences at Neuve Chapelle’ and had significantly strengthened 
their defensive lines.23  This is something of a paradox; it could be reasonably expected 
that the German Army would seek to adapt based on their experiences in the same way 
as the British sought to learn from theirs.  Nevertheless, Grant’s final recommendation 
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validated the British approach and agreed with many of the contemporary findings at the 
operational level.  ‘With more explosives’, wrote Grant, ‘and with a larger number of 
heavy guns, there seems little doubt that we should have been successful’.24   
 
The reports created by Grant, Nosworthy and Battye were unusual in that they were 
transmitted from the very bottom of the army command structure to First Army 
headquarters at the top.  Many other reports which considered the tactical experiences of 
war on the western front were passed no higher than the headquarters of the division or 
corps in which the author served.  Following the Battle of Aubers Ridge, Brigadier-
General Arthur Holland, CRA of the 8th Division, forwarded to the CRA of IV Corps a 
report on the effectiveness of artillery fire written by a junior officer.25  The officer, 
Captain the Hon. B. J. Russell of the 104th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, reported his 
observations on the effect of high explosive shells on the German parapet based on his 
experiences on 9 May.  This transfer of information highlights the difficulties of 
effective command in 1915.  Russell sent his report to the chief artillery officer in the 8th 
Division who then sent it to the chief artillery officer in IV Corps; at no point can it be 
shown that the report was forwarded to any member of the general staff outside the 
artillery hierarchy.  While this does not suggest that reports were deliberately hidden, it 
does demonstrate the difficulties in making effective command decisions at divisional 
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headquarters when the GOC was not always presented with the most up to date 
information.   
 
The presence of Russell’s report in the war diary of the 2nd Division CRA suggests that 
it was also transmitted horizontally to other artillery formations within the First Army.  
If this was indeed the case, it would not be the only time information was informally 
transferred from one group to another at the tactical level.  Following the Battle of Loos 
the 46th Division was transferred to the First Army.  Its first task was to capture the 
Hohenzollern Redoubt, a fortified position in the north of the battlefield which had been 
attacked by the 9th Division on 25 September.  As the 46th Division was unfamiliar with 
the ground, two officers – Lieutenant Colonel S. E. Hollond, GSO1 of the 9th Division 
and Captain J. S. Drew, the adjutant of the 5th Cameron Highlanders – visited the 
headquarters of the 46th Division to pass on their experiences of the attack the previous 
week.  While the advice was passed on verbally, the staff of the 46th Division did draw 
up a typed version of the conversation.  Hollond and Drew illustrated twenty-two points 
which would be useful for the war managers of the 46th Division in drawing up their 
operational plans.26  Their report covered where to site machine-guns for the attack, 
possible locations of German battlefield headquarters, what stores to take forward, 
particular points in the German line which caused trouble to the 9th Division, and the 
order in which to attack those points.  As the 46th Division had no experience of trench-
holding in the Loos sector, the topographical descriptions of the defences which were 
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presented to the new division were especially welcome.  The day after Hollond and 
Drew’s visit, Lieutenant-Colonel Gathorne-Hardy, the GSO1 of the 7th Division, also 
attended the headquarters of the 46th Division and added his thoughts on the position to 
be attacked.27  The two visits certainly affected how Major-General Stuart-Wortley, the 
GOC 46th Division, approached the planning of his attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt; 
he noted he created his draft attack plan after consultation with ‘staff and other officers 
who took part in the late attacks’.28  That plan saw Stuart-Wortley champion a limited 
objective, citing that the majority of casualties in that sector on 25 September came 
when the 9th Division tried to fight their way to their second objective through a series of 
miners’ cottages.  By removing that position from the attack the 46th Division would 
suffer fewer casualties, and would provide the division ‘with all we want’ in terms of 
battlefield success.29  This example highlights that, for the troops on the ground, 
information which stemmed from the experiences of other similar formations often had 
the greatest impact when transferred horizontally rather than vertically up the formal 
army structure.  In this, it agrees with Farrell’s study of the British Army in Afghanistan 
in the period 2006–2009, in which infantry brigades transferred new knowledge to their 
successors who could then transform that knowledge into structural and technological 
changes.30 
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When the BEF arrived in France in August 1914 it possessed little of the equipment 
necessary for fighting trench warfare. As a prolonged period of stalemate had not been 
foreseen by British operational planners, there existed no formal military or civilian 
infrastructure for the creation, development and manufacture of new types of 
weaponry.31  Despite this, the Great War - and the 1915 campaign in particular – 
provided a fertile ground for technological adaptation.  In many cases, this adaptation 
was driven from the bottom-up as junior officers and specialists drew on their individual 
experiences, and used their initiative, to try and create new technology which could 
overcome the deadlock in their particular sector.  This section examines how 
technological adaptation occurred in the First Army over the course of the 1915 
campaign and demonstrates that – with the exception of the production and use of 
poison gas – the development of new technology was often small in scale, reactionary in 
nature and practical in implementation, rather than originating as part of a considered 
approach to increase force effectiveness.  
 
One of the first performance gaps identified following the onset of strategic stalemate in 
the 1914 campaign was the need for a portable form of artillery which could be used 
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against entrenched positions from close range.32  On 11 November, officers in IV Corps 
noticed the appearance of trench mortars in the German lines and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Henry Rawlinson, the GOC IV Corps, sent his brother Toby – an officer on his staff – to 
Paris ‘to make something to counter it’.33  When he returned two weeks later, Toby 
Rawlinson brought with him four prototype trench mortars and began trials to test their 
viability in action.  While their short range and small size of shell meant that IV Corps 
war managers could only describe the tests as ‘fairly satisfactory’, Rawlinson still sent 
the mortars to the trenches and dispatched his brother back to Paris to conduct more 
experiments.34  By 12 December, engineering officers in I Corps had started work on 
making their own trench mortars out of steel piping found in the local district and, by the 
end of the year, had begun to adapt a model of trench mortar which the French Tenth 
Army had found to be simple and effective.35  In the first week of January 1915, 
experiments were made by the 1st Irish Guards in which trench mortar fire was 
combined with that of snipers to dispel an enemy attack and, in March, Lieutenant 
Marion Crawford of the 4th Guards Brigade conducted his own experiments to find the 
most effective means of employing groups of trench mortars in offensive action.36  That 
the reports created in both these experiments were passed up the chain of command and 
then disseminated across the force is further evidence of the importance of bottom-up 
adaptation at the tactical level.  In the following months a number of adaptations and 
modifications were made to the trench mortars until, in July, a design by Wilfred Stokes 
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was adopted as standard.  Stokes’ new weapon was safe, easy to use and quick-firing 
and was seen by Haig as being of ‘great value…for trench warfare and for use against 
defended houses in which there are several machine-guns’.37  The creation and use of 
trench mortars in offensive action demonstrate the process of battlefield adaptation at 
work: a performance gap was identified, experiments to resolve the problem were made, 
and a product was created and then refined until a successful version was mass-produced 
and supplied en masse to the force. 
 
Another example of technological adaptation in the 1915 campaign was the development 
of rifle and hand grenades as both offensive and defensive weapons.  Indeed, such was 
the importance of these weapons on the western front, that a training pamphlet, 
circulated in October 1915, opined that ‘the grenade had become one of the principal 
weapons in trench warfare’.38  Hand grenades were not new weapons for the British 
Army; they had been used throughout the Crimean War and in siege tactics during the 
Boer War although no provision had been made prior to 1914 in training troops for their 
use in trench warfare.  Furthermore, the need to light a fuse on the grenade prior to 
throwing it was responsible for numerous casualties in the British ranks, particularly 
when the thrower hit the grenade on the back wall of their trench, causing a premature 
explosion.39  For Haig, that the BEF did not have small, effective ‘hand bombs’ meant 
that they were ‘certainly fighting at a disadvantage’ compared to the Germans.40  To 
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counter these difficulties parties of the Royal Engineers began to experiment with 
making their own grenades in workshops close to the front lines.  There was, however, 
no central coordination of grenade production in the First Army and this resulted in a 
great number of different types of grenades being produced and different formations 
referring to the same grenades by different names, leading to much confusion.41  
Typically, individual infantry divisions created their own system of grenade production; 
in the 9th Division, the Royal Engineers preferred to supply the troops with the ‘Bethune 
Bomb’, in the 8th Division the engineers adapted petrol tins and jam pots to create 
rudimentary weapons.42  As with the production of trench mortars, adaptation and 
modification continued until a superior pattern was developed.  The end product was the 
Mills Bomb which was first designed in February 1915 and sent for combat testing in 
March, although large quantities were not supplied to the BEF on the western front until 
September.43  Thereafter, the Mills Bomb remained the standard pattern of hand grenade 
for the remainder of the war. 
 
While the creation and adaptation of trench mortars and grenades represented two of the 
inventions with the most impact, others were less successful.  Lieutenant Philip 
Christison, the machine-gun officer of the 6th Cameron Highlanders, recorded that his 
battalion went into action with a weapon known as a ‘ballista…a giant elastic catapult 
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which could hurl a grenade about 200 yards’.44  Officially known as a Leach Catapult 
after its inventor, the ballista was a prime example of the experimental nature of 
battlefield adaptation in 1915.  While it benefitted from being operated silently, the need 
to fire it in the open made a tempting target for German artillery and machine-gunners; 
as Christison noted, at Loos the teams operating the battalion catapults were all killed 
after being able to fire off only one or two grenades.45  They were soon abandoned and 
replaced by more reliable technology.  While the Leach Catapults were supplied to units 
by the War Office and by GHQ, other inventions originated within the units’ own 
structure.  The 1st Division created an ‘Inventions Committee’ with the remit of 
considering novel inventions devised by soldiers of its constituent infantry battalions, 
artillery batteries and engineering companies.46  Evidence of only one of their inventions 
survives; the ‘Reversible Trench-Stopper Mark I’ was a piece of trench defence 
apparatus that would allow enemy soldiers to pass one way along a trench through a type 
of doorway while large ‘projecting blades’ meant that they would then be trapped on the 
other side, supposedly making them easier to kill.47  The proposal was submitted to the 
Inventions Committee by Brigadier-General Cecil Lowther, the GOC 1 Brigade, but the 
committee decided not to forward it to other branches for implementation.  While the 
creation and adaptation of new technologies was an important part of force development 
in 1915, the war managers of the BEF had a difficult task in analysing and assessing the 
                                                 
44 IWM, Christison Papers, Doc.4370, unpublished memoir, 36. 
45 IWM, Christison Papers, Doc.4370, unpublished memoir, 36. 
46 TNA, WO95/1228, First Division General Staff War Diary, 26 June 1915. 
47 TNA, WO95/1228, First Division General Staff War Diary, Appendix 74, ‘For Consideration by 
the Newly Appointed “Inventions Committee”. 
196 
 
relative merits of small-scale tactical alterations which had been originally created to 
solve problems. 
 
While the majority of technological adaptations on the western front resulted in the 
creation of new or improved weapons designed to increase the firepower effectiveness 
of tactical units, one development had the potential for greater impact in terms of 
winning the war.48  During the Second Battle of Ypres, the German Army attacked the 
French, Canadian and British positions using poison gas.  The British response was swift 
and two-fold; infantry divisions were trained to protect themselves from gas attacks and 
a programme of works was begun to develop Britain’s own chemical warfare 
capabilities.  Gas was quickly adopted by senior British war managers – and Haig in 
particular – as a weapon of great potential in unlocking the deadlock of trench warfare.  
Its ability to cause panic, as evidenced at the Second Battle of Ypres, could create a hole 
in the enemy’s lines through which the BEF could channel its reserves.49  This fitted 
well with Haig’s operational methodology of fighting the decisive breakthrough battle.  
Indeed, Haig came to rely so heavily on the use of poison gas at Loos that he suggested 
to Sir William Robertson that the attack should only proceed if gas was to be used.50  In 
the event, gas played a marginal role in the limited successes during the Battle of Loos.  
In many cases, the gas blew back onto the waiting British infantry and caused casualties 
in their ranks and, on several divisional fronts, made little impact on the German 
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defences.  Despite its fickle nature, gas became a familiar feature on western front 
battlefields.  Its adoption by the British in 1915 demonstrates both the symbiotic 
relationship of technological adaptation and the willingness of British war managers to 
quickly and readily adopt new weapons with immense potential.  While Palazzo has 
suggested that this shows a flexibility of approach in the mindset of the British war 
managers, it should be said that the technological innovations and adaptations of the 
1915 campaign were employed firmly within the familiar, pre-war paradigm of war.51   
 
While this section has focused on a limited number of the more important developments, 
the scale of technological adaptation in the Great War was astounding; between August 
1915 and November 1918 47,949 inventions and ideas were submitted to the War 
Office’s Munitions Invention Department.52  The creation and adaptation of trench 
mortars and rifle and hand grenades gives insight into the practical effects of 
organisational development at the tactical level of war.  A war manager – Sir John 
French in the case of trench mortars – identified that the BEF required a weapon to carry 
out a specific task.  Then, attempts were made to create or acquire such a weapon which 
was then tested, modified and used in the trenches.  This demonstrates that one result of 
organisational development is the design or adaptation of a new piece of technology.  
The creation and improvement of trench mortars and grenades fits well into Catignani’s 
categorisation of adaptation as a ‘correction of errors’ and agrees with Farrell’s assertion 
                                                 
51 Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front, 55-6. 
52 Saunders, Weapons of the Trench War, ix 
198 
 
that adaptation relates to a refinement of existing tactics, techniques and technologies.53  
The use of gas as an offensive weapon represents something different and can be seen as 
what Rosen described as ‘a new theory of victory’.54  While Rosen coined this term with 
regards to intraservice innovation in peacetime, it suitably describes the approach 
adopted by the German Army at the Second Battle of Ypres and the British response at 
Loos.  They had identified, created and used a weapon which had the potential, at least, 
to represent a new theory of victory; Haig certainly considered the use of gas as a means 
of making sure of gaining positions ‘in spite of the greatly improved defences’ which the 
enemy had created.55  The creation and adaptation of trench mortars and grenades did 
not hold the same potential as the creation of a new gas.  In short, the war managers 
complemented their adaptation of some minor weapons with the innovation of a new, 
potentially war-winning creation. 
 
Structural Changes at the Tactical Level 
Chapter one asserted that the structure of an organisation plays an important role in the 
organisation’s learning process.  It found that at the operational level the creation of the 
First Army actively impeded that BEF’s ability to learn from its experiences by failing 
to determine who had responsibility for the force’s professional development and by 
failing to establish a formal system for data capture.  However, structural changes in the 
1915 campaign were not solely confined to the creation of the First Army.  Rather, as 
the army underwent its mass expansion, new branches were established and the structure 
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of the division – the main battle unit – was changed, with many of these structural 
alterations stemming from technological adaptation and weapons creation discussed in 
the previous section.  In terms of military innovation studies in twenty-first century 
conflict, alterations to the force structure have been shown to have sometimes originated 
at the tactical level.56  For example, in Afghanistan in 2008, 3 Brigade recommended the 
creation of an ‘influence cell’ at brigade headquarters, a recommendation which was 
implemented by 19 Brigade in the subsequent tour then retained by 11 Brigade, such 
was its success.57  In the First Army in the 1915 campaign, the process was different.  
While technological adaptations that originated at the bottom of the force hierarchy 
often resulted in changes to the force structure, the decision to alter the structure was 
taken at the top of the hierarchy and not by the individual divisions themselves.  That 
any changes occurred is surprising given the position of the War Office in 1915, which 
opined that it had ‘objections to creating new organisations in the Army during the 
progress of the war if [it could] be avoided’.58  This section examines how the tactical 
structure of the divisions of the First Army changed over the course of the 1915 
campaign and evaluates the reasons for these changes. 
 
During the Great War, the battalion was the standard operational unit of infantry in the 
British Army.  At the declaration of war, infantry battalions were split into a 
headquarters, a transport section, a small machine-gun section, and four rifle companies, 
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each of approximately 220 men.  The rifle, then, was the primary weapon of infantry 
formations and British attack doctrine was shaped around its use both in the principle of 
‘fire and movement’ which brought the infantry into contact with the enemy, and in the 
concept of the ‘mad minute’ in which a concentrated, intense period of rifle fire was 
designed to overwhelm the enemy.59  Throughout the 1915 campaign, the idea of 
infantry as riflemen did not change substantially and it was not until February 1917 that 
the structure of an infantry platoon was formally altered from the pre-1914 model.  
Drawing upon lessons identified in the Somme campaign, war managers issued a 
pamphlet – SS.143 – Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action – 
which recommended that each infantry platoon should ‘consist of a combination of all 
the weapons with which the Infantry are now armed’.60  This pamphlet asserted that a 
‘normal formation’ for each platoon would include a section of riflemen, a section of 
rifle grenadiers, a section of bombers, and a section of Lewis gunners.  This structure 
was quickly implemented in the infantry battalions of the BEF; analysis of a platoon 
personnel list for Number Ten Platoon of the 6th Cameron Highlanders shows that this 
structure was certainly in use during the First Battle of the Scarpe in April 1917 and may 
have been informally adopted prior to the release of SS.143.61  However, while changes 
to the structure of infantry units did occur later in the war, there were few change of note 
over the course of the 1915 campaign.   
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The alterations to the force structure, which occurred in the 1915 campaign, represented 
the war managers’ attempts to increase the tactical capabilities of their main battle units, 
particularly in terms of the amount of firepower they could bring to the offensive.  
Indeed, many of the technological adaptations mentioned in the previous section led 
directly to adaptations of brigade and divisional structures.  Following testing in the first 
three months of 1915, Haig ordered that all infantry brigades should be equipped with 
trench mortars ‘so they will be able to deal at once with any defended locality without 
having to send back and wait for distant artillery support’.62  Haig then ordered that the 
mortars should be organised into brigade ‘bomb batteries’ under the command of a 
Trench Mortar Officer.63  Early in the 1916 campaign, the structure of the divisional 
trench mortar batteries were ‘placed on a more satisfactory basis’ and ‘Stokes Mortar 
Batteries’ were established, each drawing their personnel from the divisional infantry.64  
In the context of organisational development, these structural alterations can be seen to 
have stemmed from war managers’ identification of the need to have a portable system 
of artillery supporting the infantry attacks.  Brigade Grenade Companies were organised 
on a more informal basis; the 7th Division formed their Brigade Grenade Company in 
December 1914 following their experiences in fighting at Ypres and in Artois but the 
Canadian Division took until April 1915 to form their own dedicated unit of 
grenadiers.65  The use of gas on the western front also necessitated a change to the force 
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structure albeit at a level removed from the division.  In July 1915 two ‘Specialist 
Companies’ were created under the guidance of Major Charles Foulkes of the Royal 
Engineers with two more following in August, half being attached to the First Army and 
half to the Second Army.  Such was the success of the Special Companies that one of 
Haig’s first actions following his promotion to Commander-in-Chief in December 1915 
was to recommend the expansion of the Special Companies into a Special Brigade, 
headed by a Director of Gas Services at GHQ. 
 
Many of the structural changes occurred as a response to tactics adopted by the German 
Army and which had resulted in localised battlefield successes against the British and 
French.  An example of this, which was not derived from a technological adaptation, 
was the creation of the Tunnelling Companies of the Royal Engineers.  On 20 December 
1914, German engineers dug tunnels under no-man’s-land at Givenchy and blew a series 
of ten small mines under basic trenches held by the Sirhind Brigade of the Indian Corps.  
The explosions were accompanied by an artillery bombardment and were followed by a 
rapid infantry advance which resulted in the capture of the entire Sirhind Brigade’s front 
and supporting trench systems.66  The structural changes of the British infantry divisions 
which followed, demonstrates a rapid acceptance on the part of the war managers that 
the structure of tactical units would have to change in response to the conditions of war 
on the western front.  While elements of the Indian Corps had been experimenting with 
small-scale mines since November 1914, few formal tests had been conducted and the 
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units lacked trained engineers to advise on the practice of tunnelling.67  However, in 
late-December 1914, GHQ ordered the First and Second Armies to select from among 
their ranks, ‘suitable personnel’ to form into Brigade Mining Sections.68  The creation of 
these informal units was, however, haphazard in nature and unevenly implemented 
across the force; for example, the plans to form Brigade Mining Sections in the 
Canadian Division were interrupted by their participation in the Second Battle of Ypres 
in April 1915 and were not resumed until July.69  However, in an example of tactical 
adaptation driven from the bottom-up, some officers within the Canadian Division 
structure undertook their own unofficial mining operations prior to the resumption of the 
creation of Brigade Mining Sections.70   
 
Concurrently, Major John Norton-Griffiths, a cavalry officer who had worked as an 
engineer before the war, wrote to the War Office in December 1914 suggesting that 
techniques he had used in improving drainage systems in Manchester could be used in 
support of the war effort to dig under German positions.71  Norton-Griffith’s suggestion 
was initially dismissed, however, in February 1915, he was ordered to France to begin 
the organisation of eight specialist tunnelling companies, which were to be incorporated 
into the First Army structure, a development which marked the first permanent change 
in force structure which had resulted from the experience of fighting on the western 
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front.72  In what was a private, although officially sanctioned, enterprise, Norton-
Griffiths visited the headquarters of New Army units that were likely to have trained 
miners among their ranks, including the Northumberland Fusiliers, Duke of Cornwall’s 
Light Infantry and the Yorkshire Light Infantry of the 23rd Division, and arranged for 
men to be transferred to the new tunnelling companies.73  Furthermore, he actively 
arranged for commissions for trained civilian mining engineers and appropriated the 
necessary tools of the trade so that the men arrived in France fully equipped for their 
task.74  Such was the success of Norton-Griffiths’ endeavour twenty-five tunnelling 
companies of the Royal Engineers were created by the start of the Somme campaign in 
July 1916.   
 
A further, particularly influential, structural adaptation in the BEF during the Great War 
was the establishment of the Machine Gun Corps.  While this was finalised in January 
1916, its origins lay in the early days of the 1915 campaign.  Each infantry battalion 
proceeded to war with two Maxim machine-guns, a number which doubled in February 
1915, and which was supplemented by the arrival of four Lewis Guns prior to the Battle 
of Loos.  The increase in number of machine-guns can be explained partly as a 
realisation of their power in both offensive and defensive situations, and as a result of 
the expansion of the army, which entailed a reduction in musketry standards.  In early 
1915, each division was given a Motor Machine Gun Battery whose original role had 
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been as armoured despatch riders but who, with the onset of trench warfare, served 
mainly as auxiliary machine gun sections.  Some commanders in the First Army viewed 
these units as ineffective, having ‘come out with the wrong ideas and little training’, and 
with leaders unsure of their roles in the wider divisional structures.75   
 
In the summer of 1915, the first steps were taken to draw together the various machine-
gun units into one centralised corps.  The catalyst for this change was the heavy rate of 
casualties incurred in the opening months of the 1915 campaign.  At that point, officers 
commanding individual reserve infantry battalions were responsible for furnishing front 
line service battalions of the same regiment with trained machine gunners.  This 
arrangement meant that, owing to the ‘unevenness of casualties’ during an attack, some 
units lost all their machine-gunners and others lost none, leading to a situation when 
half-trained men were being sent to the front to replace casualties.76  The solution was 
devised by the Director of Military Training at the War Office, Sir Frederick Heath-
Caldwell, who suggested setting up a dedicated Machine Gun Corps, with one machine-
gun company attached to each infantry brigade, complementing rather than replacing the 
existing battalion Lewis gunners, and streamlining the training and replacement of those 
in France.77  In terms of firepower, each battalion’s four Vickers machine-guns were 
replaced by four lightweight Lewis Guns and the sixteen Vickers guns then formed into 
a brigade machine-gun company in a move which was considered by the War Office to 
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be ‘a tactical necessity’.78  These machine gun companies were drawn together under the 
auspices of the Machine Gun Corps on 30 November 1915 in a prime example of the 
structural adaptation of the force in response to the changing nature of war on the 
western front.   
 
While the British Army was initially resistant to structural change during active 
operations, it displayed a remarkable ability to quickly adapt its structure in response to 
changes at the tactical level throughout the 1915 campaign.  This change was driven by 
the war managers both in the field and at the War Office in London and often occurred 
in response to German tactics; Trench Mortar batteries, brigade grenade companies, the 
Special Companies of the Royal Engineers and the Tunnelling Companies were 
structural changes which originated after the British Army copied tactical experiments 
conducted by the German Army.  This, then, could be termed adaptation through 
emulation.  Furthermore, the creation of the Machine Gun Corps stemmed from 
administrative necessity rather than innovative thinking.  In short, none of the structural 
changes which occurred at the tactical level in the British Army in the 1915 campaign 
originated as part of a considered approach to increasing force effectiveness; rather they 




                                                 





This chapter set out to address institutional change at the tactical level in the First Army 
in the 1915 campaign.   It found that in terms of technological and structural adaptation 
the war managers were quick to embrace new, experimental weapons and to incorporate 
them into their force structure.  In terms of knowledge-transfer some officers proved 
adept at using their initiative to transmit information up the army hierarchy without 
waiting for formal orders to do so.  This information, which was created at the bottom of 
the army hierarchy, represents an important facet of institutional change and is reflected 
in alterations to the structure of the Organisational Development Model as it was 
described in chapter two. Figure 3.1, below, illustrates this change to the third stage of 
the Organisational Development Model.  
 
Figure 3.1: Methods of Identifying Lessons at the Tactical Level 
 
These five possibilities represent how the war managers of the First Army – at all levels 
– could consider their experiences and affect institutional change.  When the four 


















were presented with a collection of new information based of the experiences of 
individuals.  Subsequent stages of the Organisational Development Model will 
demonstrate how this new knowledge was considered, was either accepted or rejected, 
and then was used to alter the norms and practices of the BEF.  This chapter has briefly 
highlighted two results of this process.  In the first place, experience on the front lines 
could result in the creation of new technology.  This could either be minor in scope, such 
as the development of a new type of grenade, or it could be seen as being a new theory 
of victory such as the development of an offensive gas programme.  Second, these 
technological adaptations could result in the alteration of the force structure as the war 
managers sought to increase the offensive firepower of their tactical units.  However, 
these institutional changes relied on the willingness and ability of the war managers not 
only to consider the pool of accumulated new knowledge but also to be proactive in 





War Management: Leadership and Managing the Loss of Knowledge 
 
If one tries to list all the qualities a good leader must have one gets bogged down in an 
attempt to define the perfect person – who does not exist.1 
      General Sir John Smyth VC 
 
 
The role of the war managers in the 1915 campaign, as in the wider war, has been the 
subject of sustained criticism since shortly after the end of hostilities.2  Indeed, John 
Bourne opined that ‘few groups in British history have been the subject of such 
vilification as the Western Front generals of the Great War’.3  For Alan Clark, they were 
‘the donkeys’; for Sir John Keegan, the war managers were ‘that hideously unattractive 
group’; and for A. J. P. Taylor the army consisted of ‘brave, helpless soldiers [and] 
blundering, obstinate generals’.4  In the post-war era these war managers presented an 
‘easy scapegoat’ for the huge loss of life caused by the conditions of war on the western 
front and were often perceived as a privileged elite who did not share the dangers of the 
men they commanded.5  For some commentators, the Great War was dominated by 
‘chateau generalship’, through which general and staff officers uncaringly sent British 
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heroes to certain death in fruitless, repeated attacks on fortified German positions from 
the safety of their headquarters behind the lines.6  This is an image which has largely 
endured, at least in the public consciousness.  However, these stereotypical images have 
been countered in recent years by reappraisals of the war managers’ conduct during the 
war, both through evaluations of individual commanders and through systematic studies 
of the war managers as a group.7  In particular, Simon Robbins study of the 
backgrounds, performance and reputations of some 700 senior officers over the course 
of the Great War demonstrated that despite profound institutional constraints, the war 
managers were able to adapt their working practices by mid-1918 and succeeded in 
defeating the main German army in battle.8  Paul Harris examined the development of 
the British General Staff and found that they played a crucial role in the final Allied 
victory, successfully managing changes in structure, organisation and personnel.9  
Finally, Peter Hodgkinson studied infantry battalion commanders and found that this 
group responded particularly well to the challenges of modern warfare and often took 
the lead in driving institutional adaptation.10  In short, the stereotypes of the war 
managers, which have prevailed since the 1920s, do little to aid understanding of how 
the army actually functioned. 
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Great War, 1914–1918 (Barnsley, 2014), 3. 
7 See, for example, John Baynes, Far from a Donkey: the Life of General Sir Ivor Maxse 
(London, 1995); Senior, Haking: A Dutiful Soldier; Robbins, British Generalship in the Great War. 
8 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front, 132-42. 
9 Paul Harris, ‘The Men who Planned the War’, 280-94. 




This chapter examines the fourth level of the Organisational Development Model, in 
which the body of new operational and tactial information that was created and collated 
in the third level is considered by the war managers.  It further asserts the importance of 
the individual war managers in both promoting and inhibiting organisational 
development.  In business studies, it can be demonstrated that ‘organisational learning is 
manifested through interrelated patterns of human actions, processes and objects’ and 
can be viewed as ‘a system of human actions’.11   This focus on the human aspect of 
learning in institutions agrees with Jim Storr’s assertion that ‘warfighting is 
fundamentally a human activity, in which humans choose what to do, consciously or 
subconsciously; rationally, irrationally or non-rationally’.12  The focus of this chapter is 
on the men who had the greatest ability to implement change in the BEF – the high 
command. The overarching questions addressed in this chapter are: first, how did war 
managers influence knowledge management practices and how did their actions affect 
the organisational development process; and second, what drove the actions and 
assumptions of those individual soldiers who had responsibility for considering new 
information and promoting or inhibiting force change? 
 
The chapter is split into three sections.  The first section relates the importance of the 
war managers to the Organisational Development Model and presents a new theory for 
understanding the role of leaders in terms of institutional change and learning.  
Traditional interpretations of institutional change in the British Army of the Great War, 
                                                 
11 David Schwandt and Michael J. Marquardt, Organizational Learning: Form World-Class 
Theories to Global Best-Practice (Boca Raton, FL, 1998), 54. 
12 Storr, The Human Face of War, 17. 
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such as the study of the learning curve, see learning as a cumulative process in which 
new knowledge is continually acquired until a point is reached when that accumulated 
knowledge can be used to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield.13  This section 
argues that while the accumulation of new knowledge was an important factor in 
promoting organisational development, the management of the loss of knowledge was 
equally as important in understanding the nature of institutional change in the First 
Army in 1915.  Having asserted the importance of the war managers’ role in considering 
newly-created information this chapter then examines the characteristics of the group of 
men with responsibility for making these decisions.  The second section examines the 
war managers’ self-image and group dynamics.  It studies the war managers’ 
relationships and opinions of each other as soldiers, and presents a platform for 
understanding how they, and their peers, perceived their role as leaders.  The final 
section studies the development of the First Army war managers as a group over the 
course of the 1915 campaign.  In order to provide a comparison, three datasets have been 
created which establish profiles of the war managers at three specific points in the First 
Army’s campaigns of 1915 and 1916: the first dataset examines the group on the first 
day of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 10 March 1915; the second dataset studies the 
group on the first day of the Battle of Loos, 25 September 1915; and the third dataset 
looks at the group on the first day of the Battle of Fromelles, 19 July 1916.  This section 
addresses two questions.  First, how did the group of war managers change over the 
                                                 
13 This corresponds with ideas of learning curves in non-military institutions.  See, Martin de 
Holan and Nelson Phillips, ‘Organisational Forgetting’ in Mark Easterby-Smith and Marjorie Lyles 
(eds),The Handbook of Organisational Learning (London, 2011), 434, who suggest that ‘learning 
curve models establish a positive relationship between experience and positivity; as 
organisations repeat a certain task, they learn, leading eventually to an accumulation of 
knowledge that translates into improved outcomes’. 
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course of the 1915 campaign?  Second, what factors caused these changes?  Finally, the 
chapter demonstrates how leadership and war management are reflected in the wider 
Organisational Development Model. 
 
Organisational Development and Knowledge Management 
Chapters two and three demonstrated the importance of the war managers in identifying, 
creating and collating new information based on their experiences of battle.  This section 
examines what they then did with that new information.  In considering the new data, the 
war managers were faced with a choice to accept or reject the lessons identified in the 
post-battle analysis.  In the short-term, lessons which were accepted were then used on 
an ad hoc basis in planning the next battle, and in the long-term were disseminated 
across the force and were institutionalised in official doctrine.14  This presents a positive 
interpretation of adaptation, in which learning occurs through knowledge being 
continuously accumulated.  That model agrees with earlier interpretations of institutional 
change, such as the learning curve, through which the war mangers learned more and 
more until they had accumulated enough experience and materiel to defeat the German 
Army in the field.  However, this section demonstrates that while the acceptance of new 
information represented a crucial facet of the learning process, it was not the only factor 
that affected adaptation in the BEF.  In terms of knowledge management, the complex 
manner in which new knowledge was rejected by war managers also played an 
important role in organisational development of the First Army. 
 
                                                 
14 These processes will be discussed in full in chapter five. 
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In his memoirs, British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, asserted that when the 
Great War began the high command ‘had much to unlearn’ before they could begin to 
consider new lessons, as ‘their brains were cluttered with useless lumber in every niche 
and corner’.15  While Lloyd George’s views were coloured by his own distaste for the 
war managers in general, and Haig in particular, his comment highlights an aspect of 
knowledge management which has not been critically examined with respect to the First 
Army; namely, how did the high command manage the loss of knowledge in terms of 
discarding that which was not required or deemed relevant?  Analysis of operational war 
diaries and private papers reveals that there were four main ways in which knowledge 
was lost: it could be rejected outright, it could be forgotten, it could be misinterpreted, 
and, finally, it could be discarded but remained available to be recalled at a future point.  
This section examines the relative importance of these factors in the organisational 
development of the First Army in 1915. 
 
The first of the four means by which knowledge was lost involved the rejection of a 
lesson or observation because the immediate strategic conditions rendered it 
unachievable.  A prime example of this concerns the war managers’ view that with more 
men and munitions a rapid Allied victory was inevitable.  General Sir Douglas Haig met 
with Charles Repington, an influential correspondent with The Times at his headquarters 
in Merville on 22 January.  During the meeting, Repington asserted that, to him, the 
German line was impregnable, and he asked Haig if he thought an advance could ever be 
                                                 
15 David Lloyd George, quoted in Hew Strachan, ‘Introduction’, to Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars 




made on the First Army’s front in Artois.  Haig’s response says much about his 
optimism early in the 1915 campaign.  ‘As soon as we [are] supplied with ample 
artillery ammunition of high explosive’, Haig opined, ‘we could walk through the 
German lines at several places’.16  This observation, made before the First Army had 
taken the offensive in the 1915 campaign, seems to be a plausible statement; it was 
entirely reasonable at this stage to suggest that if the First Army had a substantial 
accumulation of artillery ammunition they would have had a greater chance of achieving 
a breakthrough of the German positions.  Indeed, Haig’s observation indicates that the 
lessons of fire-power supremacy which were identified following the Boer War did not 
totally disappear with the renewed emphasis on elan, personal bravery and offensive 
thought as taught by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War.  Haig’s opinion on the 
need for more artillery ammunition did not change following consideration of his, and 
the wider First Army’s, experience at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle and, on 20 March, he 
confided in his diary that ‘given sufficient H[igh] E[xplosive] we could drive the 
Germans out of France in 6 weeks’.17  The lesson identified here by Haig was to all 
intents and purposes moot; the poor supply of ammunition from Britain in 1915 meant 
that the war managers were never going to be able to accumulate enough ammunition to 
enable their forces to walk over the German lines on as broad a front as Haig desired.  
As a result of the failure to mobilise British industry on the same scale as its armed 
forces, the lesson that more ammunition would be key to winning the war could not be 
accepted and implemented.   
                                                 
16 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 22 January 1915; see also, diary entry for 
11 January. 




Evaluation of the evolution of the First Army’s application of firepower in the 
preparatory bombardments provides examples of how specific lessons were incorporated 
into battle plans.  It also demonstrates three further means by which knowledge could be 
lost to the institution: forgetting, misinterpreting, and discarding.  The artillery plan for 
the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was innovative and speculative.  While Major-General 
Freddy Mercer, the Commander of the Royal Artillery (CRA) at First Army 
headquarters proposed bombarding Neuve Chapelle ‘by compartments’ over a period of 
four days, Haig believed that it would be more effective to condense the fire into a 
‘terrible outburst’ for three hours prior to the attack and to follow it by a ‘sudden rush of 
our infantry’.18  This tactic, which placed a heavy emphasis on the destruction of the 
barbed-wire defences and the German trenches behind, became known as the ‘hurricane 
bombardment’.  At Neuve Chapelle, the hurricane bombardment used 535 artillery 
pieces and lasted for thirty-five minutes.  Except on the extreme British left, the 
bombardment was successful and allowed the capture of the German front line by the 
British and Indian infantry.  Sanders Marble demonstrated that while the plans for the 
wire-cutting were well thought out, the bombardment of the trenches was not.19  
However, in the post-battle analysis, the bombardment was taken as the template for 
future attacks and the crucial links between the importance of the bombardment and the 
wire-cutting were forgotten. 
                                                 
18 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 10 February 1915.  Haig’s views may 
have been shaped here by his chief of staff, Sir John Gough: see, for example, Watt, ‘Douglas 
Haig and the Planning of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle’, 194. 




The Battle of Aubers Ridge demonstrated that just because something had worked in one 
specific set of conditions, it might not work in another.  In relation to the scale of the 
operation, the battle represented a reduction in the strength of firepower used to destroy 
the German trenches in the preliminary bombardment: at Neuve Chapelle 535 guns had 
been used to attack a front of 1450 yards of German trench; at Aubers Ridge 623 guns 
attacked 5080 yards of front.20  When the diversion of artillery resources onto points in 
the second and third lines of resistance are included, the intensity of the artillery barrage 
at Aubers Ridge was only a fifth of that at Neuve Chapelle.21  The result was that the 
protective wire around the German front line trenches remained unbroken by the 
reduced British artillery fire, leaving the infantry little chance of successfully breaching 
the German lines.  Following the failure to replicate even the modest successes of the 
opening morning at Neuve Chapelle, the First Army war managers abandoned the lesson 
that the hurricane bombardment was an effective means of breaking into the German 
trench system and adopted more methodical, deliberate artillery bombardments which 
began several days before the infantry attack.   
 
The reason for this change in methodology was not a sudden realisation that the new 
solution would be a war-winning development, rather it was a quick rejection of a lesson 
which they had identified, had tried to replicate, but which had failed.  The fault for the 
incorrect deduction lay with the First Army’s leadership.  While they were correct to 
                                                 
20 Lloyd, Loos: 1915, 101-2. 
21 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 84-5.  
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identify the hurricane bombardment as a successful lesson that could be drawn from the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle, they were wrong to think it would work again without 
modification to the specific operational conditions present at Aubers Ridge.  In this, the 
First Army’s war managers did not realise the symbiotic nature of adaptation and 
learning on the western front in 1915.  As much as they attempted to learn from their 
experiences, the German war managers also divined lessons from the Battle of Neuve 
Chapelle.  While the lack of ammunition supplied from home meant that for the British 
the proposed offensive on Aubers Ridge was postponed, for the German Army it 
allowed time to turn their light field defences into semi-permanent fortifications.22  
Furthermore, it allowed the creation of a German defensive doctrine which envisaged 
the creation of a front line trench system capable of resisting attacks by far superior 
numbers over a prolonged period of time, backed up by two further lines of trenches, the 
final line out of reach of the British artillery.23  In directly applying the lessons of Neuve 
Chapelle to Aubers Ridge the war managers misinterpreted the lesson and failed to 
recognise that the German Army too would be looking to learn from its experiences. 
 
Aubers Ridge marked the last time the hurricane bombardment was used in the 1915 
campaign, however it did re-emerge as a popular tactic at the end of the 1917 campaign 
during the Battle of Cambrai and was used extensively in the Hundred Days campaign in 
                                                 
22 Alexander Kearsey, 1915 Campaign in France: The Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and 
Loos considered in relation to the Field Service Regulations (Aldershot, 1929), vii-viii. 
23 Graeme Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London, 1940).  For a 
recent appraisal of the German defensive system opposite the First Army see Jack Sheldon, 
The German Army on the Western Front, 1915 (Barnsley, 2012). 
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1918.24  The re-emergence of this knowledge demonstrates that while a lesson could be 
identified and incorporated into the battle planning process for the next action, it might 
not be regarded as a permanent alteration of tactics and could be discarded if proven to 
be no longer applicable to the immediate conditions of war or else through 
mismanagement by the institutional leadership.  In order for the lesson of the success of 
the hurricane bombardment to have been used in late-1917, it must have remained stored 
in the organisational memory of the First Army or that of the wider BEF.  As chapter 
one asserted, the ‘knowledge repositories’ available to the war managers of the First 
Army were intangible and there was no formal system in place which provided for the 
storage of new information.  Thirty months of preparing for battle using a methodical 
bombardment had seen few operational successes on the western front.  In seeking a 
solution to the deadlock, war managers combined an old concept with new technology in 
the form of tanks and aeroplanes, and new infantry infiltration tactics, to create an all-
arms battle plan which achieved more initial operational success than the battles of the 
1915 and 1916 campaigns.  In this, war managers were able to retrieve discarded lessons 
and modify them to suit the immediate conditions of war in a way that they did not do in 
earlier campaigns.  The discarding of knowledge by institutions has been described as 
‘unlearning’.25  This concept was explained by Prahalad and Bettis as a ‘process by 
which [organisations] eliminate all logics and behaviours and make room for new 
                                                 
24 Bidwell and Graham, Fire-power, 78; Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front, 123-59; 
and for Cambrai see Bryn Hammond, Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle 
(London, 2008). 
25 Bo Hedberg, ‘How Organisations Learn and Unlearn’, in Paul Nystrom and William Starbuck 
(eds), Handbook of Organisational Design: Adapting Organisations to their Environment (New 
York, 1981), 18. 
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ones’.26  In the case of the British First Army in 1915 this does not quite apply; it 
suggests a radical paradigm shift rather than the rejection of specific lessons learned 
from the experience of battle.  Easterby-Smith suggested that there are two different 
forms of unlearning: the first is the radical process described by Prahalad and Bettis and 
the second is an incremental process in which new information is stored on top of old 
information, rendering the latter more difficult to retrieve.27  Easterby-Smith’s idea of 
incremental unlearning accurately describes how the First Army war managers rejected 
the hurricane bombardment after Aubers Ridge and replaced it with the alternative 
strategy of the long methodical bombardment, as it had itself replaced earlier 
methodologies after its success at Neuve Chapelle. 
 
Catignani’s assertion that at any stage of the learning process knowledge could be lost or 
discarded holds true for the artillery preparation in the First Army in 1915.28  Lessons 
could be lost in four main ways.  First, they could be viewed as unchangeable as in the 
manner that Haig realised he would achieve more operational success with more high 
explosive ammunition, and rejected on the basis that more high explosives would not be 
forthcoming.  Second, new knowledge could be forgotten as in the case of the links 
between wire-cutting and the bombardment of trenches at Neuve Chapelle.  Third, new 
knowledge could be misinterpreted, such as applying the fire-power lessons of Neuve 
Chapelle to Aubers Ridge without due consideration for the changes in operational 
                                                 
26 C. K. Prahalad and Richard Bettis, ‘The Dominant Logic: A New Linkage between Diversity 
and Performance’, in Ken Stanley, Sue Tempest and Alan McKinley (eds), How Organisations 
Learn: Managing the Search for Knowledge (London, 2004), 87. 
27 Mark Easterby-Smith, ‘Disciplines of Organisational Learning: Conributions and Critiques’, 
Human Relations 50.3 (September 1997), 1093. 
28 Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 38. 
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conditions caused by German battlefield adaptation and the increase in length of front to 
be attacked.  Finally, new knowledge could be discarded when it did not work but could 
be retrieved from the organisational memory at a later date as demonstrated by the 
example of drawing on the experience of Neuve Chapelle when planning the Battle of 
Cambrai. 
 
The four processes outlined above – rejecting, forgetting, misinterpreting and discarding 
– highlight the ways in which knowledge could be lost to the wider BEF.  There is, 
however, a further way in which knowledge was lost to the war managers – deliberate 
human agency.  In considering his experience at Neuve Chapelle, the immediate lesson 
identified by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the GOC IV Corps, was that it 
was not worthwhile pressing home an attack on the first day once the enemy had 
manned his second line defences, if those rearward positions had not been bombarded by 
heavy howitzers.29  Rawlinson had been skeptical of Haig’s plans to break through and 
advance on the Aubers Ridge, preferring to limit the attack to the capture of Neuve 
Chapelle itself.  Indeed, Rawlinson only broached the subject of a further advance with 
his divisional commanders on 6 March, four days prior to the battle.30  In its aftermath, 
as much as Haig viewed his breakthrough strategy as a success, Rawlinson viewed it as 
a costly failure.  Again writing to Kitchener, Rawlinson opined that casualties would 
have been reduced with a more limited attack and that the determination of ‘our leaders’ 
                                                 
29 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO30/57/51, Rawlinson to Kitchener, 15 March 1915.  
30 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, 31. 
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to try to get the cavalry through was ‘the origin of our heavy losses’.31  By the end of 
March, Rawlinson had developed an alternative strategy to Haig’s breakthrough battle.  
Termed ‘bite and hold’, the plan involved a limited attack on a specific position and then 
holding it against the inevitable German counterattack and inflicting more casualties on 
the enemy than they inflicted on the British.32  Rawlinson did, however, acknowledge 
the difficulties in adopting a policy of bite and hold in a letter to Kitchener, in which he 
asserted that the methodology ‘does not of course result in any decisive victory which 
could affect the final issue of the war’.33  While Rawlinson has received the credit for 
devising this alternative strategy in March 1915, he was, in fact, informed of it as early 
as 9 February by Major-General Sir Thompson Capper of the 7th Division.  Capper 
advocated undertaking a ‘bombard and storm’ operation, the result of which would be ‘a 
“bite” out of the enemy’s entrenched line.  This “bite” could be enlarged by fresh attacks 
until a hole was made through which a sufficiently large operating force could be 
poured’.34  Rawlinson received this report on 9 February and forwarded it to Haig the 
following day, demonstrating that both commanders were aware of, and rejected, the 
alternative methodology early in the planning phase.35   
 
                                                 
31 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO30/57/51, Rawlinson to Kitchener, 1 April 1915; CAC, Rawlinson 
Papers, RWLN 1/1, Diary, 14 March 1915, 25 March 1915. 
32 National Army Museum, Rawlinson Papers, Letter Book, 1952-01-33-17, Rawlinson to 
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1915; CAC, Rawlinson Papers, RWLN 1/1, 14 March 1915. 
33 TNA, Kitchener Papers, PRO30/57/51, Rawlinson to Kitchener, 1 April 1915. 
34 TNA, WO95/1628, Seventh Division General Staff War Diary, Capper to Rawlinson, 8 
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Of greater significance here is the nature of information sharing.  Rawlinson was a 
prodigious letter writer and chose to air his views over the problems of operational 
methodology with a range of individuals.  Among his frequent correspondents were 
Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War; Lord Stamfordham and Major Clive 
Wigram, the King’s private secretaries; Lord Derby, the Director-General of Recruiting; 
and Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Sclater, the Adjutant-General at the War Office.  
While Rawlinson’s ‘bite and hold’ methodology was a viable alternative to Haig’s 
breakthrough plans, he failed to transmit this information through the proper channels to 
anyone further up the First Army war management hierarchy.  Indeed, there is no 
indication of any suggested methodological changes in the IV Corps report on the battle, 
which consists of a simple hour-by-hour narrative of operations.36  Rawlinson’s diary 
suggests that the reason for this was personal.  Following the battle Rawlinson attempted 
to place the blame for the delay in advancing from Neuve Chapelle onto Major-General 
Francis Davies, the commander of the 8th Division.  Davies countered and asserted that 
he only acted on orders, which had originated at IV Corps headquarters, and that any 
blame should be apportioned to Rawlinson.  Faced with this criticism of his conduct, 
Rawlinson eventually confirmed Davies’ version of events.  While Sir John French and 
Sir William Robertson advocated Rawlinson’s removal from command, he was saved by 
the intervention of Haig.  This marked an important milestone in Rawlinson’s career.  
With Sir John French ‘furious’ at him, Rawlinson could not lobby GHQ for a change in 
attack methodology; with Haig as his ‘good friend and staunch ally’ Rawlinson felt 
                                                 
36 TNA, WO158/374, Neuve Chapelle, Report on Operations, ‘Report on the Operations of the IV 
Army Corps, 10th-15th March 1915’, nd. 
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obliged to acquiesce to his operational plans.37  Out of touch with one commander and 
beholden to the other, Rawlinson had to content himself with directing his ideas to 
individuals with limited or no influence over operational planning, thus rendering them 
largely ineffectual.  The affair demonstrates the importance of personal networks in the 
learning process.  When personal relationships broke down or where one party felt 
obliged to another a culture was created in which identified lessons were not, or could 
not be, shared.   
 
A similar situation existed regarding the transfer of information from GHQ to First 
Army headquarters.  As mentioned in chapter two, Brigadier-General John DuCane, the 
artillery advisor at GHQ, authored a memorandum on the operations at Neuve Chapelle 
on the orders of the CGS, Sir William Robertson.  However, instead of forwarding 
DuCane’s original findings to Haig at First Army, Robertson rejected some of DuCane’s 
observations, annotated the report himself, and returned it to DuCane for substantial 
redrafting.  DuCane duly redrafted the paper incorporating Robertson’s suggestions, 
which materially altered the nature and substance of the report and erased the thoughtful 
suggestions DuCane had presented on altering First Army’s operational methodology.  
By choosing to forward a redrafted paper to Sir John French, Robertson ensured, 
perhaps unwittingly, that DuCane’s conclusions were shared only with a few select 
members of staff at GHQ rather than with Haig, who was the officer who was best 
placed to incorporate them into his own operational thinking.   
 
                                                 
37 CAC, Rawlinson Papers, RWLN 1/1, Diary, 17 March 1915. 
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The war managers made identifiable mistakes, both when they considered the data with 
which they were presented in the post-battle analysis, and by not transmitting relevant 
information to the right individuals within the formation structure.  In business studies, 
the manner in which knowledge is lost can be described collectively as ‘knowledge 
traps’.38  These are further described as being circumstances, times or events ‘in which 
there is a loss of project-specific knowledge, where the project lacks some relevant 
knowledge, or where knowledge is not created or applied optimally’.39  This section has 
examined the five ‘knowledge traps’ which affected the First Army’s organisational 
development in the 1915 campaign: rejecting, forgetting, misinterpreting, discarding and 
withholding knowledge.  While it would be incorrect to suggest that eliminating these 
knowledge traps would have ensured rapid success on the battlefield, an awareness of, 
and more careful management of, the loss of knowledge may have led to a more open, 
flexible system of leadership and decision-making among the First Army war managers. 
 
First Army’s War Managers: Characteristics and Image 
When evaluating the consideration of new information, leadership and decision-making 
theory is not enough and a more complete understanding requires historical analysis of 
the human element in these specific circumstances.  Only by examining the backgrounds 
and characteristics of the individuals who comprise a social group can the true nature of 
that group be realised.  This section presents a demographic study of the characteristics 
and dynamic of the First Army war managers both as individuals and as a group.  The 
                                                 
38 Blaize Horner Reich, ‘Avoiding Knowledge Traps in Project Management’, Project 
Management Initiative, online, www.pmi.org (accessed 7 February 2017). 
39 Reich, ‘Avoiding Knowledge Traps’, www.pmi.org (accessed 7 February 2017). 
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men who made up the high command of the First Army in the 1915 campaign were 
drawn from a narrow section of society, being part of the aristocracy or the upper middle 
classes, with ties to the political and industrial establishment.  In the First Army in the 
1915 campaign, officers drawn from the aristocracy were present in a minority: Major-
General the Earl of Cavan commanded both 4 Brigade and the Guards Division in the 
campaign; Major-General The Hon. Edward Montague Stuart-Wortley, a grandson of 
the 2nd Baron Wharncliffe, commanded the 46th Division; and Brigadier-General John 
Hepburn-Stuart-Forbes-Trefusis, the son of the 20th Baron Clinton, was killed 
commanding 20 Brigade shortly after the Battle of Loos.  More common were upper 
middle-class officers from established military families.  These included Lieutenant-
General Sir Hubert Gough, whose father, uncle and brother not only attained the rank of 
general in the British Army, they were all awarded the Victoria Cross for bravery in the 
field; Major-General Sir Thompson Capper, whose brother John also commanded a 
division on the western front; and Major-General Sir Claude Jacob who was one of 
twenty-eight members of his family to have served in either the army of the East India 
Company, or later, the Indian Army.40   
 
Many of the war managers were descendants of families with ties to the business world, 
the church or to the civil service.  For example, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, commander of IV Corps throughout the 1915 campaign, was the son of the 
renowned diplomat and orientalist of the same name; Lieutenant-General Sir Richard 
                                                 
40 The last example comes from Simon Robbins, British Generalship during the Great War: The 
Military Career of Sir Henry Horne (1861–1929) (Farnham, 2010), 2-3. 
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Haking, GOC 1st Division and XI Corps, and Major-General Charles Barter, GOC 47th 
Division, were the sons of clergymen; and Major-General Herman Landon, GOC 9th and 
33rd Divisions, was the son of a successful cotton merchant in India.  Added to this 
number was General Haig, whose father’s occupation as a drinks’ manufacturer in Fife 
led Brigadier-General Sir Reginald Pinney to disparagingly refer to his commander-in-
chief as ‘the opulent whisky distiller’.41  Any deviation from this stereotypical British 
background could be divisive; Brigadier-General Francis Wallerstein was described by 
one officer as ‘an Austrian and presumably a traitor’ on account of his foreign sounding 
name.42  While Wallerstein’s family were German Jews rather than Austrians, he was 
self-conscious enough of his Teutonic heritage to change his name to the more 
anglicised Wallerston in order to fit in with his peer group.   Only one senior war 
manager of the BEF bucked the trend of a privileged background; the CGS, Lieutenant-
General Sir William Robertson, joined the 16th Lancers in 1877 as a private soldier after 
service as a footman in the household of the Countess of Cardigan. 
 
The privileged background of the First Army war managers was amplified by their 
education.  Simon Robbins, in his study of the British high command in the Great War, 
found that officers educated at public schools dominated the army.43  Robbins’ research 
demonstrated that over the course of the war 52.9% of all officers who held the rank of 
                                                 
41 Brigadier-General Sir Reginald Pinney, quoted in Robbins, British Generalship during the 
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42 Glasgow University Special Collections Department, Papers of Francis J. MacCunn, MS GEN 
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brigadier-general or above were educated at the ten most prestigious public schools.44  
When the war managers of the First Army of the 1915 campaign are analysed, the 
dominance of a public school education – and these ten schools in particular – is even 
more stark.  Of the twenty war managers with the rank of brigadier-general or above 
who held a command position at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, and whose educational 
history can be identified, 70% attended the ten most prestigious schools; at the Battle of 
Loos the figure was exactly the same.  Indeed, of the five corps commanders who served 
with the First Army at Loos, three – Lieutenant-Generals Gough, Pulteney and 
Rawlinson – all attended Eton.  Even those who did not attend these ten top schools 
were still afforded a similarly privileged education: Lieutenant-General Sir Charles 
Monro attended Sherborne; Brigadier-General Anthony Reddie was a product of Fettes 
College, and Major-General Edward Bulfin was an old boy of Stoneyhurst.  A public 
school education, and particularly the ethos instilled into the pupils, was seen as 
providing the new middle classes with the values of the old gentry.45  They gave to their 
pupils a code of conduct rooted in Christian morality and romantic patriotism, while the 
playing of organised sports and games were viewed as being ideal preparation for a war 
in which leaders would have to quickly make decisions, take risks and disregard their 
own personal safety.46  This education provided the basis for one of the organisational 
development inputs discussed in chapter two; knowledge gained through instruction. 
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That knowledge was further enhanced by professional training at the Royal Military 
College at Sandhurst or the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich.  At Sandhurst, the 
infantry and cavalry officers were provided with ‘a basic military education, together 
with an introduction to discipline’ and at Woolwich, artillery and engineering officers 
learned the skills of the ‘technical’ branches of the army.47  While the majority of 
officers completed the course at Sandhurst, some 30% of the war managers in the 1915 
campaign had been commissioned without any form of professional education.48  
Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney and Major-Generals Edward Bulfin, Francis 
Davies and Edward Montagu Stuart-Wortley all entered the professional army through 
what was known as the ‘back door’ through which officers were commissioned into the 
local militia and sat a competitive examination for transfer to the regular army.49  This 
method of entrance proved no barrier to a successful army career: Field Marshal Sir 
John French ‘neatly side-stepped’ the ‘drudgery’ of Sandhurst, and rose to command the 
BEF in 1914.50  That being said, graduating from Sandhurst still was still viewed by 
many officers as being a desirable pathway into the army. Sir James Willcocks, who 
commanded the Indian Corps in 1915, was determined to attend despite twice being 
refused entry; he was successful on the third attempt.  Once at Sandhurst, the standard of 
cadets varied considerably but poor performance there did not demonstrably limit an 
officer’s prospects.  While Sir Douglas Haig passed out first in his class, Lieutenant-
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General Sir Charles Monro, who succeeded him as the commander of the First Army, 
passed out 120th in his intake of students.  The war managers’ professional education 
was augmented, for some, by training at the Staff College in Camberley but, like an 
education from Sandhurst, this was not a requirement for achieving high command in 
the BEF.   
 
Analysis of the war mangers as a group therefore reveals a number of commonalities.  
While there were anomalies – such as Lieutenant-General Robertson – the vast majority 
of the war managers came from a similar background and upbringing.  In general, they 
were from the upper or upper-middle classes, had established family connections with 
the British Army and had been educated at public schools which had instilled an ethos 
which emphasised leadership, decision-making, bravery and physical prowess.  Many 
had sought a professional military education at Sandhurst or Woolwich but a substantial 
minority had not.  Furthermore, a number of the senior war managers – including Haig, 
Monro, Gough, Rawlinson and Haking – had passed the staff officers’ course at 
Camberley.  This demonstrates that while the war managers of the First Army were a 
homogenous group in terms of social class and background, in terms of professional 
education the quality varied widely, with some officers – notably Sir William Pulteney, 
GOC III Corps – rising to high command despite having attended neither Sandhurst nor 
Camberley.   
 
While this analysis is useful in understanding the elementary demographics of the war 
management group, it does not reveal the group dynamics nor does it address what the 
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war managers thought about each other.  It is difficult to find criticism of General Haig 
from his contemporary officers.  Indeed, a comment in Haig’s own diary illustrates one 
reason for this.  When Sir John French became upset over Haking’s criticisms of 
French’s handling of the XI Corps reserve at the Battle of Loos, Haig instructed Haking 
to leave out the critical paragraph in his official report ‘since this is a comment by a 
subordinate on the actions of his commanding officer’.51  While Haig was content to 
criticise Sir John French among the military and political establishment, he appears to 
have viewed criticisms emanating from subordinate officers as being unacceptable.  It 
follows too that Haig would not tolerate subordinate’s criticism of his own actions and, 
as a consequence, contemporaneous negative comments were limited to those of 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, an officer with whom Haig shared a mutual 
dislike.52   
 
First Army headquarters was a close-knit community and, by February 1915, still 
resembled the pre-war Aldershot command which Haig used as a model for First Army.  
Haig was assisted by a staff of thirty-nine individuals, although only five officers 
exercised any real influence over operational matters.53  Indeed, even the degree to 
which these officers could affect Haig’s thinking has been questioned; speaking of GHQ 
staff in June 1916, Lord Esher opined that Haig’s staff was ‘an excellent machine, 
                                                 
51 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Typescript Diary, 9 November 1915. 
52 See, for example, Wilson’s comments on Haig in Jeffrey, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 165; 
and Haig’s disdain of Wilson in NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/141/84, Haig to Lady Haig, 26 
January 1915; NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 1 March 1915 
53 Haig’s ‘inner circle’ was confined to Richard Butler, his chief of staff; Tavish Davidson, his 
deputy chief of staff; John Charteris, the head of intelligence; and Brigadier-Generals Mercer 
and Rice, the chief artillery and engineering officers, respectively.  The remainder of his staff 
largely comprised junior staff officers, aides des camps and liaison officers. 
232 
 
formed to carry out [Haig’s] ideas and intentions’, however none of his staff were 
forceful enough to actually influence his decision-making.54  As many of the staff at 
GHQ in 1916 accompanied Haig from First Army, it is reasonable to assume that the 
same system applied in the 1915 campaign.  This is confirmed by Major John Charteris, 
Haig’s head of intelligence in 1915, who asserted that ‘in many ways [Haig] is his own 
Chief of Staff.  He knows so much more about fighting than any of the Staff.’55  Haig’s 
original chief of staff, Brigadier-General Sir John Gough, was killed in February 1915 
shortly before he was to return to Britain to command a newly raised infantry division.  
Haig was ‘badly upset, although he shows it little’, wrote Charteris, adding that ‘for us at 
First Army HQ it is like losing one of our own family’.56  Haig’s choice as Gough’s 
replacement, Brigadier-General Richard Butler, was inexperienced for such as 
prestigious position.  Butler began the war as a major on the general staff at Aldershot 
before being appointed to command the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers in September 1914 and 
then 3 Brigade two months later.57  His appointment ahead of more senior officers – 
Whigham, the BGGS of I Corps and Kiggell of the War Office – suggests that Haig was 
keen to surround himself with men with whom he was familiar from Aldershot and who 
would not question his authority.  Haig’s dominance of his staff in terms of decision-
making asserts the importance of the First Army’s senior war manager in the formation’s 
organisational development.  While other officers could make suggestions as to how best 
to proceed, the rigid hierarchical nature of the British Army combined with Haig’s 
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forceful personality meant that the First Army’s organisational development was 
inextricably linked to Haig’s own personal learning process and his willingness to 
evaluate his experiences. 
 
In terms of his subordinate officers, Haig’s views were mixed.  Of his five corps 
commanders, Haig used Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson and his IV Corps in 
four of the five offensive actions in the 1915 campaign.  Despite this apparent faith, 
Haig believed Rawlinson had profound deficiencies as a commander, in particular his 
lack of loyalty towards junior officers and his selection of unsuitable staff officers.58  Of 
more importance were Rawlinson’s deficiencies in terms of operational planning.  At 
Neuve Chapelle, Haig was not impressed with Rawlinson’s vague plans for the capture 
of the village and constant delegation of planning to subordinate officers and, in a barely 
disguised reference, threatened to dismiss any commander ‘who did not do what was 
required’ to capture the village.59  Furthermore, Rawlinson disregarded Haig’s orders to 
prepare an attack on the Aubers Ridge until four days before the opening of the battle.  
Later in the campaign, Haig was equally dismissive of Rawlinson’s artillery ammunition 
expenditure estimates at Givenchy and his tactical awareness of his surroundings at 
Loos.60  Haig’s worries over Rawlinson’s capabilities as a commander were not shared 
by Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, the GOC Indian Corps, who described 
Rawlinson as being ‘so straight and fearless’, adding that ‘working with him was a real 
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pleasure’.61  Despite Rawlinson’s obvious failures of leadership, Haig made no move to 
sack him and even went as far as recommending him for promotion to the command of 
First Army in December 1915, asserting that he had ‘many other valuable qualities for a 
commander on active service’, in particular, ‘his bright joviality’ and ‘brains and 
experience’.62  While Haig may have stuck with Rawlinson because of a lack of suitable 
replacements, an alternative explanation is that Haig realised that Rawlinson was, 
following the Davies affair, beholden to him and was less likely to question Haig’s 
supreme authority in any future dispute with Sir John French.  Certainly, following 
Neuve Chapelle, Rawlinson believed Haig to be his ‘good friend and staunch ally’.63  In 
reality, it was the other way round. 
 
A different set of circumstances characterised the relationship between Haig and 
Willcocks.  Shortly after the Indian Corps arrived in France, Haig noticed that there was 
‘an air of despondency’ at their headquarters.64  This mood continued throughout the 
campaign and was combined with Haig’s perception that Willcocks disliked the troops 
under his command, was constantly nervous about being attacked and, most importantly, 
was reticent in producing operational planning documents.  The latter proved the catalyst 
for Willcocks’ removal from command.  On 30 August, he submitted a plan of attack to 
First Army headquarters which Haig viewed as ‘a most discouraging document’; 
Willcocks had fallen foul of Haig by demonstrating a lack of offensive spirit and was 
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replaced by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Anderson, a man of ‘greater initiative and 
tactical resource’.65  The same could not be said of two of Haig’s other corps 
commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Richard Haking and Sir Hubert Gough who were 
characterised as ‘thrusters’; ‘bold, aggressive commanders’ who were ‘prone to launch 
hasty, ill-prepared attacks’ with little thought to the inevitable loss of life.66  Haking had 
first impressed Haig in late 1914, when, in command of 3 Brigade, he ‘had all the major-
generals of the Indian Corps doing his bidding’ and, upon his promotion to command the 
1st Division, proved able to produce thoughtful, painstaking plans of attack.67  For 
Brigadier-General Cecil Lowther, GOC 1 Brigade, Haking took ‘everything in the best 
spirit and [was] an excellent man to work for’.68  Indeed, Lowther’s disappointment at 
leaving the 1st Division in August 1915 was tempered by the fact that Haking too was 
leaving.69  Gough, more than any other war manager, typified the image of a thruster.  
For Haig, he was a ‘keen, active, energetic officer…who is able to command his corps 
himself…without the intervention of a staff officer’.70  Over the course of the war 
Gough became Haig’s protégé, perhaps in part because of Haig’s ties to Gough’s brother 
but also because of their common perception on how the war should be fought.  
Certainly, officers who shared Haig’s mindset – Gough, Haking and Major-General 
Henry Horne – were promoted to senior positions within the First Army structure in 
1915 and the wider BEF in 1916 following Haig’s promotion to commander-in-chief.  
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The choice to promote these war managers, in particular, was taken by Haig alone and 
can be seen as a means of reinforcing his dominance by filling the level of command 
immediately beneath his own with men with a similar world-view and who relied on him 
for their position.  This, then, further reinforces the importance of Haig’s role in terms of 
the First Army’s organisational development. 
 
The culture created by Haig at First Army headquarters was underpinned by the belief 
that the British Army should be characterised by its offensive spirit.  This, however, had 
a knock-on effect on subordinate officers’ ability to transmit new information up and 
across the army hierarchy.  Following the XI Corps’ failed attack at Loos on 26 
September, Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo Stewart, the chief of staff (GSO1) of the 24th 
Division, believed that his division was passed incorrect information from XI Corps 
headquarters, regarding the state of the German defences which his division confronted 
on the battlefield.  Stewart was ‘led to believe that it was a victory everywhere’ and that 
‘the Germans had been driven from their entrenchments and open warfare was being 
resumed’.71  Furthermore, when the 21st and 24th Divisions were undergoing initial 
training in France when attached to XI Corps from 4-20 September, they only rehearsed 
follow-up attacks in open warfare rather than a trench-to-trench attack under heavy fire 
which they were actually required to undertake.  Stewart concluded that there existed ‘a 
cult of optimism’ at XI Corps headquarters, which led to unverified rumours from the 
front being treated as fact only because they were positive regarding British battlefield 
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successes.72  His assessment reveals much about the nature of leadership and the 
importance of organisational culture in the wider BEF in 1915.  Officers were so afraid 
of appearing ‘downhearted’, ‘unnerved’ or ‘despondent’ that they tended to err on the 
side of over-optimism.73  This existed alongside a tendency among some senior war 
managers – Haig, Gough and Haking in particular – to attribute blame for operational 
failure on the perceived lack of offensive spirit among their subordinate officers.  The 
‘blame culture’ that existed at First Army headquarters permeated down the force 
structure and created a buffer by which senior war managers were protected from 
criticism. 
 
Regarding the brigade and divisional commanders who served in the First Army in 
1915, Haig tended to make judgements on their suitability based on two main factors – 
their previous experience of battle, and the positivity of their outlook.  In the first place, 
Haig was quick to comment on other war managers’ history and reputations.  Thus, 
Brigadier-General Peter Strickland was noted as being ‘a hard and capable soldier with 
considerable foreign experience’; Brigadier-General William Walker ‘was in the 
Ghurkas and won the VC (in Somaliland)’; Brigadier-General Walter Ross was ‘a good 
hard determined officer…[who was] badly wounded in South Africa’; and Major-
General Fasken ‘commanded at Bannu while I was chief of staff in India’.74  While Haig 
was conscious of war managers’ reputations in terms of personal bravery, he was 
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equally as aware of their previous weaknesses in terms of leadership.  When the 23rd 
Division joined III Corps in September 1915, Haig remembered that its commander, 
Major-General James Babington, had ‘twice failed in South Africa to press the enemy’, 
and he felt the need to mention specifically to Babington the need ‘to pursue the enemy 
remorselessly’.75  Similarly, Haig recalled that Fasken ‘showed much lack of decision 
when some tribesmen invaded his district’ in India and that Major-General Holland 
erroneously ‘placed two field guns on Coles Kop’ during the Boer War.76  In terms of 
the personal spirit of the war managers Haig focused on both positive and negative 
characteristics.  Major-General Forestier-Walker, the then BGGS of the Second Army 
and future GOC 21st Division, had ‘not enough of the fighting spirit’; Brigadier-General 
Tuson, GOC 23 Brigade, was ‘too sleepy looking and inactive’; Major-General 
Bannatyne-Allason of the 51st Division was ‘long-faced and melancholy’; and Brigadier-
General Turner of the Canadian Division was ‘a weak looking man’.77  Conversely, 
Major-General Claude Jacob of the Indian Corps was ‘a first-rate officer with plenty of 
energy’; Brigadier General Lewis, GOC 56 Brigade had ‘plenty of energy and practical 
sense’; Brigadier-General Mackenzie Stewart, GOC 58 Brigade was ‘a capable, 
determined man’; and Brigadier-General Montague Wilkinson, GOC 44 Brigade ‘seems 
well up to his work’.78  Haig’s opinion of his subordinate war managers had an effect on 
how long those units remained with the First Army.  When Haig found the war 
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managers of the Canadian Division to be ‘very sketchy in their methods of command’ 
the division was soon transferred out of the First Army despite the men being ‘fine 
looking fellows’ and ‘quick, intelligent and hardy’.79  Similarly, the 51st Division was 
transferred from the First Army when Haig came to the conclusion that Major-General 
Bannatyne-Allason ‘knew very little about the kind of soldiering which must be made to 
achieve success’.80 
 
This section has demonstrated that while the First Army war managers were a 
homogeneous group in terms of background, they varied widely in terms of their 
professional education and their approach to war.  As a group, the war managers were 
dominated by Haig both in terms of operational planning, where he often worked 
separate from his senior staff officers, and through his patronage which provided rapid 
promotion or a swift return to Britain.  The ‘cult of optimism’ which existed at First 
Army headquarters created a culture in which subordinate officers were so afraid of 
being punished for being considered downhearted and despondent that they sometimes 
took decisions against their better judgement rather than question authority.  Haig 
ensured that officers who either shared his operational outlook or who were beholden to 
him occupied the highest positions within the First Army leadership framework.  In 
terms of organisational development this placed an increased importance on Haig as the 
senior war manager.  Torunn Laugen Haaland’s study into adaptation in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces in Afghanistan in the twenty-first century showed that, rather than being 
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identified, lessons are ‘continuously negotiated’ by groups of war managers.81  In the 
First Army of 1915 this was not the case.  The hierarchical structure of the First Army, 
the prevailing organisational culture and Haig’s forcefulness of personality meant that 
while lessons could be identified at multiple levels of command, they needed his 
approval before they could be converted into force-wide change.  While the 
consideration of new knowledge took place at each level of command, Haig’s reliance 
on his own instincts and failure to implement a formal system for force-wide data 
capture placed the responsibility for organisational development firmly at his feet.   
 
The Changing Composition of First Army’s War Managers 
In terms of organisational development this thesis has asserted the importance of the role 
of war managers in the learning process.  As the majority of new knowledge was created 
through the war managers self-identification of lessons or by accepting the lessons 
identified by those around them, this relatively small group of army officers can be said 
to have wielded significant influence in the overall organisational development of the 
First Army.  This section examines the implications the unprecedented expansion of the 
British senior officer corps had for leadership in the First Army by analysing the group 
of war managers at three different points over the course of the 1915 campaign.  It 
demonstrates how the group developed as the campaign progressed and determines what 
factors influenced these changes.  To do this, three datasets have been created, each of 
which examines the war managers at a specific date: the first looks at the first day of the 
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Battle of Neuve Chapelle (10 March 1915); the second looks at the first day of the Battle 
of Loos (25 September 1915); and the third examines the war managers of the First 
Army on the first day of the Battle of Fromelles (19 July 1916).  The datasets were 
created using data gathered from, among others, The Times online archive, the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography online, the London Gazette online, the University of 
Birmingham’s ‘Lions led by Donkey’s’ Project, and Peter Hodgkinson’s ‘Infantry 
Battalion Commanders of the British Army in the First World War’ Project.82  These 
three particular dates have been chosen as they represent the state of the First Army in 
its first planned offensive action, at the start of its largest battle, and at the end of the 
campaign when the First Army undertook its first major operation in 1916.  
 
At the Battle of Neuve Chapelle there were twenty-seven war managers occupying 
command positions with a rank of brigadier-general or above; at Loos in September 
1915, this number had risen to seventy-eight before falling to forty war managers at 
Fromelles in July 1916.  Table 4.1 demonstrates how these war managers were split by 
rank at each battle.  In general, the First Army comprised one Army Commander – Haig 
at Neuve Chapelle and Loos and Monro at Fromelles – with a number of corps under his 
command.  Each corps was initially comprised of two divisions before increasing to 
three in mid-1915 as Kitchener’s new armies began to arrive on the western front, 
although in some instances a fourth division was attached for training purposes.  Each 
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division was composed of three infantry brigades and a variety of support services.  
While a number of officers of general rank served on the staff and in the specialist 
services such as the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, this study focuses on the 
changing nature of command with particular respect to the infantry brigades and higher 
echelons of command. 
 
Table 4.1: War Managers according to Rank, March 1915–July 1916 
RANK NEUVE CHAPELLE LOOS FROMELLES 
Army Commander 1 
 
1 1 





6 18 9 
Brigade 
Commanders 
18 54 27 
 
Throughout the 1915 campaign Haig displayed an interest in promoting ‘the best and 
youngest men’ to the highest positions of command in the BEF.83  Haig first mentioned 
the need to promote younger officers in November 1914 during a visit to the 1st Division 
headquarters when he recommended seeking out ‘capable young fellows’ from the ranks 
to be commissioned as company officers to replace men who had been killed in the First 
Battle of Ypres.84  Haig believed that the nature of fighting on the western front called 
for officers with the youthfulness and physical fitness to withstand the rigours of trench 
warfare: for example, on meeting Major-General Baldock, GOC 48th Division in April 
1915, Haig remarked that he was ‘a nice old man but looks very old for this modern 
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war’.85  To change this, Haig approached the Prime Minister, Asquith, in July and asked 
about the possibility of removing older officers from high command and replacing them 
with younger, more dynamic commanders.  Together, Haig and Asquith examined the 
hierarchy of officers in the Army List and took note of divisional commanders who were 
best suited for promotion to command corps and, in time, armies on the western front.86   
 




Army Commander 53 
 
53 55 





53.7 53.8 53.7 
Brigade 
Commanders 
50.3 49.2 46.1 
 
 
Table 4.2 presents the average age of the First Army war managers over the course of 
the 1915 campaign and can be used to demonstrate the success of Haig’s endeavours to 
find younger commanders.  At the level of corps command, the average age of the war 
managers dropped by three and a half years between March 1915 and July 1916.  While 
at Neuve Chapelle, Rawlinson was aged fifty and Monro fifty-four, Sir James Willcocks, 
GOC Indian Corps, was fifty-seven years old.  Furthermore, the two divisional 
commanders in the Indian Corps, Major-Generals Keary and Anderson were, on 
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average, five years older than the other divisional commanders.  The decrease in the war 
managers’ average age between Neuve Chapelle and Fromelles can be attributed in part 
to the removal of the Indian Corps from the First Army.  However, the appointment of 
forty-five year old Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert Gough to command I Corps in July 
1915 went a long way to reducing the average age.  Gough began the war as the GOC 3 
Cavalry Brigade before being promoted to command the 7th Division in April 1915 and 
was one of the officers Haig earmarked for accelerated promotion in his conversation 
with Asquith.  He served as the GOC I Corps until 1916 when he was promoted to 
command the British Reserve Army.  Across the campaign the average age of the 
divisional commanders remained the same at almost fifty-four years old.  In terms of 
spread, the youngest divisional commander was Major-General George Thesiger, GOC 
9th Division, who was forty-six years old and the oldest was Major-General Charles 
Fasken, GOC 19th Division, who was sixty.  Haig was concerned that the arrival of the 
New Army divisions ‘with rather elderly commanders’ would have a detrimental effect 
on the efficiency of the First Army.87  As a result, those war managers were often 
removed from their command shortly after their arrival in France, providing there was 
an operational reason for doing so.  Thus, following perceived weaknesses in leadership, 
Major-Generals Sir John Ramsay (59) and Charles Fasken (60) were relieved of 
command and were followed later in 1916 by Major-Generals Edward Montagu Stuart-
Wortley (59) and Charles Barter (58).  Furthermore, the promotion of the youthful 
Thesiger to command the 9th Division was taken because the original divisional 
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commander, Major-General Herman Landon (56), was deemed unfit and was confined 
to bed during the planning for the Battle of Loos.88 
 
The infantry brigade commanders represent the largest group of officers at each of the 
three battles.  At Neuve Chapelle, the their average age was 50.3 years and by Fromelles 
in July 1916 the average age had dropped to 46.1 years old.  Over the course of the 
campaign the age of brigade commanders fluctuated widely: Brigadier-General John 
Trefusis was thirty-seven years old when he assumed command of 20 Brigade in August 
1915 whereas Brigadier-General Francis Wallerstein was fifty-nine years old when he 
arrived in France in July as the GOC 45 Brigade.  As at the divisional level, brigade 
commanders of New Army formations were often replaced shortly after their arrival in 
France on account of their age.  Brigadier-General Edward Grogan, GOC 26 Infantry 
Brigade, was removed from command in May 1915 aged sixty-four and was replaced by 
forty-five year old Brigadier-General Archibald Ritchie.  Rather then being the order of 
Haig, Grogan’s removal was ‘the result of an order issued by GHQ fixing an age limit 
for brigadiers’.89  By 1916 the removal of officers on account of their age had 
intensified; when Major-General David Campbell assumed command of the 21st 
Division in May 1916, he sent Brigadier-General Gerald Gloster home ‘as soon as he 
discovered his age, apparently without further enquiry into his military ability’.90  He 
was fifty-two.  Haig’s insistence on the removal of older commanders is, then, an 
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extension of a wider institutional policy rather than being his own personal preference.  
The drop in age of war managers continued throughout the conflict and the average age 
of brigadier-generals appointed in the period January–April 1917 had decreased to 41.1 
years old.91   
 
Figure 4.1: Brigade Commanders’ Positions in August 1914 - Comparison by Battle  
 
 
While the changes in age patterns suggest Haig was largely successful in promoting 
youthful commanders, it does not address whether that had a knock-on effect on the war 
managers’ operational effectiveness or ability and willingness to critically examine their 
experiences.  One knock-on effect of promoting younger soldiers was that officers with 
more mission-specific experience were given more operational responsibility.  Figure 
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4.3 demonstrates how the group changed over the course of the campaign by examining 
the role of the brigade commanders at each battle, on the declaration of war.  At the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle, 24% of all brigade commanders began the war in that role, 
although only Brigadier-General Raleigh Egerton, GOC Ferozepore Brigade, was 
commanding the same brigade as in August 1914; the other three pre-war brigade 
commanders had all been in command of brigades of the Territorial Force.  By the Battle 
of Loos in September 1915 the number of pre-war brigade commanders had dropped to 
10% and by the Battle of Fromelles the following year, it dropped to 8%.  There are two 
main reasons for this.  First, commanders who had performed well in the 1915 
campaign, such as Brigadier-Generals Sydney Lawford and the Earl of Cavan, were 
promoted to command divisions of the New Army.  Second, commanders, such as 
Brigadier-Generals Claude Westmacott and Arlington Chichester, were invalided back 
to Britain; it is important to note here that while some officers who were sent home sick 
were, in fact, ill, it was often used as a polite term for being sacked.92  The high attrition 
rates of the 1914 campaign necessitated the promotion of able battalion commanders.  
Indeed, at Neuve Chapelle, 41% of the brigade commanders began the war commanding 
infantry battalions and had experience of leading them in the fighting of 1914.  At Loos, 
the number of former battalion commanders promoted to brigade command still 
represented the largest group, however, at Fromelles in July 1916, only 25% of the 
brigade commanders had begun the war as battalion commanders and had been 
overtaken as the largest group by officers who began the war as regimental officers and 
company commanders.   
                                                 





Analysis of this group gives the clearest indication of how the First Army war managers 
changed from 1915 into 1916.  Whereas at Neuve Chapelle no brigadier-generals began 
the war serving as a regimental officer, by Fromelles some 45% of all brigade 
commanders had seen service as company commanders on the western front.  An 
example of this speed of promotion is Brigadier-General John Trefusis who began the 
war as a captain in the 1st Irish Guards and, by August 1915, was promoted to command 
20 Brigade.  Similarly, Brigadier-General Torqhuil Matheson, GOC 46 Brigade, began 
the war as a major in the 3rd Coldstream Guards and was promoted to major-general 
commanding the 20th Division in early 1917.  These officers took the place of men who 
had been appointed to brigade command from the retired list.  The rapid expansion of 
the army in 1914 necessitated the recall of officers who had retired from active service 
prior to the declaration of war.  Four of the infantry brigades present at Neuve Chapelle 
were commanded by officers who had retired from the service prior to August 1914.  
One of these was the Earl of Cavan who retired in 1912, following four years in 
command of the 1st Grenadier Guards.  On the declaration of war, Cavan ‘sent a 
telegram to the War Office [notifying them] that [his] services were at their disposal’ 
and the following week he was appointed to command a brigade in the 47th Division 
before being sent to France to command 4 Brigade.93  Similarly, Montagu Grant 
Wilkinson, who had retired as the CO of the 1st King’s Own Scottish Borderers in early 
                                                 
93 Churchill Archive Centre, Papers of Field Marshal Frederic Rudolph Lambart, 10th Earl of 
Cavan [afterwards, CAC, Cavan Papers], CAVN 1, unpublished memoir, 1. 
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1914, was recalled on the declaration of war and was appointed GOC 44 Brigade.94  For 
Haig, men like Wilkinson, who had recently given up command of their battalions, were 
the perfect candidates for promotion as brigade commanders in the New Army.95  
However, the extent of the expansion of the British Army in 1914–15 meant that the 
War Office had to look further afield to fill the command vacancies; Brigadier-General 
Ernest Wilkinson was appointed to command 62 Brigade despite having retired as a 
major in the Egyptian Army in 1907.  The number of officers who were on the retired 
list in 1914 and who were serving with the BEF decreased as the war progressed.  At 
Neuve Chapelle 24% of the brigadier-generals were officers who had retired before the 
war broke out; at Fromelles, it had dropped to 8%.   
 
The small pool of officers from which the war managers could be drawn presented a 
particular challenge for effective leadership in the First Army.  The fighting of the 1914 
campaign exposed the leadership weaknesses of some of the original BEF war 
managers.  To counter perceived poor performance, officers such as General Ivor 
Maxse, the original GOC of 1 Brigade, ‘who had not done well’, were removed from 
command and posted back to Britain to command a division of the New Army.96  In the 
short term, this removed a supposedly inefficient commander from the immediate 
theatre of war, however there seems to have been little realisation that the officers who 
were sent home would eventually work their way back to the front, often in command of 
larger formations with more responsibility.  For example, Brigadier-General Richard 
                                                 
94 IWM, Wilkinson Papers, Doc.8035, unpublished memoir, 3-9. 
95 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/102, Typescript Diary, 13 August 1915. 
96 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/99, Typescript Diary, 14 September 1914. 
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Davies, GOC 6 Brigade, was sent home in September 1914 as he was ‘very jumpy and 
nervous and upsets his regimental COs’.97  Davies was promoted to command the 20th 
Division of the New Army and led them back to France, and the First Army, in July 
1915. While he ‘now seem[ed] fit and well’, Davies’ health failed him in early 1916 and, 
after a period as commanding officer of Cannock Chase Reserve Centre in England, he 
committed suicide in 1918.  Similarly, Major-General Colin Mackenzie lasted three 
weeks in command of the 3rd Division before being sacked ‘owing to the mess he made 
of the attack’ at La Bassee in October 1914.98  After a period commanding the 15th 
Division in Britain, and then assuming the role of Director of Staff Duties at the War 
Office, Mackenzie was appointed to command the 61st Division of the New Army and 
led them to France in June 1916.  The lack of competent commanders was one of the 
chief command problems for the BEF in 1915–16 and the demand for general officers 
meant that even those with unenviable histories and reputations were recycled and sent 
back to the front.   
 
The First Army that attacked at the Battle of Fromelles on 19 July 1916 was marked 
different in composition from that of the previous year.  Experienced formations such as 
the 1st, 7th and 9th Divisions had been sent to other armies and had been replaced by the 
39th, 40th, 61st and 63rd Divisions of the New Army.  As the BEF’s main sphere of 
operations shifted south to the Somme in 1916, the role of the First Army – which 
remained in Artois – changed from planning the most significant offensive operations to 
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one of trench raiding and training divisions newly arrived from Britain.  Indeed, over the 
course of the 1916 campaign, fourteen different infantry divisions served in XI Corps 
alone with eight of those remaining for less than three months before being sent to fight 
in the Somme battles.99  Of the eight divisional commanders who were part of the First 
Army structure in July 1916, only three – Major Generals Barter, McCracken and 
Hudson – had any experience of planning and conducting large-scale planned 
operations.  Furthermore, of the twenty-seven brigadiers, thirteen had less than three 
months’ experience commanding their formations.  However, despite this inexperience, 
the senior war managers remained relatively constant and General Sir Charles Monro 
and Lieutenant-Generals Sir Richard Haking and Sir Hubert Gough had gained a wealth 
of experience in planning offensive operations in the 1915 campaign.  It was, then, at the 
level of brigade command that the real changes in war management occurred in the First 
Army in the campaigns of 1915 and 1916.  The promotion or dismissal of pre-war 
brigade commanders and those who had been recalled from the retired list led to a 
command gap which was filled by promoting the best men from among the battalion 
commanders and junior officers.  This resulted in the age of brigade commanders falling 
by four years on average, however the senior war management group remained 
comprised of broadly the same individuals over the course of the two campaigns.  The 
hierarchical structure of the British Army, which put the emphasis on decision-making 
onto a small group of senior war managers, meant that while the changes in personnel 
affected how units and formations approached the business of war at the tactical level, 
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the retention of the same war managers in the higher echelons of command meant that 
rapid, force-wide change was not forthcoming at the operational level in 1915. 
 
Conclusion 
The First Army war managers made clear mistakes in rejecting, forgetting and 
dismissing lessons from the 1915 campaign.  While many of these mistakes were an 
expected product of inexperience in trench warfare, others could have been eliminated 
by the application of sustained logic in battle planning, particularly at the highest levels 
of the First Army structure.  Despite these failures, the lessons of the 1915 campaign, 
such as the reintroduction of the hurricane bombardment as part of an all-arms battle 
plan, remained available to the war managers and could be recalled, as the planning for 
the Battle of Cambrai demonstrates.  That the war managers did not continuously 
evaluate every possible option in battle planning suggests that many commanders found 
it difficult to objectively evaluate the information presented to them.  While these forms 
of knowledge loss are relatively understandable, the failure of some senior war managers 
to pass on important information to the relevant commanders exposed an underlying 
problem with the British Army’s organisational culture.  Rawlinson and other war 
managers were aware of alternative methodologies which might have been more 
successful in breaking the deadlock of trench warfare but, by not passing these thoughts 





The reason for this reticence was the prevailing culture of the First Army.  Haig, as the 
senior war manager, created a culture in which his word was absolute, often acting 
without consulting his staff and surrounding himself with officers who either shared his 
operational worldview or who were, in some way, beholden to him for their position.  In 
the aftermath of the Davies Affair, Rawlinson owed his survival as IV Corps 
commander to Haig’s patronage, and this state of affairs meant that Rawlinson was 
reluctant to rock the boat by displaying an alternative viewpoint.   Similarly, Lieutenant-
General Hubert Gough owed his rapid rise from cavalry brigadier to commander of the 
Reserve Army in a little over twelve months to Haig’s support.  Others, such as 
Lieutenant-General Richard Haking and Major-General Henry Horne also benefitted 
from Haig’s patronage, rising to high command in the First Army structure and, 
following Haig’s promotion to commander-in-chief, further up the BEF hierarchy.  Haig 
displayed a strong preference for promoting officers who shared his vision of the 
decisive breakthrough battle and demonstrated offensive spirit in the attack.  He wanted 
subordinate officers who would display personal bravery and physical fitness, would 
encourage the morale of their troops and would not question his authority.  Ultimately, 
Haig created a culture where all lessons which had been identified and accepted at lower 
levels needed to pass his final approval before they were disseminated and 
institutionalised.  In terms of learning and adaptation, this asserts the importance of Haig 






Figure 4.2: Consideration of Knowledge in the Organisational Development Model 
 
The First Army’s 1915 campaign saw a high turnover of war managers as men were 
killed, wounded, promoted, transferred and sacked.  This served rapid personnel change 
had a number of implications.  First, Haig was able to create promotion pathways for his 
‘favourites’, men like Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert Gough, whose career was linked to 
Haig’s until his final dismissal in 1918.  By doing this, Haig ensured that officers who 
shared his mindset in terms of seeking the decisive breakthrough battle were promoted 
to the highest points in his army.  These men were complemented by others, such as 
Rawlinson, who were beholden to Haig for remaining in their positions.  At positions 
lower down the army hierarchy, particularly at the level of brigade and battalion 
command, Haig’s desire to promote ‘youthful’ commanders who could withstand the 
rigours of war served to promote more effective commanders with more recent, relevant 


















In short, Haig exercised supreme control over learning and force change and, even if 
subordinate officers were inclined to consider their experiences and suggest lessons to 
be learned, these lessons had to be approved by Haig in order to be disseminated across 
the First Army.  This reasserts Haig’s position as the dominant war manager with the 
ultimate responsibility for considering and accepting or rejecting new knowledge.  This 
consideration of knowledge was of crucial importance in terms of the First Army’s 
organisational development.  This highlights that the identification of new knowledge 
based on individual and collective experience, whether originating from the top-down, 
bottom-up or from outside the institutional structure was important, it was only one 
stage in the wider organisational learning process.  In short, identifying a lesson did not 
mean that it was going to be learned in an institutional sense.  While knowledge that was 
rejected could be, in some cases, recalled from the organisational memory, the 
information that was considered and accepted then had to disseminated across the 






The Dissemination and Institutionalisation of Lessons 
 
Books, circulars, schools, lectures all abound in profusion.  But unless they are applied 
with the knowledge of men and in a practical manner, they do not produce trained 
formations. 
     Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse1 
 
In May 1916, Major-General Launcelot Kiggell, Haig’s Chief of Staff at British General 
Headquarters, issued a circular pamphlet (SS.109) to all units and formations of the BEF 
which set out the approved training of divisions for offensive action, based on lessons 
identified in the 1915 campaign.2  The pamphlet asserted that the ‘chief stumbling 
blocks’ of past attacks, including failures in communication and mutual support in the 
attack, the premature use of reserves and difficulties in reorganizing and consolidating 
ground, could be overcome through better divisional training.  This, Kiggell thought, 
was best achieved by divisions creating their own detailed programmes of training in 
advancing from trenches against a hostile defensive system and then in exploiting 
successes once those systems had been broken through.  While general in nature, the 
points made in SS.109 were an attempt to impose a uniformity of method on to the 
formations of the BEF and it formed the basis for British tactical doctrine at the start of 
the Somme campaign.3  In December 1916, SS.109 was revised to incorporate the 
lessons of the Somme and was re-circulated as SS.135 – Instructions for the Training of 
                                                 
1 IWM, Private Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, Doc.3255 [afterwards, IWM, Maxse 
Papers], ‘Undated note to a member of the Court of Inquiry’, quoted in French, ‘The 51st 
(Highland) Division in the Great War’, 49. 
2 IWM, GHQ, SS.109 –Training of Divisions for Offensive Actions, May 1916. 
3 Prior & Wilson, The Somme, 58. 
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Divisions in Offensive Action.4  These pamphlets were described by Jim Beach as being 
‘keystone’ manuals which formed ‘the highest level of combat doctrine published by the 
BEF’.5  The dissemination of official publications was a means by which lessons that 
had been identified by experience and had been accepted by war managers were 
institutionalised in the operational methodology of the British Army. 
 
The preceding chapter asserted that, following the creation and collation of new 
knowledge, the war managers were left with a choice to accept or reject that 
information.  It asserted the importance of the war managers in managing newly-created 
knowledge and demonstrated the different ways that knowledge could be rejected. This 
chapter examines what happened when newly-identified lessons were accepted by the 
war managers.  In doing so, it addresses four main questions.  First, how much 
importance did the First Army war managers attach to the dissemination of information 
as a means of increasing military effectiveness?  Second, how did the mechanism for the 
delivery of training and education change over the course of the campaign?  Third, how 
was new knowledge transmitted from the front to units training at home?  And finally, to 
what extent did the First Army war managers incorporate lessons they had identified and 
accepted into their formal training provision and codify them as doctrine?  The chapter 
is split into three sections.  The first section examines the use of publications in 
disseminating information both in terms of the continuing importance of pre-war 
training manuals and the creation of new publications based on the consideration of 
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5 Beach, ‘Issued by the General Staff’, 470. 
258 
 
experiences in the 1915 campaign.  The second section studies the First Army’s 
provision of training and education on both a formal and informal basis and 
demonstrates that as the campaign progressed the war managers increasingly relied on 
formal methods of knowledge dissemination in training.  The third section focuses on 
the informal processes of knowledge dissemination including secondments, mentoring 
and ‘on-the-job training’.  The chapter concludes by demonstrating how the 
dissemination and institutionalization of lessons learned fits into the wider 
Organisational Development Model. 
 
Recent research into conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated that the 
institutionalisation of lessons is a key indicator of an army’s ability to learn from its 
experiences.6  In order to achieve successful battlefield adaptation new information does 
not only need to be created, captured and accepted, it must be disseminated across the 
organization in order to become the new normal.  To do this effectively, an institution 
requires a formal system for translating the experiences of units or individuals into 
information which is available and easily understandable to other parts of the 
organization.7  For the majority of the Great War, and all of the 1915 campaign, the BEF 
did not implement any force-wide framework for the dissemination of new knowledge.  
Yet the exchange of ideas still took place.  Analysis of the secondary literature indicates 
that there were three main ways in which this happened.  Richard Downie’s institutional 
learning cycle suggests that after new knowledge is acquired lessons are institutionalised 
                                                 
6 Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 32; Serena, Revolution in Military Adaptation. 
7 Robert Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen McCartney, ‘’Transformation in Contact’: Learning the 
Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs 87.2 (March 2011), 253-70. 
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in formal military doctrine through the creation and dissemination of official 
publications.8  Victoria Nolan proposed a different approach and suggested that lessons 
are transmitted and embedded through an institution’s practical and academic teaching.9  
This corresponds with Catignani’s idea that lessons learned are institutionalised through 
the delivery of learning programmes in training and education.10  Aimee Fox-Godden 
identified a further means through which new knowledge was disseminated across the 
BEF, arguing that the British Army’s organizational culture, personalised nature and 
mistrust of formal doctrine meant that it encouraged informal dissemination of lessons 
through such means as mentoring, secondments and exploiting existing social 
networks.11   
 
In terms of organisational learning, Fox-Godden split the means of knowledge 
dissemination sharing into formal ‘people-to-documents’ methods and informal ‘people-
to-people’ methods.12  The former category sees new knowledge collated by war 
managers, then extracted and codified for future use.  This method includes both the 
creation and dissemination of doctrinal publications and the establishment of formal 
training schools, which then use the publications as the basis of their teaching.13  The 
informal ‘people-to-people’ means of information sharing represents more of an ad hoc 
approach to organisational learning in which information is transferred between 
                                                 
8 Richard Downie, Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador and the Drug 
War (Westport, CT, 1998), 38. 
9 Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency, 97. 
10 Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge’, 32. 
11 Fox-Godden, ‘Beyond the Western Front’, 190-209. 
12 Fox-Godden, ‘Beyond the Western Front’, 194. 
13 Fox-Godden, ‘Beyond the Western Front’, 194, 199. 
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individuals on a more limited basis. Fox-Godden’s classification is useful in 
understanding the dissemination of information across the various theatres in the later 
period of the war, however for the 1915 campaign the methods of information 
dissemination do not fit neatly into these categories.  There are two main reasons for 
this.  First, while the dissemination of official publications was an important means of 
knowledge-transfer, by focusing on the creation and spread of doctrinal publications in 
the Central Distribution Service (CDS) and Stationery Service (SS) series, Fox-
Godden’s classification neglects the informal sharing of lessons learned reports between 
formations.  Second, while Fox-Godden is correct to highlight the importance of official 
training schools in the knowledge dissemination process, these schools were only 
established on a large scale towards the end of the 1915 campaign; prior to that, the 
provision of training also occurred on an informal basis.  This chapter evaluates these 
three methods of knowledge dissemination and assesses their relative importance in the 
organisational development of the First Army in the 1915 campaign. 
 
Written Dissemination of Lessons 
This section examines the importance of the creation and use of official publications and 
the circulation of ‘best-practice guidelines’ as means of disseminating new knowledge 
across the British Army in the 1915 campaign.  Despite claims by Paul Harris that the 
British Army was anti-intellectual in approach, the British War Office produced a large 
number of official publications which were influential in shaping the training and 
operational thought of the regular British Army and the Territorial Force in the pre-war 
period and then the new armies in 1914 and 1915.  These publications drew upon 
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lessons identified from practical experience in the Boer War and the theoretical 
experience from observation of the course of the Russo-Japanese War.  One of the main 
outcomes of learning from those conflicts was the creation, in 1906, of a force-wide 
formalised general staff with responsibility for army strategy, the provision of officer 
education, preparations for war and the gathering of intelligence.14  Part of the 
preparations for war was the codification of lessons and experiences in a series of formal 
manuals which were disseminated throughout the British Army, directed operational 
methodology and formed the basis of training provision.15  
 
The manuals created by the General Staff at the War Office provided the foundations for 
the training of the regular formations of the British Army in the pre-war period and 
represented the extent of the codification of identified lessons at the point the BEF 
embarked for France in August 1914.  In addition, the manuals were also used as the 
basis for the six months mobilization training given to units of the Territorial Force from 
August 1914 until their departure for the front.  Mitchinson, in his recent study of the 
Territorial Force, highlighted the importance of both the FSR and a specially produced 
publication named the Infantry Training Manual in shaping the development of the 
Territorial Force, although he admits that the extent to which manuals were studied 
                                                 
14 Paul Harris, The Men who Planned the War: A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the 
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Deploying the British army, 1902–1914 (Oxford, 2012), 66-7.  See also, Hew Strachan, ‘The 
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within formations are ‘open to question and difficult to determine’.16  Information 
regarding the training of the Territorial Force in the pre-war period is largely confined to 
divisional and regimental histories as the official war diaries which charted the daily 
activities of units and formations only begin on the date of embarkation for a war theatre 
and not on the date of mobilization.  However, monthly reports relating to the training of 
the 51st (Highland) Division – which formed part of the First Army from May to July 
1915 and took part in the attack at Givenchy in June – have survived and their contents 
demonstrate the role of official publications in mobilization training.17  The first of the 
51st Division memoranda from October 1914 asserts that, based on experiences gained 
since mobilization in August, ‘schemes of training for all arms…should have been laid 
down by the War Office during peace’.18  However, subsequent memoranda record that 
training was being carried out ‘on the lines laid out in the official syllabus’.19  This 
demonstrates that at the point of mobilization, and for some time after, the divisions of 
the Territorial Force received little written guidance on the manner in which they should 
be training their units and the matter was largely left to the initiative of individual 
division, brigade and battalion commanders.   
                                                 
16 K. W. Mitchinson, The Territorial Force at War, 1914–1916 (London, 2014), 66. 
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The syllabus of training mentioned in Bannatine-Allason’s report was probably the same 
as that issued to the divisions of the New Army in late-August 1914.  Those instructions 
envisaged a six-month training period in which the first ten weeks consisted of basic 
recruit training.  During this phase, the men of the Territorial Force and New Army 
received preliminary instruction in musketry and began basic squad drill, including 
saluting, physical training and route marching.  They then graduated on to practice 
bayonet fighting, entrenching and outpost duty.  After ten weeks the troops began 
platoon training with five weeks’ company training beginning two weeks later.  The 
final stage of the syllabus was set aside for battalion and brigade training, including 
three-day route marches, field firing with artillery support and the training of specialists 
including machine-gunners, grenadiers and signalers.20  In the 9th Division of the New 
Army – which joined the First Army in June 1915 and was in the first wave at the Battle 
of Loos in September – the training was conducted ‘on lines identical with those of the 
old army’ using their pre-war training syllabus.21  Captain John McEwen of the 5th 
Cameron Highlanders noted that during the training of the 9th Division in England, the 
manuals Infantry Training and Musketry Regulations were ‘open books’ for young 
officers, and Captain Joseph Goss, the quartermaster of the 7th King’s Own Scottish 
Borderers in the 15th Division, recounted that despite numerous instances of confusion 
‘officers and men rapidly got into the way of doing things as laid down in the various 
                                                 
20 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 296-7. 
21 Ewing, History of the 9th (Scottish) Division, 9.  The use of the War Office syllabus is also 
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Manuals of Instruction’.22  Indeed, even off duty, ‘it was a common thing to find parties 
of young officers or NCOs studying their drill books and teaching each other the 
rudiments of their new profession’.23    However, it should be noted that the 
dissemination of these publications was uneven and units of the 15th Division suffered 
from a ‘scarcity of official training manuals‘ at the beginning of their training period.24   
 
Sitting alongside these formal publications were a variety of informal books and 
pamphlets which sought to provide abbreviated reference guides for new officers and 
NCOs.  Written in late-August 1914, and drawing on his experience as an officer in the 
Boer War, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell’s Quick Training for War 
became an instant best-seller, running to five editions in September 1914 alone and 
selling 65,000 copies in five weeks.25  Similarly, Captain A. P. Birchall, formerly an 
officer on the Instructional Staff in Western Canada, wrote Rapid Training of a 
Company for War in November 1914.26  Both Birchall and Baden-Powell were keen to 
declare that their work was not intended as a substitute for the information contained in 
the official publications, rather they existed alongside them as a handy point of 
reference.  While formal and informal manuals of instruction were used extensively in 
the training of Territorial Force and New Army formations in England in 1914 and 1915, 
they largely focused on drill and discipline which had been perceived as being the 
                                                 
22 McEwen, Fifth Camerons, 53; Joseph Goss, A Border Battalion: The History of the 7/8th King’s 
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23 Buchan & Stewart, Fifteenth Division, 5. 
24 Buchan & Stewart, Fifteenth Division, 9. 
25 Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Baden-Powell, Quick Training for War (London, 2011), edited 
by Martin Robson. 
26 Captain A.P. Birchall, Rapid Training of a Company for War (London, 1914). 
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particular strength of the pre-war regular British Army, rather than imparting any 
knowledge which related directly to the conditions of war found in France from late-
1914. 
 
This emphasis is unsurprising given the volunteer nature of the new armies and the 
inexperience of the Territorial Force.  Analysis of the training period of the 9th and 15th 
Divisions demonstrate that there was no centralised, force-wide attempt to disseminate 
formal written lessons from the front and incorporate them into the training manuals 
used by the new armies and the Territorial Force at home.  When publications-based 
information sharing from the front did occur, it tended to be for a reason other than 
increasing the effectiveness of the units in question.  The commanding officer of the 10th 
Scottish Rifles convened a special parade to read accounts of the 2nd Scottish Rifles’ 
actions during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, however rather than using the experiences 
as a means of examining the tactical realities of conflict on the western front, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ussher used the reports to foster regimental spirit by using the deeds 
of other battalions of the regiment as a benchmark for the recruits to attain.27   In the 5th 
Seaforth Highlanders of the 51st Division, Sergeant John Bruce Cairnie noted that the 
battalion NCOs were given a lecture, which consisted of ‘reading aloud extracts of 
“Notes from the Front”’ because ‘it rained all afternoon’ and the men could not train 
outside.28  This three-part publication was written by an unidentified officer in France 
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and was published and disseminated not only to units of the Territorial Force such as the 
5th Seaforths but was also received by the 18th Division of the New Army.29  While 
Notes from the Front contained some useful comments on the nature of war in the 1914 
campaign, and the FSR laid out the general principles of war, the official training 
manuals used on a large scale in 1914 and 1915 did not give much assistance to young 
officers with no prior military training in the handling of platoons or companies in the 
attack.30 
 
The failure to update the official manuals with up to date information from the front had 
a knock-on impact on the effectiveness of the Territorial Force and New Army 
formations.  In accordance with the war training syllabus, battalion, brigade and 
divisional manoeuvres of the kind which the 9th, 15th and 51st Divisions would undertake 
in France, only occupied the final two months of the six-month training period.31  These 
exercises were characterised by a lack of professionalism and highlighted significant 
inexperience and failures in staff work.  William Nicholson, an officer on the staff of the 
51st Division recorded that during one exercise ‘neither side attacked; the brigade on one 
side was scattered over miles of country and advanced some two miles in four hours; 
while the other brigade sat in a hole and successfully escaped notice’.32  The men of the 
4th Cameron Highlanders were trained in the officially approved principles of fire and 
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31 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, 296. 
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movement as set out in the FSR; however, in practice, this consisted of ‘skirmishing 
over fields, hedges, ditches, dykes and fences after an imaginary enemy who we[re] 
usually put to complete rout in the end by a bayonet charge’.33  A similar situation 
existed in the new armies.  In one divisional exercise, Captain the Earl of Seafield got 
lost when trying to assault a defensive position and when he finally found the right 
coordinates the defenders had ‘marched home to bed’.34  When the 7th King’s Own 
Scottish Borderers practised a night attack during the day, their signallers were forced to 
wave flags and pretend they were lamps.35  Finally, an exercise run by the 15th Division 
was stopped, as the men had fallen out to eat blackberries they found by the roadside.36  
These examples highlight the difficulties in the training of units which were added to the 
First Army structure in the 1915 campaign.  The over-reliance on pre-war manuals of 
instruction, coupled with the lack of relevant knowledge being transferred from the 
front, created an unrealistic set of training conditions which bore little resemblance to 
the conditions being experienced by units in France. 
 
When the divisions of the Territorial Force and new armies arrived in France they found 
their textbook training had been overtaken by events on the ground.  As a result, 
Rawlinson believed that the attachment of the 49th (West Riding) Division to his IV 
Corps in April would be of little value in offensive operations but they might prove 
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useful if trained to defend trenches, ‘which does not take much skill’.37  However, even 
though the units followed the same written training syllabus in England, there was much 
disparity in perceived levels of effectiveness.  For example, Rawlinson ‘rejoiced’ at the 
departure of the 51st Division from his corps in June ‘as they give much trouble’ and 
thought that he ‘gain[ed] materially by the exchange’ of the 51st and Canadian Divisions 
for the 48th (South Midland) Division of the Territorial Force and the 9th Division of the 
New Army.38 Bannatine-Allason quickly realised that the 51st Division was poorly 
equipped for the rigours of life on the western front and informed Haig that his men 
needed more training before being asked to enter the trenches.39  Haig answered that 
‘infantry peace time training was little use in teaching a company how to capture a house 
occupied by half a dozen machine guns’.40  Haig’s response demonstrates not only the 
deficiencies of using peacetime manuals as the primary means of knowledge 
dissemination to formations training in England, but that war managers in France were 
aware of the deficiencies and did little to rectify the situation.  Serena’s study of 
adaptation in the US military in the Iraq War found that ‘training must fit the 
circumstances of the mission and operational environment’.41  That the methodology in 
1914 and 1915 did not fit this model is demonstrated by the fact that while training in 
England in November 1914, the 6th Cameron Highlanders paraded every Saturday 
morning ‘to form square, front rank kneeling, bayonets fixed to receive a charge of 
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Uhlan Cavalry’.42  In the British Army the training that regular, Territorial Force and 
New Army units received in the pre-war and pre-embarkation periods was not mission 
specific.  The use of existing pre-war manuals led to the creation of groups of men who 
had been trained to be generic soldiers of the British Army rather than being trained as 
soldiers with a particular mission to accomplish – namely, the defeat of the German 
Army situated in a fortified defensive system by means of a trench-to-trench attack 
supported by a preparatory artillery bombardment and using a variety of tactical 
weapons systems. 
 
Whereas the dissemination of knowledge through the existing training manuals provided 
a general introduction to soldiering, those produced and disseminated in France were 
based on practical experience and were mission specific. The production of written 
pamphlets and manuals in the theatre of war represented the BEF’s formal attempts at 
creating and disseminating doctrine in a portable and accessible manner.  This was a 
necessary response to the exponential growth of the British Army and represented the 
development of a more bureaucratic system of knowledge dissemination. Evaluation of 
the production of manuals and pamphlets in the field demonstrates how new knowledge 
was codified and disseminated across the BEF.  Existing studies of the production and 
use of these pamphlets have tended to focus on the later period of the war: Beach argued 
convincingly that doctrine creation at GHQ was an uneven and haphazard process even 
after the creation of a dedicated Training Branch in early 1917; Fox-Godden examined 
the extent to which pamphlets and manuals produced on the western front were 
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disseminated to other theatres in 1917 and 1918; and Paddy Griffith focused on 1917 ‘as 
the “classic time” of the BEF’s manual production’.43  This section represents the first 
attempt at understanding the nature and extent of the production and dissemination of 
codified new knowledge on the western front in 1915. 
 
As Beach noted, the codification of new knowledge is a crucial component of any 
serious learning process.44  The responsibility for the production and dissemination of 
official manuals and pamphlets until November 1915 lay with the Central Distribution 
Section (CDS) of the War Office in London who dispatched their publications to France 
for distribution by the Army Printing and Stationery Service (APSS).  The first 
publication to be commissioned in the CDS series, as it became known, was CDS.2 – 
Notes from the Front which was issued in November 1914 and, as has been 
demonstrated, was also disseminated to troops training at home.45  In 1915, the 
production of these publications was taken over directly by the APSS using the series 
code SS for Stationery Service.46  Prior to February 1917, authorship of the CDS and SS 
pamphlets is unclear.  Beach notes that until the creation of the Training Branch in 
February 1917, doctrine creation was the task of the GHQ staff who would assign a 
                                                 
43 Beach, ‘Issued by the General Staff’, 464-91; Fox-Godden, ‘Beyond the Western Front’, 194-
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writer or committee of writers on an ad hoc basis.47  In total the CDS produced 128 
pamphlets in the period January–December 1915 and 145 overall.  Figure 5.1 
demonstrates the production of pamphlets per month in the period 1914–1916. 
 
Figure 5.1: Production of CDS Publications, 1914–1916 
 
Source: Christopher Henderson, ‘Documents produced by General Headquarters, British Expeditionary 
Forces, registered and disseminated by the Central Distribution Service, 1st Printing Company, RE – Part 
1: CDS1 to CDS299; Christopher Henderson, ‘Documents produced by General Headquarters, British 
Expeditionary Forces, registered and disseminated by the Central Distribution Service, 1st Printing 
Company, RE – Part 2: CDS301 to CDS388 
 
                                                 









The production of pamphlets by the CDS averaged approximately ten publications per 
month in 1915.  These pamphlets were organised within the CDS system into seven 
specific classifications: tactical; aeronautics; artillery; military engineering and trench 
warfare; signals service; machine guns; and meteorological.48  While only one pamphlet 
was produced which studied meteorological conditions, twenty-four were issued which 
dealt with the day-to-day problems caused by trench warfare.  The latter category 
encompassed a range of subjects including how to protect oneself during a poisonous 
gas attack, reports on types of German land mines and flamethrowers; and an eighteen-
part series on defensive arrangements in trenches.  Contemporary unit war diaries often 
do not mention the receipt of CDS publications, making an evaluation of the extent of 
dissemination of new knowledge in this manner difficult.  However, the war diary of the 
Lahore Division of the Indian Corps does demonstrate that the pamphlets were 
disseminated regularly to divisional headquarters.  On 29 May, the Lahore Division 
received copies of Notes from the Front – Part III; on 3 June they received Instruction 
for use of Chemical Grenades; and on 3 July they were issued with forty-eight copies of 
Notes on Artillery and ten copies of Notes on Strengthening a Defensive Portion of the 
Line which had been translated into Hindi for the native troops.49  What is striking in the 
production of pamphlets is the emphasis on disseminating new knowledge at the tactical 
level of war; of the seventy publications listed in CDS.58 – List of General Staff 
Publications (corrected to 30th November 1915), sixty deal with tactical effectiveness in 
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the practicalities of weapons handling and lessons for specialist formations such as the 
Royal Artillery and Royal Flying Corps.50 
 
The other ten publications in the CDS58 were recorded as being focussed on the tactical 
level, although examination of the titles reveals that they actually deal with what is now 
recognised as the operational level of war.  Of these ten pamphlets, eight were manuals 
which had been translated and circulated.  As chapter one demonstrated, Haig was 
consulted by the war managers of the French Army about the manner of the First 
Army’s attack at Neuve Chapelle, and those lessons he identified were later passed back 
to the British in the form of the French doctrinal publication ‘Note 5779’.  That 
document was translated by GHQ and published as CDS.23 – Preliminary Deductions 
from Recent Engagements in June 1915.  That pamphlet, and a companion publication 
CDS.24 – Object and Conditions of Combined Offensive Action, were certainly 
disseminated down the First Army structure to the level of divisional headquarters.  On 
19 June, the general staff of the 1st Division noted that they had received ‘some 
admirable pamphlets translated from the French’, which were ‘full of valuable lessons 
and deductions’ based on their experiences in the battles of May and June near Arras.51  
In December, the General Staff published CDS.333 – A Study of the Attack in the 
Present Phase of War: Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander which 
was written by a French officer, Captain Andre Laffargue, based on his experiences on 9 
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May at Neuville-St-Vaast.52  While Laffargue’s manual was widely disseminated in both 
the British and French armies, the extent to which it influenced a change in thinking 
among war managers is unclear.53   
 
By the end of November, there was a concerted effort to learn from the German 
experience through the circulation of captured documents.  Indeed, of the twenty 
pamphlets published by the CDS in November, eleven were translations of German 
publications.54  Analysis of these documents highlights the time lapse between 
acquisition and dissemination.  CDS.80 was found on the body of a German officer in 
May and CDS.81 was captured on 16 June 1915; however, both documents were only 
published and disseminated by the British in November.  Furthermore, the translated 
publications highlight the importance of the dissemination of new knowledge to the 
German process of battlefield adaptation.  Among the doctrinal publications captured 
and circulated by the British were documents which examined the operational 
performance of the German Fifth Army in attacks in the Argonne and lessons drawn 
from fighting in the Ban de Sapt by General von Eberhardt.55  German war managers 
attempted to identify lessons from their own experiences and transferred them 
horizontally across the institution at the level of army command.  Additionally, they 
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sought to examine critically the performance of the French Army; CDS.303 was written 
by the Germans in April 1915, and was based on experiences of battles in Champagne 
the previous winter, and in which the author examined the organization of the French 
lines of defence and the German attempts to combat attempted attacks.56  Another 
publication, CDS.304, sought to draw lessons ‘based on the knowledge acquired from 
the errors which appear to have been committed by the French’ in the same winter 
battles.57  The production of translated documents may suggest that the British attempted 
to learn from other armies on the western front in the same manner as the German Army 
did, however analysis of the First Army, I Corps and IV Corps war diaries reveals no 
evidence that the translated German publications were passed to them from GHQ. 
 
Nor is there evidence that the British war managers viewed the publication of the official 
CDS pamphlets as a particularly important means of disseminating new operational 
knowledge.  Only one pamphlet was issued in 1915 which can be described as relating 
to the British operational level of war.  CDS.5 - Trench Warfare: Notes on Attack and 
Defence, was published in February 1915 and was drawn from memoranda previously 
issued for the guidance of troops at the front.58  It was the first British publication which 
specifically considered the organization and execution of localised trench-to-trench 
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attacks and it provided a good deal of relevant advice including the need for close 
cooperation of infantry and artillery, the creation of ‘a wall of fire’ to stop the enemy 
from reinforcing the attacked trench, parties of engineers to advance with the attacking 
columns, and the careful organization of local reserves.59  Indeed, many of the points 
contained in Trench Warfare were incorporated into the planning for the Battle of Neuve 
Chapelle in March, the month after the pamphlet’s issue.  The continuing relevance of 
the publication following that battle was shown on 17 April, when Major-General Keary 
of the Lahore Division watched a practice attack by the entire Ferozepore brigade ‘on 
the lines indicated in “Trench Warfare”’.60   
 
Issued alongside the CDS publications were the manuals and pamphlets produced by the 
Stationery Service (SS).  Over the course of the war over a thousand documents were 
issued in the SS series, however no complete list survives which records their titles and 
dates of publication.  Analysis of surviving publications reveals that 110 SS numbers 
were issued prior to the Battle of the Somme in July 1916.  However, there appears to 
have been much crossover with the CDS publications; indeed where low-numbered SS 
pamphlets can be found their identification number corresponds with that in the CDS 
list.  Thus, SS.23 – Preliminary Deductions for Instruction from Recent Engagements, 
which was issued in November 1915 was first issued as CDS.23 in June.  While the 
CDS and SS publications were useful in disseminating new knowledge on trench 
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management or on weapons handling, they were not used by the BEF as a means of 
sharing a new operational methodology on a large scale.     
 
To briefly summarise, the production of codified information and its dissemination via 
the publications of the Central Distribution Service and the Stationary Service marks the 
initial attempts by the war managers to consider and transfer new knowledge across the 
force.  While that knowledge was initially largely confined to informing troops on the 
unfamiliar procedures of trench management and tactical weapons handling, 
publications which dealt with the operational level of war were produced towards the 
end of the campaign.  In the majority of instances these were translations of French and 
German documents, which demonstrates at least a willingness on the part of the war 
managers to consider the experiences of others outside their immediate surroundings.  
However, the degree to which these were evenly distributed or the extent to which war 
managers actively considered their contents remains unclear.  Of the publications 
produced by the BEF based on their own experiences, CDS.5 – Trench Warfare: Notes 
on Attack and Defence was the most influential in influencing battle-planning 
procedures, however, following the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, it was not continually 
updated with the newest information.  In terms of Organisational Development, the use 
of the CDS and SS publications as a means of knowledge-transfer laid the platform for 
further, more considered, attempts at information dissemination. 
 
On 8 November 1915, First Army issued an order to the headquarters of the I, III, IV 
and XI Corps, instructing them to each send a senior officer with ‘trench experience’ to 
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First Army headquarters the following day for the purpose of ‘discussing and criticising’ 
a draft of a pamphlet entitled ‘Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Fighting’.61  That 
pamphlet was eventually published in March 1916 as SS.101 – Notes for Infantry 
Officers in Trench Warfare.62  This confirms Beach’s assertion that prior to February 
1917 ad hoc committees were often used to create new doctrine, however the extent that 
this was controlled by ‘the busy operations staff at GHQ’ is unclear.63  Certainly there is 
no indication in the war diaries that GHQ instructed First Army headquarters to convene 
a committee to critique the pamphlet, so the initiative may have been undertaken at the 
behest of First Army.  The over-riding principle on which the document was founded 
was that trench warfare was ‘only a phase’ of operations on the western front and the 
purpose of that phase was to create a favourable situation for field operations to 
resume.64  Furthermore, success in the attack depended on two main factors: training of 
the troops and thoroughness of preparation.65  The document itself is split into five 
sections.  While the first four sections deal with the characteristics of trench warfare, the 
citing and construction of trenches, general trench routine, and the defence of a trench 
system, the final section provides notes on the system of attack.   
 
Analysis of the final section of SS.101 illustrates the extent to which the lessons of the 
1915 campaign – in terms of offensive action at the operational level – were 
incorporated into official formal doctrine for wide-spread dissemination.  The first 
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evidence of learning from the experiences of the battles of 1915 comes in the 
introduction to the chapter where the author asserts that the attack began ‘weeks before 
the day fixed for the assault’.66  This is a recognition that all available time should be 
taken to plan the infantry attack thoroughly and methodically.  In this, it marks a great 
departure from the First Army war managers’ opinions of preparation time prior to the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March when Haig assumed that the attacking troops would 
be ready to undertake offensive operations with only ten days preparation.67  As the 
campaign progressed, more time was taken in the planning phase of operations; while 
the planning of Neuve Chapelle was eventually extended to thirty-two days, the planning 
of Aubers Ridge took fifty-eight days and the planning of the Battle of Loos took three 
months.  The planning of the Battle of the Somme, the subsequent British offensive 
action on the western front in the 1916 campaign, took over six months from the 
Chantilly Conference to the assault on 1 July.  SS.101 also highlighted the need to 
remove troops from the trenches to enable them to receive special training for the 
assault.68  This approach had worked well during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle when 23 
Brigade of the 8th Division was withdrawn from the trenches for a week prior to the 
attack in a move which war managers believed immediately benefitted the officers and 
men.69  During this time, the four battalions of 23 Brigade were engaged in a programme 
of intense physical training, inspections in full battle order, reconnoitering the area of 
ground to be attacked, and in attending local conferences under the command of the 
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GOC, Brigadier-General Sir Reginald Pinney.70  Other elements of the IV Corps 
‘rehearsed in detail’ the means of arriving at and leaving from their forming up 
positions, and unit commanders used the break from trench-holding to train their men in 
the specific roles they were expected to undertake in the coming battle.71   
 
This, then, is an example of successful organisational learning in the First Army.  The 
withdrawal of attacking troops from the trench line for a period of rest and intensive 
training prior to an offensive movement was identified by war managers as being a 
success, and was repeated again by removing elements of the 1st Division from the 
trenches in May, and then by withdrawing some divisions prior to the Battle of Loos in 
September.  Indeed, the planning phase was further extended in the 1916 campaign 
when Haig issued a memorandum calling for up to four and a half weeks dedicated 
training on a brigade-by-brigade basis for the corps which were earmarked for the first 
attack on the Somme.72  The lesson that withdrawal from the line for training prior to the 
offensive was accepted by the war managers to such an extent that it was specifically 
mentioned in SS.101, the only publication which can be shown to have been drawn up 
by the First Army war managers based on their collective experiences in the 1915 
campaign.  In this, it was written into formal doctrine, disseminated throughout the army 
and was institutionalised as the new norm. 
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While the lessons codified and disseminated in SS.101 represent how organisational 
development could take place, the example was not the norm over the course of the 1915 
campaign.  Indeed, only towards the end of the campaign can it be shown that First 
Army’s war managers gave any consideration to incorporating lessons learned into 
formal written doctrine and disseminating it throughout the army.  Despite the war 
managers’ production and dissemination of more formal doctrine in time for the 
planning phase of the Somme campaign, the extent to which pamphlets were distributed 
to a level low enough to be useful in altering operational performance remains unclear.  
Certainly in February 1916 battalion officers undertaking offensive actions against the 
German lines, mainly through the means of trench raids, repeated ‘avoidable mistakes’ 
due to their ‘ignorance of certain facts and useful lessons drawn from recent similar 
enterprises’.73  Haig concluded that to avoid this in future, careful choices needed to be 
made in both the selection of subject matter and the means of communicating it down 
the army structure to regimental officers, as there existed a danger that if officers were 
presented with too much written information, it might have gone unread.74  With 
particular respect to trench raiding, GHQ produced SS.107 - Notes on Minor 
Enterprises, a short pamphlet, based on recent experience, in March 1916.  This 
publication emphasised that definite rules for conducting trench raids could not be laid 
down and the information contained therein ‘may be useful as a guide’ for future 
operations.75  As this publication was produced after Haig’s comments on the 
importance of select material being passed to regimental officers, it can be assumed that 
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this was the type of pamphlet he meant to be circulated.  However, this represents 
somewhat of a paradox as, despite Haig’s suggestion that ‘officers undertaking 
enterprises’ – platoon and company commanders in the case of trench raids – should 
view the latest publications, SS.107 was earmarked as a ‘confidential document’ which 
was not to be taken any further forward than brigade headquarters.  While there were 
practical reasons for this, for example, not wanting the document to be captured from a 
dead or wounded officer, this example highlights a lack of clarity regarding the 
responsibility of the dissemination of newly created doctrinal publications and their 
intended audience.  That this was not addressed until the establishment of the Training 
Branch in February 1917 demonstrates the lack of importance war managers attached to 
creating a formal force-wide system for the dissemination of new knowledge.  
 
Despite this, information sharing did occur on an informal basis at different levels of the 
First Army hierarchy.  This can be viewed in terms of the sharing of ad hoc reports 
rather than formal doctrinal publications.  This process involved the identification of 
minor enterprises such as trench raids and bombing actions which had been particularly 
successful or well organised, the reports of which were then circulated around particular 
formations to be used as templates for similar future operations.  A good example of this 
is the experience of the 15th (Scottish) Division after its arrival with the First Army in 
July 1915.  On 28 August, Brigadier-General Archibald Montgomery, the Chief of Staff 
of IV Corps, circulated a memorandum to the 15th and 47th Divisions which was 
originally written by the general staff of the 8th Division in the planning phase of the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March.  This document was comprised of extracts from the 
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8th Division scheme of attack at Neuve Chapelle and included sections on how to 
assemble for the attack, medical preparations, the supply of attacking troops and the 
importance of utilising wire-cutting and trench-blocking parties in the attack.76  
Similarly, Montgomery forwarded a memorandum two days later to all three of the IV 
Corps’ divisions which shared extracts from operational orders and reports by the GOC 
of the 6th Division and the GOC of 16 Infantry Brigade, both in the Second Army, 
detailing lessons from their operations at Hooge earlier in August.77  There is no 
indication in either the IV Corps or First Army war diaries that these documents were 
transferred to IV Corps through any official channels nor is there any indication of I 
Corps receiving the same data.  Rather, it seems likely that Montgomery received these 
papers informally, direct from the war managers of the VI Corps and then chose to 
disseminate them throughout IV Corps hierarchy on his own initiative.  Towards the end 
of the 1915 campaign GHQ and First Army headquarters also began to use the informal 
transfer of best practice guidelines as a means of sharing new knowledge.  On 18 
December, GHQ circulated reports on a bombing expedition undertaken by the 1st 
Battalion, Cheshire Regiment on 6–7 December, and a week later supplied the First 
Army with thirty copies of a document which presented the summary of a small 
offensive carried out by the 6th Battalion, Gloucester Regiment the previous month.78  
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Similarly, First Army headquarters circulated particulars of a raid at Neuve Chapelle of 
11 December which the GOC considered to be ‘a good example of a minor enterprise’.79  
The presence of these documents in the war diary of the 15th Division highlights that 
informal information sharing took place in the First Army towards the end of the 1915 
campaign.  While the first examples of this were confined to Montgomery at IV Corps 
headquarters, by the end of the year both GHQ and First Army headquarters had adopted 
this method.   
 
The informal sharing of documents was not only used in the theatre of war and there is 
evidence that documents were passed from units or individuals at the front to elements 
of the New Army training in Britain in early 1915.  Study of the training period of the 
18th Division reveals that the formation used reports sent back from the front to prepare 
their own training schemes.  Of particular importance were the reports compiled by 
Major-General Henry Horne, GOC 2nd Division, and Brigadier-General the Earl of 
Cavan, GOC 4 (Guards) Brigade in I Corps, regarding the successful attack on the 
Brickstacks at Cuinchy in early February 1915.80  These files contained not only factual 
reports of the actions but draft operational orders, sketches of trenches and notes on 
artillery preparation.81  Significantly, the turnaround time of the passing of documents 
informally from the front to formations at home was much shorter than even the formal 
top-down dissemination as practiced towards the end of 1915.  To give an example, 
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notes by an airborne artillery observer, Lieutenant Game of the 32nd Battery, Royal 
Field Artillery, were compiled on 18 April 1915 and were received by the 18th Division 
headquarters in Colchester only four days later.82  In comparison, the formal 
dissemination of written doctrine took far longer, and in the case of SS.101 it took four 
months from discussion at First Army headquarters to dissemination by GHQ.  The 
presence of informal knowledge dissemination in the First Army in 1915 corresponds 
with Catignani’s findings relating to the British Army in Afghanistan.  In 1915 on the 
western front, just as in conflict in the twenty-first century, informal sharing of new 
knowledge was used to make up for deficiencies in the institution’s formal learning 
procedures.83 
 
To summarise, by the end of the 1915 campaign, the war managers in the First Army 
sought to use both formal and informal methods of knowledge-transfer in order to 
disseminate information across the force.  Pamphlets, such as SS.101, were created by 
small groups of experienced war managers and represent the most up to date operational 
information.  SS.101 showed that the war managers realised the need for a period of 
careful, methodical preparation in which attack formations were withdrawn for the line 
for specialised training.  However, for the majority of the 1915 campaign, this 
considered approach was not the norm and when it became more common towards the 
end of 1915 there was no standard, formal application.  To counter the lack of a formal 
knowledge-transfer system, officers began to disseminate what can be termed here ‘best-
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practice guidelines’ rather than centrally produced documents.  This approach originated 
at IV Corps headquarters but, by the end of the campaign, was also common practice at 
GHQ and First Army headquarters.  Indeed, this informal sharing of information began 
earlier with regards to the transfer of new knowledge from units at the front to those 
training in Britain and was a more common and quicker means of disseminating 
information.  The use of written, codified publications does, however, only represent one 
of the means by which knowledge-transfer war achieved in the BEF in 1915. 
 
Practical Dissemination of Lessons Learned 
While the creation and dissemination of formal and informal documents was important 
in sharing information across the BEF in 1915, war managers also relied on more 
practical methods of knowledge-transfer.  On 26 October 1915, the Chief of the General 
Staff, Sir William Robertson, issued a memorandum detailing Sir John French’s 
thoughts on the general military policy that the BEF would pursue over the course of the 
coming winter.84  This document highlighted a change in thinking by senior war 
managers, regarding the best methods of disseminating new knowledge across the force.  
The changing structure of the BEF, including the incorporation of New Army divisions 
and inexperienced replacements in other formations, necessitated the adoption of a more 
thorough and relevant instruction in basic and specialist training.  In order to do this, Sir 
John French recognised that the ‘changed conditions [of war] may entail some departure 
from the principles of our training manuals and require some centralisation of instruction 
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under the best instructors’.85  The change away from documents-based knowledge-
transfer was not universally accepted among the BEF’s war managers.   Based on his 
experiences, Douglas Haig, for example, believed that ‘the principles laid down in [the] 
training manuals held good’ in November 1915.86  French’s realisation marked a 
departure from previous informal approaches to training provision and represented the 
first steps in ushering in a more formal system of information sharing.  This section 
examines how the provision of training moved from using informal methods to a more 
formal structure over the course of the 1915 campaign.  It demonstrates that while this 
was a positive move for the First Army, a lack of clarity over the responsibility for 
training provision, education and professional development meant that the maximum 
possible effectiveness was not achieved. 
 
Training plays a crucial role in the organisational development of military institutions 
through the imparting of the general and specific military skills required for battlefield 
success.  However, the training of a national armed force is also important in reinforcing 
institutional identity, fostering traditions and embodying the military culture of the 
organisation.87  As Millett, Murray and Watman have noted, training accounts for one of 
the ‘companion issues’ of military effectiveness and is one of the key means by which 
                                                 
85 TNA, WO95/159, First Army General Staff War Diary, Sir William Robertson to Army 
Commanders and GOC Cavalry Corps, 26 October 1915. 
86 TNA, WO95/160, First Army General Staff War Diary, Sir Richard Butler, ‘First Army, 1915 - 
Instructions for Training’, 10 November 1915. 
87 Peter Wilson, ‘Defining Military Cultures’, Journal of Military History 72.1 (January 2008), 32; 




knowledge can be transmitted across the organisation.88  Furthermore, training can also 
be seen as a ‘combat multiplier’ which increases the offensive potential of a military 
formation and enhances the possibility of victory.89  However, as this chapter has shown, 
an important caveat is that the training and education provided must be relevant to the 
dominant battlefield circumstances in order to be truly effective; in other words, it must 
be ‘mission specific’.  Whereas the previous section demonstrated that the provision of 
out-dated training based on pre-war publications reduced the effectiveness of new 
formations arriving with the First Army in 1915, this section will examine the delivery 
of both formal and informal training and education in the war theatre over the course of 
the 1915 campaign.  It will highlight some of the problems inherent in conducting mass 
training in war and will assess their implications for the organisational development of 
the First Army. 
 
In the 1915 campaign, training provision broke down into three main areas – physical, 
practical and theoretical.  Physical training was the dominant method of training in the 
pre-war British Army.  Its importance in the wider training provision was recognised by 
the publication of the Manual of Physical Training in 1908, which enshrined the 
importance of physical fitness of soldiers into British official doctrine.90  When the 
Canadian Division was added to the First Army structure in March 1915, Colonel C.F. 
Romer, the divisional chief of staff, noted that the training of newly arrived units 
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‘requires extreme physical fitness on the part of the men’.91  Similarly, Major-General 
Haking of the 1st Division found, in June 1915, that following an extended period in the 
trenches his ‘men [were] not at all fit for marching.  Hope we are out for a week or so to 
give [commanding officers] a chance to pull them together’.92  Officers of 1 Brigade 
found that when men came out of action ‘weary and unstrung’ there was no better way 
of ‘restoring alertness’ than to revert to ‘the old steady drill’ or ‘a short route march or 
physical drill’.93  In order to raise levels of physical fitness, units of the First Army spent 
much of their available training time conducting route marches and engaged in physical 
training and running drill, particularly when withdrawn from the line in order to train for 
a specific attack.94  The 4th Cameron Highlanders, who served as part of 24 Brigade in 
the 8th Division between 22 February–9 April, and then as part of 21 Brigade of the 7th 
Division until December 1915, conducted forty route marches in their first ten months in 
France.95  In total, thirty of the route marches undertaken by this battalion were 
completed in the period 19 March–25 June, demonstrating the immediate importance 
placed upon increasing fitness of newly arrived infantry battalions.  For Haig, physical 
fitness was allied to discipline, something which he considered separate from military 
training and upon which he placed the greatest importance.96  While physical training 
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was important in maintaining soldiers’ discipline in the trenches, and enabled them to 
withstand the rigours of trench warfare, it was in no means mission specific and 
involved no attempt to disseminate newly-acquired tactical or operational knowledge. 
 
From July 1915 onwards, emphasis moved away from physical training towards more 
practical, mission-specific training.  This split into two main spheres; first, the training 
of units to attack particular positions, typically as part of a larger formation and which 
was known as ‘combined training’, and second, the training of individuals in weapons 
handling and imparting new technical knowledge based on experience, known as 
‘individual training’.  Turning first to combined training, it can be shown that there was 
a significant change in operational thought over the course of the campaign, although the 
pace of change varied according to formation.  In April 1915, the Ferozepore Brigade of 
the Lahore Division conducted a mock attack on ‘an imaginary line of trenches’ in the 
same manner as those utilised during the home training of the New Army divisions.97  
At the same time, the 1st Division made preparations for the construction of a 
‘Breastwork Training Course’ at Le Vertbois Farm in their own allocated training area, 
which took the form of two lines of breastworks some 300 yards apart, which 
represented generic British and German trenches.98  This development was a response to 
a problem identified by Haig in January when he witnessed a practice bombing 
demonstration in which the men struggled to get out over the British breastworks during 
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a mock attack.99  However, while the men of the 1st Division were trained over the 
Breastwork Training Course in April, other formations of the First Army were not.  Such 
discrepancies indicate the differences in methodology according to formation, and the 
lack of importance attached to the creation of a uniformity of approach through the 
dissemination of identified lessons.   
 
The problem of men being unable to leave their own trenches in the attack was not 
rectified in time for the Battle of Givenchy in June, where the difficulties faced by the 
7th, 51st and Canadian Divisions resulted in ‘isolated detachments [advancing] instead 
of a strong well-controlled line of several ranks deep’.100  However, even when isolated 
detachments found their way into the German lines, such as on the 8th Division front at 
Aubers Ridge, the trench system with which they were confronted was an alien 
environment and the confusion this caused led to the stagnation of the attack.  The 
response was to construct replicas of the German trench system based on reports of 
British soldiers who had entered the German line and had drawn up diagrams of the new 
German style of trench construction.101  The troops were then ‘practised in attacking the 
model so that they know exactly what to look for and where to turn etc. once they get 
into the enemy’s line’.102  For Haig, this was most important as ‘in a maze of hostile 
                                                 
99 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/100, Typescript Diary, 19 January 1915. 
100 TNA, WO95/156, First Army General Staff War Diary, Sir Henry Rawlinson to First Army, 
covering letter to ‘Report of Operations of IV Corps from 13th to the 17th June 1915’, 21 June 
1915.  This information seems to have come to IV Corps from Gough’s Seventh Division who 
reported the difficulties in their after action report. 
101 TNA, WO95/156, First Army General Staff War Diary, Sir Hubert Gough to IV Corps, ‘Report 
on Operations’, 20 June 1915.  The first replica trenches were constructed by the First Division 
on 20 June. 
102 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/103, Typescript Diary, 31 October 1915. 
292 
 
trenches it is almost impossible to find one’s way about’.103  The driver of this initiative 
appears to have been Major-General Gough, the commander of the 7th Division, who 
identified the problem and, when promoted commander of I Corps in July, ordered his 
three divisions – the 2nd, 7th and 9th who would attack on the first day at Loos – to 
practise ‘issuing from trenches to the assault’ and bombing the German trenches they 
were to attack.104  Gough himself then attended practice demonstrations by units under 
his command, such as that undertaken by the 10th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders on 
26 August.   
 
By October, the idea of creating replicas of German positions had spread to parts of IV 
Corps.  Prior to an attack on German positions at Hulluch, the 47th Division ordered the 
construction of the ‘Hulluch Course’, an exact replica of the German lines over which 
the attacking 142 Brigade would practise their assault for four days prior to undertaking 
the offensive.105  While the course was constructed on the exact scale as Hulluch village, 
time constraints meant that only flags could be used to mark out the various positions.  
The attack, carried out on 13 October, failed, but the battalions of 142 Brigade continued 
to train over the Hulluch course until the cessation of active operations were announced 
at the end of the month.106  Haig also realised the importance of creating replica 
trenches, albeit far later than some of his subordinates, and even impressed on Major-
General Haking the importance of digging model German trenches a full four months 
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after Haking had already done so.107  However, this lesson was accepted by the war 
managers to the extent that it was specifically incorporated into new doctrine in SS.101 
which advised that ‘the enemy’s defensive lines should be reproduced somewhere to 
actual scale’ behind the British lines and the men practiced in attacking them, both with 
and without officers, until they knew their specific roles and those of the men around 
them.108  In doing so, this lesson can be said to have become the new normal in British 
attack methodology training and provides a further example of how the wider 
institutionalisation of new knowledge could work. 
 
The second area, that of individual training, involved increasing the effectiveness of 
weapons specialists.  This can be best examined through analysis of the First Army’s 
approach to the training of bombers and grenadiers. Over the course of the campaign, as 
the lack of high explosive ammunition forced the infantry to adopt tactics more akin to 
siege methods in the offensive, the First Army began to place greater emphasis on the 
importance of using bombs and grenades in offensive operations.109  Assessments of the 
1st Division attack at the Battle of Aubers Ridge concluded that the men were not 
sufficiently well trained in bomb throwing to defeat the inevitable German bombing 
counter-attack, following a British assault on their trenches.110  Similarly, at Festubert, 
the 4th Cameron Highlanders found it ‘impossible’ to defend their newly captured 
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trench from a German bombing counter-attack.111  As a result of the difficulties 
experienced, formations began to include bombing practice into their informal training 
programmes.  As the 1st Division recognised that in terms of bombing they were ‘a good 
way behind the Germans’, they concentrated on bombing practice during their period in 
corps reserve during the month of June using the practice German trenches they had 
constructed two months earlier.112  Results, however, appear to have been patchy as 
Haig commented a month later that of the division’s three brigades, the 1st Munster 
Regiment of the 3rd Brigade ‘had done well at bombing’, whereas the ‘Germans seem to 
have got the upper hand over the 1st Brigade’.113   
 
Despite the identification of concerns over the ability and quality of bombing in the First 
Army, again the war managers made little attempt to standardise operational procedure 
on a large, force-wide scale. While a ‘Bomb School’ was established behind the lines in 
March, officers and men were only trained in small numbers and the training tended to 
focus on the use of trench mortars rather than the bombs and grenades needed for a 
trench-to-trench attack.  When guidance came, it arrived from GHQ.  In October, Sir 
John French issued a memorandum which altered how infantry battalions approached 
training in bomb throwing.  Experience of the Battle of Loos demonstrated that it was no 
longer best practice for the battalion structure to include a dedicated bombing platoon, 
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rather every platoon in a battalion should be prepared to carry out a bombing attack.114  
Indeed, the commander of the Lahore Division ordered his troops to pay particular 
attention to advanced training in bombing ‘in consequence of the news of the recapture 
of the Hohenzollern Redoubt by a German bombing attack’.115  This blanket training 
replaced the previous model whereby bombers were chosen from within the ranks, as 
and when required, to complete a three day course which concluded with an examination 
of the soldiers’ proficiency in throwing bombs.116  This change in methodology 
necessitated a change in how new knowledge was disseminated across the BEF.  As a 
result, a number of instructional schools were established at various levels across the 
BEF which allowed for a more structured, formal approach to training. 
 
The creation of instructional schools highlights the existence of a theoretical level of 
training in the BEF in 1915.  Fox-Godden suggested that training schools represented a 
means of interpreting the material published and disseminated in the centrally produced 
doctrine which, despite its codification, remained inaccessible to many soldiers.117  In 
terms of organisational learning, Fox-Godden classified the establishment and use of 
training schools as a formal, ‘documents-to-people’ method of knowledge-transfer as the 
syllabi of the schools were based on the doctrinal pamphlets and manuals produced in 
the CDS and SS series.  However, this classification does not fit the creation of schools 
in the 1915 campaign, which were organised and run on a more informal ‘people-to-
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people’ basis.  As Simon Robbins pointed out, prior to the creation of the Training 
Branch in February 1917, the establishment of instructional schools was undertaken on 
the initiative of local commanders rather than being part of a centrally controlled plan.118  
An example of this is the genesis of the Machine-Gun School which was established by 
GHQ in November 1914.  Following extreme casualties at the First Battle of Ypres, 
Major-General Sir Thompson Capper invited Major C. D. Baker-Carr, a former 
instructor at the pre-war Musketry School at Hythe, to join the 7th Division staff in order 
form a school to train new machine-gunners.119  Baker-Carr then suggested to GHQ staff 
that the school of instruction be available to all divisions and the GHQ Machine-Gun 
School – which trained tens of thousands of machine-gunners and provided the basis of 
the Machine-Gun Corps – was born.120  As the 1915 campaign progressed the use of 
training schools became one of the most prominent and effective means of disseminating 
new knowledge across particular areas of the BEF. 
 
Speaking shortly after his elevation to commander-in-chief in December 1915, General 
Sir Douglas Haig opined that ‘schools of instruction constitute [the] natural means of 
passing on new ideas’ across his force.121  Training schools existed at a number of 
different levels of command in the 1915 campaign.  At the highest level – central control 
from GHQ – the most influential training unit was, from November 1914, Baker-Carr’s 
Machine-Gun School, although other schools teaching bayonet fighting and anti-aircraft 
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gunnery were also formed by GHQ, albeit on a smaller scale.122  The development of 
army-level schools of instruction has been credited to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles 
Monro, who, according to Colonel Kentish, the first commanding officer of the Third 
Army School of Instruction, ‘first originated the idea’ of a dedicated army-level 
school.123  Rather than relying on a formal syllabus, the Third Army School of 
Instruction rejected official textbooks and training manuals in favour of general and 
specific discussions based on the experiences of the officers present.124  The school 
concentrated on providing basic advice to junior officers, particularly those recently 
arrived from home, on all manner of offensive and defensive arrangements in trench 
warfare and assumed no prior military knowledge among the attendees.125   
 
While the Third Army took the lead in disseminating new knowledge through an officer 
training school, the First Army was the first formation to transfer technical knowledge 
through the creation of a school which concentrated on bombing, both in the form of 
using hand-held grenades and the larger experimental trench mortars.  Under the 
command of Captain Crowe of the Royal Field Artillery (RFA), a house and garden in 
St Venant were commandeered and ‘fitted up for lectures and instruction’ in the firing of 
trench mortars which itself took place at a ‘test site’ a mile distant under the control of 
nine officers and ninety other ranks of the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA).126  However, 
in the First Army, the normal system for schools of instruction, prior to October 1915, 
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was for formal training to be the responsibility of the various corps then attached to that 
army.127  While GHQ maintained responsibility for the training of machine-gun 
personnel, the training in bombing and the use of trench mortars was under the control 
of the individual armies, and instruction on signalling and sniping was conducted at 
corps schools, each of which adopted a different methodology.  This highlights the 
problems over the responsibility of training and is a reason for the lack of uniformity of 
approach which characterised the First Army, and the wider BEF’s, approach to the 
dissemination of knowledge in the wider 1915 campaign.   
 
There also existed conflicting opinions over who should be taught in the GHQ, army and 
corps schools.  On visiting the Third Army School of Instruction in December 1915, 
Haig noted that  while ‘valuable work was being done’, Colonel Kentish ‘was not very 
clear as to the “objective” of his instruction’.128  Kentish had attempted to train as many 
people as possible and, towards the end of 1915, a hundred officers and another hundred 
NCOs were passing through the Third Army School of Instruction each month.129  
Rather than adopting a similar approach in the First Army, Haig was of the opinion that 
the ‘first essential’ of training provision in the First Army was to create schools which 
focused on training instructors who would then be detached to train others at subordinate 
units and formations.130  For Haig, new knowledge and new methods were more 
efficiently disseminated across his formation by cascade training rather than adopting a 
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blanket ‘train all’ approach.  Haig’s system seemed to be the more effective, at least in 
terms of the training of snipers, as the First Army produced three times as many snipers 
from lower-level schools than the other armies did in the same period at the end of 1915 
from their army level schools.131  In a memorandum of 10 November, three days after 
Haig spoke at a large First Army training conference, his chief-of-staff, Sir Richard 
Butler, outlined the approach to be taken in training the units of the First Army in 
preparation for the 1916 campaign.132  The First Army war managers asserted that the 
division, as the ‘real battle unit’, was to take charge of the formal training of its 
constituent parts through the formation of specialist schools which would ‘impart rapidly 
and widely a knowledge of new methods, and to ensure the uniformity of principle and 
uniformity of employment’.133   
 
Butler’s memorandum suggested that specialist schools should be established and run by 
each infantry division in the First Army, under the control of the individual divisional 
commander who ‘will inspire the unit with his personal energy and fighting spirit’.134  It 
further noted that the instructors should draw on experiences gained in the battles of the 
1915 campaign and should focus on the use of machine guns in the attack, the training of 
grenadiers and bombers, and the technical instruction and tactical handling of trench 
mortars.  The individual divisions were given the choice of establishing one general 
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training school or individual schools each dealing with a particular specialist area.  Table 
5.1 highlights the establishment of the divisional training schools in the First Army. 
 














1st --- 29 Nov 17 Oct --- --- Before Dec. 
2nd --- Jan 1916 Jan 1916 Jan 1916 Jan 1916 --- 
7th 15 Dec --- --- --- --- --- 
8th 14 Nov --- --- --- --- --- 
9th --- 7 Nov 9 Oct --- 27 Dec 8 Oct 
12th --- 22 Nov --- 1 Dec --- --- 
15th --- 16 Dec --- 16 Nov 16 Dec 4 Oct 
19th --- 27 Nov 27 Nov 27 Nov 27 Nov 27 Nov 
20th --- --- --- --- --- --- 
23rd --- 1 Dec 8 Sep --- --- --- 
33rd 19 Dec --- --- --- --- --- 
46th --- 2 Dec --- --- --- --- 
47th --- --- 17 Oct 14 Nov --- 16 Nov 
Guards --- --- 30 Oct 7 Nov 30 Nov 7 Nov 
Lahore --- --- 28 May --- --- 25 Jun 
Sources: TNA, War Office, WO95/1190, Guards Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/1229-30, 1st 
Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/1287-89, 2nd Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/1629-
30, 7th Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/1673, 8th Division General Staff War Diary; 
WO95/1733-34, 9th Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/1822, 12th Division General Staff War 
Diary; WO95/1911-12, 15th Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/2052, 19th Division General Staff 
War Diary; WO95/2094-95, 20th Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/2167, 23rd Division General 
Staff War Diary; WO95/2405, 33rd Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/2662, 46th Division 
General Staff War Diary; WO95/2698-99, 47th Division General Staff War Diary; WO95/3912-14, 




Analysis of the dates of the establishment of divisional training schools reveals the 
different approaches formations took in the practical dissemination of new knowledge.  
While some formations, such as the 2nd, 15th, 19th and Guards Divisions chose to 
separate their instruction into individual specialist schools, others, including the 7th, 8th 
and 33rd Divisions, preferred to use one school to teach all subjects.  The 46th Division 
also established one divisional school of instruction but chose to augment this with the 
creation of dedicated brigade schools in bombing, machine gunning, and engineering, 
the latter being run by specialist trainers attached from the division’s Royal Engineers 
Field Companies.135  While the creation of brigade schools can be seen as a means of 
decentralising control of training to a unit’s ‘natural leaders’, in at least one instance – 
that of 44 Brigade in the 15th (Scottish) Division – brigade schools were established as a 
response to the lack of mission specific training given to units in England and the lack of 
a formal, top-down training programme available upon their arrival in France.136  In the 
majority of divisions, the date of formation of schools of instruction occurred shortly 
after the issue of Butler’s First Army training memorandum.  In units where this occurs 
later, in December 1915 and January 1916, the establishment of schools happened on the 
units’ first rest period out of the trenches following Butler’s memorandum.  For 
example, while the establishment of the 2nd Division schools in January 1916 suggests 
that the formation lagged behind in terms of creating a physical space for the 
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consideration of ideas and the dissemination of new knowledge, in reality the date was 
determined by the immediate conditions of trench warfare.   
 
Some formations deviated further from the First Army recommendations; the Guards 
Division created a School of Explosives which encompassed both bombing and the use 
of trench mortars, while the 47th Division issued orders for the commencement of 
classes for the training of artillery and infantry telephonists together in order to ensure 
the closer cooperation of the arms in battle situations.137  As Table 5.1 shows, the 
creation of divisional schools of instruction did not occur solely in response to Butler’s 
memorandum.  The 1st and 47th Divisions created bombing schools on 17 October, 
possibly as the result of a local IV Corps directive, and the 23rd Division began their 
own bombing school on 14 September after sending fifteen officers and fifty-six NCOs 
to a six-day course at the bombing school of the 27th Division, then attached to the III 
Corps.138  The Lahore Division of the Indian Corps began their schools of instruction as 
early as 23 May, not as part of an order from above, but ‘on the initiative of the 
C[ommander of] R[oyal] E[ngineers]’.139  Indeed, in many cases, the formations of the 
Indian Corps were ahead of their British counterparts in terms of the establishment of 
formal systems of knowledge dissemination.  Major Hesketh-Pritchard, an officer in the 
40th Pathans Regiment of Indian cavalry, became the first British divisional sniping 
officer and inspired a system of sniper training schools in the Indian Corps from the 
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summer of 1915.140  In contrast, at the same time Haig recommended that Bannatine-
Allason of the 51st Division utilise the natural skills of the ‘stalkers’ from his highland 
infantry battalions to increase unit effectiveness, rather than arranging a formal 
programme of training soldiers in the technical art of sniping.141  
 
The First Army memorandum, while setting out the necessities of specialist training, 
focused more explicitly on the training of junior officers.  Butler ordered that each 
division should establish a school of instruction to train company and platoon 
commanders as well as newly arrived officers, in subjects including the principles of 
carrying out an attack, the development of an offensive spirit, the methods of increasing 
morale and discipline, and the handling of new weapons.142  The purpose of these 
schools was to ‘help our young and inexperienced officers to solve the various practical 
problems that face them day to day’.143 Rather than being training per se, the work of the 
Divisional Officers’ Schools saw the dissemination of new knowledge as part of a 
professional education in which ‘instances of the various fights which had actually taken 
place’ were studied and applied to develop the skills of officers as leaders.144  There is 
an important distinction here; Storr noted that ‘training allows people to perform 
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difficult tasks with ease, whilst education allows them to mentally reduce complex 
problems to simple ones’.145   
 
The need to address the lack of a system for fostering the professional development of 
young officers was brought about by the high casualty rate in the First Army in the 
campaign.  As Haig wrote to his wife in October, some elements of the army lacked 
‘junior officers with some tactical knowledge and training to act on the spot at the right 
moment’.146  The Battle of Loos had demonstrated that in large-scale offensive 
operations officer casualties represented a serious problem for overall unit cohesion and 
its wider command and control mechanism; in three days’ fighting, the 9th Division lost 
eight out of its twelve battalion commanders.147  As a result, the formalised training of 
young officers in divisional schools of instruction aimed at disseminating not only the 
knowledge which was crucial for officers to do their own jobs, but promoted the training 
of ‘understudies’ for ‘duties of a higher grade’ which they might need to use early in an 
engagement.148  Furthermore, experiences such as that of the 4th Cameron Highlanders 
at Festubert highlighted the need for NCOs to also know the duties of junior officers.  In 
that instance, all officers of the battalion’s ‘D’ Company were killed or wounded early in 
the advance, leaving CSM James Stott in charge of the company.  When he too was 
killed, the system of command disintegrated and no further progress was made.149  To 
counter this eventuality, the First Army memorandum emphasised the need to 
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incorporate the practical training of NCOs in platoon leadership into the training 
conducted in divisional officers’ schools.150 
 
Aimee Fox-Godden asserted that the establishment of training schools represented a 
‘people-to-documents’ method of knowledge dissemination as the official CDS and SS 
pamphlets provided the basis for instruction.151 In the majority of cases, the curricula of 
the Divisional Officers’ Schools have been lost or never recorded.  However, the 
curriculum of the 9th Division Officers’ School has been found and it demonstrates the 
importance of informal ‘people-to-people’ methods of knowledge dissemination in the 
1915 campaign.  Each day at the 9th Division school was split into a number of lectures 
each presented by a subject expert.  The first running of the course, in November  1915, 
saw Captain Boys of the Royal Garrison Artillery present papers on the use of trench 
mortars in the attack; the Divisional Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) presented a 
paper on discipline; Lieutenant-Colonel Hollond, the senior staff officer with the 
division, lectured on tactics in the attack; and the Royal Artillery brigade major lectured 
on the importance of artillery and infantry cooperation.152  Further papers were presented 
by the commander of the Divisional Train, the Commander of Royal Engineers, and by 
officers of the divisional Royal Army Medical Corps personnel and Tunnelling 
Company.  While the majority of knowledge-transfer was conducted through lectures, 
each class at the school also made a number of visits to other parts of the division in 
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order to gain a greater understanding of how the wider divisional organisation 
functioned and to foster relationships and cooperation between the different branches.  
In November 1915, training classes visited the divisional Royal Engineers’ workshops to 
examine how bombs were constructed, the Royal Field Artillery batteries to watch 
artillery demonstrations, the divisional Motor Machine-Gun Battery to understand the 
role of the machine gun in the attack, and finally the 9th Division Grenade School.153  
That the training syllabus for the divisional officers’ schools was based on the 
experience of the individuals involved rather than using a centrally distributed training 
manual suggests that Fox-Godden’s classification of schools of instruction as a ‘people-
to-documents’ method of knowledge dissemination is not fully applicable for the First 
Army in the 1915 campaign. 
 
The dissemination of knowledge through the training and education of the officers and 
men of the First Army was, however, hampered by a number of constraints.  These can 
be split into four main categories: time, space, personnel, and equipment.  For the first 
nine months of the 1915 campaign, formations were not removed from the front trench 
line for a long enough period to undertake meaningful large-scale training.  Even for 
regular formations the lack of a period of combined training prior to deployment to the 
war theatre left them feeling like ‘a mere agglomeration of units’ rather than cohesive 
fighting divisions.154  Indeed, the 7th Division was not given any time out of the line to 
rest and train as a complete unit between its arrival in France in October 1914 and the 
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Battle of Loos in September 1915.155  Inclement weather further affected the training 
provision of the units of the First Army by reducing the number of days that formations 
could train outdoors.  The 51st Division noted, during their instructional period in 
England, that training during the month of December 1914 had been ‘considerably 
hampered by bad weather and the bad state of the country’ and in March, the training 
programme had been ‘much interfered with’ by the constant rain.156  Also in France, 
divisional training was either cancelled or suspended because of the weather; the 47th 
Division reported that their ‘outdoor work [was] very much hampered by bad weather’ 
in December and a practice ‘problematic attack’ by the 12th Division was cancelled 
prior to rehearsal due to the weather.157  The training of units was further inhibited by 
the need to provide working parties for trench building during their nominal periods of 
rest. The 4th Cameron Highlanders, for example, were withdrawn from the front lines 
for a week’s training in July 1915 but still had to supply working parties of six officers 
and 300 men every night out of a battalion strength of little over 600 men.158  Similarly, 
the staff officers of the 15th Division found that the need for each battalion to supply 
300–350 men per night affected their ‘ability to train as a unit’ and prevented them from 
sending many men to the schools of instruction.159  In October the First Army adopted a 
formal ‘winter policy’ in which it was decided that general offensive actions would need 
to be halted until the spring and, instead, small, aggressive trench raids would be 
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conducted along the front to gain intelligence, give British divisions time out of the 
trenches, demoralise the enemy and give new troops battle-like experience.  Only 
following the establishment of this policy were divisions able to find time out of the line 
to train as a whole unit.  In the IV Corps sector, the policy was for two of the corps’ 
three divisions to hold the line while the third completed a month’s training programme 
behind the lines.  This concerted period out of the lines represented a ‘valuable piece of 
training’ for the 47th Division; the 9th Division ‘reaped the benefits’ of their time out of 
the line; and the prolonged training of 44 Brigade ‘did a lot of good’ in assimilating new 
soldiers into the unit.160  
 
Once formations were given time out of the line to train, the question of where to do so 
remained unanswered.  While training in England, the 51st Division were forced to keep 
to the roads rather than exercise in open countryside as farmers did not want their new 
crops destroyed.161  A similar situation existed in France where Brigadier-General Cecil 
Lowther, GOC of 1 Brigade, ‘rode all around the area’ in search of ground on which to 
train his men in their rest period prior to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, but found ‘very 
little available’ as the crops were beginning to emerge in agricultural areas.162  Short of a 
formal training ground, Lieutenant Hugh Munro of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland 
Highlanders, rehearsed his platoon in occupying a trench by night ‘in the field adjoining 
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the farm’ in which his unit was billeted.163  Even when a physical space was available 
problems arose; the general staff of the Lahore Division had to secure the permission of 
the local mayor to use nearby rifle ranges for practice musketry.164  While the creation of 
the schools of instruction did provide a dedicated area for the theoretical and small-scale 
practical training to take place, it made little provision for the large-scale training of the 
divisions as complete units which was required for successful offensive operations.  
Haig appears to have identified this problem shortly after assuming command of the 
BEF in December.  At a conference of army commanders in January, he ordered that 
each army should have a training area in the rear of its area of operations where two or 
more divisions could be exercised in large-scale attacks using replica trenches.165  Over 
the course of the 1915 campaign, the importance of a physical space not only in which 
knowledge could be disseminated but could be put into practice was realised by the war 
managers and tentative steps were taken to rectify the problem. 
 
Finally, once time and space had been secured, further problems existed in the provision 
of training equipment and personnel.  In the Lahore Division, the divisional trench 
mortar batteries struggled to maintain their full complement of men as they either 
quickly became casualties or were promoted to be instructors on the completion of their 
training.166  The high turnover of personnel not only affected unit cohesion, it reduced 
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the effectiveness of the batteries as offensive weapons in their own right.  The highly 
experimental nature of the technological adaptation to trench warfare meant that 
casualties were often incurred by inexperienced soldiers while training; on 12 July, three 
men of the 9th Division were injured during training when a bomb fell from a catapult 
and exploded.167  Furthermore, a programme of practice bombing undertaken by 2 
Brigade in August had to be scrapped after two accidents caused the death of one man 
and the wounding of an officer and three men when faulty fuses caused the bombs to 
explode instantaneously.168  While these instances had no real knock-on effects, others 
within the First Army did.  On 1 April, Major-General Sir Thompson Capper, GOC of 
the 7th Division, was wounded by bomb fragments while watching a practice bombing 
attack, resulting in his removal from divisional command until August.169  On their 
arrival in France the 9th Division established their own ad hoc bomb-making facility at 
Nieppe which was blown up in an accident four days later, wounding all of the officers 
and men of 90 Field Company, Royal Engineers who were administering it.170  This not 
only reduced the effectiveness of the RE company but also removed all personnel from 
the 9th Division who were trained to make bombs.   
 
This latter example highlights the problem regarding the supply of equipment and 
personnel.  The 9th Division was forced to establish its own bomb factory ‘owing to 
there being practically no government issue of bombs available’ in France in May 
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1915.171  It was a similar story for units training in England.  The 15th Division had 
received little in the way of instruction in bombing prior to their departure for France 
due to the difficulties in supplying the troops in France and those training in England.172  
The supply of rifles had hampered the training of the New Army divisions which joined 
the First Army from mid-1915 onwards and formations were forced to make do with 
replicas until actual rifles were available; as late as July 1915 some units training in 
England had only eighty rifles for a battalion of a thousand men.173  Similarly, the 
machine-gun officer of the 11th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, trained his men 
using wooden replica guns until actual weapons were made available the month prior to 
the battalion’s departure for France and the artillery units made a ‘dummy gun’ out of a 
pine log mounted on a funeral carriage.174  By July 1915, the production of bombs for 
training purposes had picked up, and the Lahore Division was being supplied with 1,500 
bombs per week to use for practice attacks, and the battalions at rest in the 9th Division 
were given ‘a practically unlimited supply of bombs’ for training purposes.175  Later in 
the campaign, the available equipment had increased again with 2 (Guards) Brigade able 
to expend 9,000 bombs during an attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt.176  The 
availability of equipment with which to train affected the practical instruction of the 
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formations of the First Army particularly in the early months of the campaign.  
However, as the campaign progressed, the increased provision of equipment and the 
greater number of instructors meant that the practical training became a more effective 
means of disseminating new knowledge. 
 
Informal Knowledge-Transfer 
While the use of official publications and training schools were important methods of 
knowledge-transfer, the war managers of the First Army also sought to share knowledge 
on an informal basis, through secondments, attachments and what is termed in 
organisational learning theory as ‘on-the-job training’.177  Catignani’s study of the 
British Army in Afghanistan highlighted the importance of informal networks in the 
dissemination of new knowledge and asserted that they play a crucial role in affecting 
battlefield adaptation.178  In terms of the British Army in the Great War, Foley showed 
that the BEF war managers made good use of ‘non-formal methods of learning’ 
throughout the war, particularly focussing on the incorporation of subject experts from 
outwith the armed forces into the war management training establishment.179  Fox-
Godden drew a similar conclusion and found that the army both tolerated and exploited 
the use of pre-existing social networks to enhance the organisation’s learning 
potential.180  This section examines how the First Army’s war managers made use of 
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informal methods of knowledge-transfer to exchange new information on the conduct of 
war in the 1915 campaign. 
 
The first system of informal knowledge-transfer used by units of the First Army 
involved what can be described as ‘job-shadowing’.  In organisational learning terms, 
this process involves ‘the learner accompanying the job holder throughout their normal 
working activity and observing the processes involved’, so that the learner can witness 
first hand the role which they will take over.181  In the context of the 1915 campaign, 
newly arrived formations, who were to be incorporated into the First Army structure, 
and experienced formations occupied the roles of ‘the learner’ and ‘the job holder’, 
respectively.  The practice adopted in the BEF was for divisions of the New Army, then 
training in England, to send representatives to France for a short period of job-
shadowing to ‘see life in the trenches’.182  Brigadier-General Montagu Wilkinson of 44 
Brigade and his brigade major ‘went on a joy-ride’ to France where they were attached 
to the headquarters of a brigade of the 6th Division.  For Wilkinson, the trip was a ‘most 
interesting experience’ which involved being billeted at the front, visiting a Royal 
Artillery battery, undertaking a night-time tour of the trenches and viewing significant 
positions in the German lines at Messines and Mount Kemmel.183  Later, battalion 
commanders of the New Army divisions still at home were also offered the opportunity 
to job-shadow experienced officers in France and the commanding officer of the 7th 
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King’s Own Scottish Borderers returned from France ‘with Army Books 136 [standard 
issue notebooks] filled to overflowing’ with practical experiences from the front.184   
 
When formations themselves arrived in France each was posted to a corps with the view 
of shadowing the work of an experienced division.  The 9th Division was initially 
trained by the same units of the 6th Division which the officers had visited in March, 
with infantry battalions, engineer companies and artillery batteries each shadowing their 
respective ‘job holders’.185  Similarly, the units of the 15th Division were sent by 
companies into the front line trenches to learn from the battalions of 142 Brigade of the 
47th London Division between 20 July and 1 August 1915.  The job-shadowing was 
found to be a particularly useful means of acclimatising to trench warfare conditions and 
the men of the 6th Cameron Highlanders learned much from the ‘experienced territorial 
regiment’ who were responsible for their instruction.186  The staff of the 9th Black 
Watch thought that in this period ‘much useful knowledge of trench warfare was gained’ 
from the 47th Division personnel.187  Lieutenant Cecil Harper found that ‘that there was 
much to be learned which was new to us’, but the instruction by the 47th Division taught 
the men of the 10th Gordon Highlanders ‘the tricks of the trade’.188  Lieutenant Archie 
Gilmour of the 7th King’s Own Scottish Borderers found that his ‘trial visit’ to the front 
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line helped to ‘disperse one or two illusions’ of trench warfare and 2nd Lieutenant 
Reggie Hutt of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers, was ‘told and shown everything worth 
while’ by a platoon commander of the 1st North Staffordshire Regiment.189  As Harper 
noted following his initial experiences of the trenches, the men ‘learned eagerly all they 
could about the routine and peculiarities of trench warfare’ because they had ‘received 
scanty preparation’ for the realities of conditions at the front during their training in 
England.190  In this, the informal, people-to-people knowledge dissemination which took 
place during the initial period of instruction in the trenches represented an ad hoc 
solution to an identified gap in knowledge.   This, itself, originated because of the lack 
of a formal structure for transmitting mission-specific training based on experience 
gained at the front to units training for war in Britain. 
 
The job-shadowing undertaken in the initial period of instruction in trench warfare, 
while viewed by one participant as a means of getting ‘more used to the smell of 
gunpowder’, also had the practical effect of informally disseminating knowledge not 
only of general trench warfare practices but of the specifics of holding a particular 
stretch of trenches.191  In this, the choice of ‘job holders’ to carry out the initial 
instruction was particularly important.  In the early stages of the campaign, newly 
arrived battalions of the Territorial Force were posted to GHQ where they were given 
‘some instruction’ prior to being sent to the front; however in the First Army, from 
                                                 
189 IWM, Private Papers of Captain A. K. Gilmour, Doc.16973, Gilmour to Unknown, 26 July 
1915; IWM, Private Papers of 2nd Lieutenant E. R. Hutt, Doc.328 [afterwards, IWM, Hutt 
Papers], Hutt to his parents, 21 May 1915. 
190 IWM, Harper Papers, Doc.7593, Memoir, 29. 
191 IWM, Hutt Papers, Doc.328, Hutt to his mother, 15 May 1915. 
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February onwards, initial training was to be conducted by the corps to which the unit 
was to be attached.192  The initial period of trench instruction often took place in areas 
which were deemed peaceful sectors; members of the 6th Cameron Highlanders referred 
to the section in which they were trained as ‘a very quiet one’ in which a policy of ‘live 
and let live’ was adopted.193  However, the policy of training the 6th Cameron 
Highlanders – and the rest of the 15th Division – in that particular sector had a more 
practical origin.  The division was trained in the section of the IV Corps line over which 
they would attack on 25 September during the first day of the Battle of Loos.  Their 
instruction had been conducted not only by the 47th Division but by elements of the 1st 
Division too, ‘in order to give a more varied experience in the methods of trench 
warfare’.194  Officers from the 1st and 47th Division were instructed to inform their 
counterparts in the 15th Division as to the ‘exact topography’ of the sector, paying 
particular attention to ‘the details of the siting of the enemy’s trenches’, which the 15th 
Division would later attack.195  In this manner mission-specific information was 
transferred informally from experienced to inexperienced units based on their own 
perceptions of the terrain and the enemy. 
 
Job-shadowing was complemented by the temporary secondment of personnel away 
from their unit.  Four Territorial Force battalions were attached to the the 1st and 2nd 
                                                 
192 TNA, WO95/591, I Corps General Staff War Diary, GHQ to First Army, 4 February 1915. 
193 GUSCD, Reunion Club Papers, MS GEN/1376/7, Diary of James Campbell, 21 July 1915; 
IWM, Christison Papers, Doc.4370, Memoir, 31-2. 
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1915. 




Divisions in March to undergo their initial period of trench instruction.196  After the 
period of job-shadowing, I Corps ordered Major-Generals Haking and Horne to 
complete formal reports stating their impression of the ability of the new units’ 
commanding officers and regimental officers, the physique of the NCOs and men, and 
unit discipline and training, in order to assess the battalions’ fitness for taking over part 
of the trench line.197  Because the units were deemed not ready, ‘a temporary 
interchange’ of officers and non-commissioned officers took place, allowing officers 
from the new Territorial Force units to be attached to experienced brigades for specific 
instruction to correct problems ‘not only in their method of giving orders, but to an even 
greater degree seeing that they are carried out’.198  The experience ‘gave excellent 
results’.199  The process of seconding individuals or small groups to learn or teach 
specific tasks continued throughout the campaign: in August, small parties of the 23rd 
Division were attached to the 27th Division for a week to learn from the more 
experienced formation; the same month, three instructors from Sandhurst were attached 
to the Sirhind Brigade in the Lahore Division to supervise training; and in November 
officers of the Royal Engineers were attached to brigades of the 8th Division when 
training.200  At the end of the 1915 campaign, the policy of attaching individuals or small 
groups to other formations was formally adopted on a large scale.  For example, 21 
                                                 
196 They were the 5th, 7th and 9th King’s (Liverpool Regiment) and the 5th Royal Sussex. 
197 TNA, WO95/589, I Corps General Staff War Diary, I Corps to 1st and 2nd Divisions, 19 March 
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198 TNA, WO95/589, I Corps General Staff War Diary, I Corps to 1st and 2nd Divisions, 8 
February 1915. 
199 TNA, WO95/589, I Corps General Staff War Diary, I Corps to 1st and 2nd Divisions, 8 
February 1915. 
200 TNA, WO95/2167, 23rd Division General Staff War Diary, 8 September 1915; TNA, 
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Brigade was removed from the 7th Division on 20 December 1915 and was replaced by 
91 Brigade of the 30th Division, recently arrived from home.  Similarly, in the 8th 
Division, the experienced 24 Brigade was transferred to the 23rd Division and was 
replaced by 70 Brigade.  While the change of structure in the 7th Division was 
permanent, that in the 8th Division was not and 24 Brigade returned to the 8th Division 
in July 1916.201  As the 1915 campaign progressed the benefits of a ‘temporary 
interchange’ of personnel between experienced and inexperienced formations became 
clear.  What began as an informal means of transferring local knowledge developed, by 
late-1915, into a force-wide system of knowledge dissemination. 
 
Units undergoing training in England also benefitted from the attachment of officers 
who had experience of conditions at the front.  In the 9th Division, lectures by officers 
recently returned home from France ‘were followed with the closest attention’, 
particularly with respect to the construction of trenches.202  At Aldershot, Captain R. N. 
Stewart, who had spent five months serving at the front with the 1st Cameron 
Highlanders in 1914 before being sent home wounded provided ‘invaluable assistance’ 
in imparting knowledge of the realities of the war.203  During Stewart’s attachment to 
‘C’ Company of the 5th Camerons, all questions regarding trench warfare were directed 
to him and he was ‘reverently listened to’.204  On Stewart’s return to the 1st Camerons 
his place in the 5th Camerons was taken by Captain J. B. Black, who had also been 
                                                 
201 Archibald Frank Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions: Part 1 - The Regular British Divisions 
(London, 1935), 81-96. 
202 Ewing, Ninth Division, 10. 
203 McEwen, Fifth Camerons, 58. 
204 McEwen, Fifth Camerons, 58. 
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home recuperating from wounds received in France.  Thus the cycle of attaching 
experienced officers to new units continued.  Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. 
Sandilands was placed in command of the 7th Cameron Highlanders prior to their 
departure for France as part of the 15th Division, as ‘he had the advantage of already 
being out at the Front’ and transferred his knowledge to the new battalion.205 The 
informal dissemination of knowledge through secondments, attachments and on-the-job 
training represented an important source of information sharing at the front and acted as 
an informal conduit for the flow of information from the front to units training in Britain 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the dissemination of new knowledge occurred in the 
First Army in the 1915 campaign.  In doing so, it added a further, final layer to the 
Organisational Development Model.  The dissemination of new knowledge is, above all, 
the crucial stage of organisational development.  Without the transfer of identified and 
accepted lessons from individuals with knowledge to those without, it cannot be said 
that true learning at the organisational level has taken place.  As Lieutenant-General Sir 
Ivor Maxse noted, ‘books, circulars, schools, lectures, all abound in profusion.  But 
unless they are applied with the knowledge of men and in a practical manner, they do 
not produce trained formations’.206  Only once new knowledge is accepted, disseminated 
and has become the new normal can it be said that lessons have been learned.  This 
                                                 
205 Colonel J. W. Sandilands and Lieutenant-Colonel Norman MacLeod, The History of the 7th 
Battalion, Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders (Stirling, 1922), 24. 
206 IWM, Maxse Papers, Doc.3255, ‘Undated note to a member of the Court of Inquiry’, quoted in 
French, ‘The 51st (Highland) Division During the Great War’, 49. 
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chapter identified three methods in which new knowledge was disseminated and 
institutionalised in the First Army during as a result of the 1915 campaign on the 
western front which can now be added to the Organisational Development Model.  
 
In the first place, new knowledge which had been identified and accepted by war 
managers was codified as formal doctrine and shared across the institution.  Running 
alongside this was the informal transfer of new written knowledge in the form of ‘best-
practice’ guidelines which was often shared horizontally across same-level formations 
rather than through the rigid army hierarchal structure.  Second, new knowledge based 
on experience was incorporated into the formal and informal training and education of 
units and formations of the First Army.  While this began on an informal basis, events 
on the ground – particularly the high casualty rate – promoted the formalisation of 
training provisions.  This was particularly evident in the creation of formation schools of 
instruction.  While some divisions had been proactive in establishing local training 
centres, the First Army memorandum of 7 November, which set out the training 
provision for the coming winter, proved to be the catalyst for more wholesale change, 
although the lack of specific direction from above meant that the uniform approach 
advocated by Haig was not achieved in the 1915 campaign.  Finally, new knowledge 
was transferred from experienced individuals and formations to the inexperienced by 
informal methods.  Of particular importance here was the policy of ‘job-shadowing’ by 
which general and specific knowledge was passed between formations.  While these 
methods were crucial to the dissemination and institutionalisation of lessons learned, it is 
also important to note that they took time to materialise – four months in the case of 
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doctrine production in the First Army.   The necessity of fighting a war of this scale 
meant that while accepted lessons were disseminated in the long-term, in the short-term 
they were simultaneously incorporated into the First Army’s organisational memory and 
used on an ad hoc basis.  In this, the Organisational Development Model becomes a 
cycle; lessons which have been accepted become part of the war managers ‘knowledge 
gained through experience’.  The three means of knowledge dissemination and 
institutionalisation join the creation of a new piece of technology and a change in 
institutional structure – identified in chapter three – as outcomes of the institutional 
learning process.  These outcomes are presented in Figure 5.2.   
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This chapter set out to address four questions.  First, it has been shown that the First 
Army war managers attached increasing importance to the dissemination of new 
knowledge as the campaign progressed.  While the use of written doctrine as a means of 
disseminating information did not realise its full potential until after the creation of the 
Training Branch in February 1917, it was already an effective means of transmitting 
information, particularly at the tactical level through the CDS and SS series publications.  
That war managers met to consider the creation of new doctrine in November 1915 
suggests the tacit acceptance of the importance of pamphlets and publications in 
disseminating new knowledge.  Similarly, Haig’s insistence on the creation of divisional 
and local schools of instruction, which formalised the First Army’s training provision, 
gives weight to the assertion that as the campaign progressed, First Army war managers 
placed greater importance on the transfer of new knowledge.  Second, the mechanism 
for training changed markedly over the course of the campaign.  While the training of 
the new armies and Territorial Force in Britain was general in nature and often 
inadequate, in France greater importance was attached to mission-specific training and 
education as the campaign progressed.  Again, this is best demonstrated through the 
establishment of schools of instruction and the provision of time, space, equipment and 
personnel, all of which increased from October 1915 onwards.  Third, one of the key 
deficiencies of the BEF’s processes of knowledge dissemination was the lack of joined-
up thinking between provision at the front and at home.  War managers were aware of 
the deficiencies of the reliance on pre-war training manuals – as Haig’s comments to 
Bannatine-Allason show – yet no attempts were made to rectify the situation.  While a 
lack of equipment and the need to rapidly reinforce the BEF in France offers some 
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mitigation, a system for transmitting mission-specific training could have been created 
in 1915 using the attachment of personnel which later developed informally at the 
regimental level.  Finally, in the 1915 campaign, war managers did attempt to 
incorporate lessons which they had identified into both their training provision and 
operational doctrine albeit the standard, method and pace of these efforts differed across 
formations.  The key problem affecting the dissemination of knowledge across the First 
Army, and indeed the key problem inhibiting successful organisational development, 
was the lack of a formal system for transmitting mission-specific information on a force-





The Legacy of Learning from the 1915 Campaign 
 
I saw plenty of attacks later – very many.  I never saw one worse prepared than [Loos], 
bar one, at Fromelles…in 1916, again run by XI Corps, again without proper artillery 
preparation.  Also again an attack where all details were ordered direct from Corps 
Headquarters for new and untrained and inexperienced divisions.1 
      Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo Stewart 
 
 
The 1916 campaign on the western front saw the focus of the BEF turn from the plains 
of the Artois region on the Franco-Belgian border to the rolling hills of Picardy, a 
hundred kilometres to the south.  Many officers who had gained experience of battle 
planning with the First Army – Haig and Rawlinson, in particular – were promoted at 
the end of 1915 and played prominent roles in the planning of the Somme offensive.  
The Battle of the Somme, which began on 1 July and lasted until 18 November 1916, 
was, for the British, ‘the greatest military tragedy of the twentieth century’; in total 
419,654 British soldiers were killed or wounded, 56,886 on the first day of the battle, 
alone.2  These attacks were, however, not undertaken by the First Army, which remained 
in the same vicinity as in the 1915 campaign.  While the location of the First Army 
stayed the same, the role it undertook changed from that of the year before.  Instead of 
undertaking sustained offensive actions, the First Army, now under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Monro, was tasked with holding the trench line, 
organising raids of the German positions and, in July 1916, conducting a diversionary 
                                                 
1 TNA, CAB45/121, Brigadier-General Cosmo Stewart to Major-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 
November 1927. 




attack on the village of Fromelles.  That attack, which failed with over 7,000 casualties, 
has been described as being ‘a remarkable story of blundering in the planning process’, 
the result of which was ‘a bloody holocaust’.3  If results are taken an indicator of 
organisational development then it would appear that the First Army learned little from 
its experiences in 1915. 
 
This chapter examines the extent to which the First Army and its war managers were 
able to implement the lessons of the 1915 campaign in their subsequent operations.  It is 
split into two sections.  The first section examines the institutional learning process of 
the First Army by studying how it planned its next offensive action – the Battle of 
Fromelles in July 1916.  Analysis of five key elements of the planning process offers a 
useful indication of the extent to which the First Army war managers were willing or 
able to incorporate the lessons of the 1915 campaign into their subsequent planning 
process.  The second section studies how the war managers who left the First Army 
structure at the end of 1915 campaign used the lessons they had learned to plan 
operations during the Battle of the Somme. 
 
The First Army and Learning in 1916 
The war managers of the British First Army identified a number of lessons from their 
individual and collective experiences in the 1915 campaign.  This section begins by 
examining the extent to which the war managers applied those lessons to the planning of 
                                                 
3 Paul Cobb, Fromelles, 1916 (Stroud, 2010), 8-9; Martin Gilbert, Somme: The Heroism and 
Horror of War (London, 2006), 121. 
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the Battle of Fromelles in the 1916 campaign.  To evaluate this, five examples of the 
First Army’s actions in the 1915 campaign from which lessons were drawn will be 
examined.  They are: the selection of troops to undertake the attack; the selection of the 
ground to be attacked; the preparations made in the planning phase; the setting of 
objectives; and the planning of the artillery bombardment.  Following this evaluation, 
this section goes on to examine how the First Army war managers sought to make sense 
of their experiences in the post-battle analysis.  This allows for conclusions to be drawn 
on whether the war managers altered their means of data creation and capture in the 
1916 campaign or whether there was continuity in methodology from the actions of 
1915. 
 
The first example to be analysed is the selection of the troops designated to make the 
attack.  One of the key lessons identified by the war managers from the Battle of Loos 
was that inexperienced infantry divisions should be given a prolonged period of holding 
the line prior to being asked to undertake a significant offensive action, in order that they 
could acclimatise to the nature of trench warfare and become familiar with their 
surroundings.4  At Loos, the handling of the reserve 21st and 24th Divisions of XI Corps 
attracted a large amount of scrutiny and resulted in an official enquiry.  On 26 
September 1915, the two divisions – which only arrived in France three weeks before – 
reinforced the British line and staged an attack on the German trenches.  It was a 
complete failure and the troops fell back in disarray, with reports of men abandoning 
                                                 
4 TNA, WO158/263, Battle of Loos: Reports of the 21st and 24th Divisions, Haig to GHQ, 4 
November 1915.  
327 
 
their weapons in the rush to get to safety.5  None of the staff officers of the two divisions 
had any experience of trench warfare and each infantry battalion contained on average 
only one officer who had served in the pre-war regular army.6  Indeed, of the war 
managers, none of the brigadier-generals had commanded a brigade in action prior to 
Loos and neither divisional commander had experience of command in the field.  As 
Lieutenant-Colonel Cosmo Stewart, the GSO1 of the 24th Division, remarked after the 
war, ‘one lesson from Loos will always hold good.  That is, as far as possible, new and 
inexperienced troops should not experience their baptism of fire in a decisive operation 
in which they are liable to be exposed to great trials’.7 
 
At Fromelles in July 1916, the operation was again managed by XI Corps, commanded 
by Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking, who selected the 61st Division to attack on 
the right of the British line with the 5th Australian Division of the Second Army being 
chosen to attack on the left.  The 61st (South Midland) Division was a Territorial Force 
formation that had been created in September 1914 as a replacement for the 48th (South 
Midland) Division which was earmarked for overseas service.  It was originally intended 
that the 61st Division should remain on home service, however it was posted to the 
western front and the First Army on 28 May 1916 to replace divisions that had been 
transferred to the Fourth Army on the Somme.  Prior to undertaking the offensive at 
Fromelles on 19 July, the division had only experienced one quiet tour in the trenches 
                                                 
5 TNA, WO158/262, Battle of Loos: 21st Division Report, George Forestier-Walker to II Corps 
headquarters, 15 October 1915. 
6 TNA, CAB45/121, Brigadier-General Cosmo Stewart to Major A. F. Becke, 8 August 1925. 
7 TNA, CAB45/121, Brigadier-General Cosmo Stewart to Major A. F. Becke, 25 August 1925. 
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and the sum of their collective experience were five company-sized trench raids 
conducted in the period 26 June–13 July.8  Indeed, the failure of the preparatory 
bombardment to cut the barbed wire prevented two of those raids from achieving their 
rather pointless objective of remaining in the German trenches for a period of one hour.9  
Rather than being a means of building up experience of undertaking meaningful 
operations against the enemy, the raids conducted by the 61st Division were ordered to 
foster the offensive spirit of the units involved.  If the 61st Division was an 
inexperienced formation, so too was the 5th Australian Division.  The latter was formed 
in Egypt in early 1916 and only joined the Second Army in France on 29 June, three 
weeks prior to the attack.  In terms of leadership, both divisional commanders were 
similarly inexperienced: Major-General Colin Mackenzie of the 61st Division served on 
the western front in 1914 as GOC 4th Division, but was replaced after only three weeks 
in command owing to poor battle-planning skills; and Major-General James McCay, 
GOC 5th Australian Division, was a former colonial Minister of Defence who had 
commanded 2 Australian Brigade in the Gallipoli landings in April 1915 but had no 
experience of offensive action on the western front.   
 
While the Second Army had ordered the 5th Australian Division to be attached to XI 
Corps for the battle, Haking himself chose the 61st Division to make the attack ahead of 
more experienced divisions in his corps.  The reason for this was Haking’s underlying 
belief that inexperience worked in the favour of newly-arrived infantry divisions, as they 
                                                 
8 TNA, WO95/3033, Sixty-First Division General Staff War Diary, June–July 1916. 
9 TNA, WO95/3033, Sixty-First Division General Staff War Diary, ‘Report on Raids carried out by 
183rd Infantry Brigade on night of 4/5th July 1916’. 
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would advance ‘full of esprit and elan, and being ignorant of the effects of fire and the 
intensity of it, would go forward irresistibly and do great things’.10  As has been 
established, Haking advocated the power of offensive spirit and believed that moral fibre 
and personal courage were crucial to operational success.  His ethos, that neither he nor 
the officers under his command ‘will stop until we have used up every man we have 
got’, typified his approach to battle-planning both in the 1915 campaign and beyond.11  
Major-General Mackenzie appears to have held similar beliefs, reporting back to Haking 
that, after the attack, he was ‘confident [the division’s] spirit is as good, or even better, 
than it was before the attack’ despite fifty percent casualties among the attacking 
battalions.12  At Fromelles, Haking failed to implement one of the prime lessons of the 
1915 campaign.  The experience of the XI Corps at Loos demonstrated that it was 
unwise to throw inexperienced formations into the attack before they had acclimatised to 
their surroundings.  This point was evident to Haig and to the commanders of both the 
21st and 24th Divisions, both of whom passed their after-action reports to Haking and the 
XI Corps staff in the days following the Loos attack.13  Haking, however, made no such 
allowance in his official reports to First Army and suggested that the failures in the 
attack at Loos were the result of the attacking divisions’ lack of march discipline, 
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abandoning their rifles, and imagining they were coming under friendly fire.14  In his 
after-action report following the Battle of Fromelles, Haking fell back on familiar 
reasons for the failure to break the German line.  ‘The 61st Division’, he wrote, ‘was not 
sufficiently imbued with the offensive spirit to go in like one man’ and the 5th 
Australians ‘were not sufficiently trained to consolidate the ground gained’.15  
 
Michael Senior suggested that Haking displayed both a willingness to blame subordinate 
formations for operational errors rather than admit any fault of his own, and that he 
showed a ‘lack of empathy’ towards his men.16  While this appears true, his conduct at 
Fromelles also displays Haking’s inability to accept a lesson which had been identified 
at points both above and below him in the army structure and of which he was aware.  In 
terms of organisational development, the lesson was clearly identified at the ‘data 
creation and collation stage’ but was not accepted at the ‘consideration stage’.  The 
reason for this was that the lesson did not fit within what Travers would term Haking’s 
‘mental horizons’; in short, he was incapable of adapting his mindset to this reality of 
war.17  Throughout the 1915 campaign, Haking demonstrated a willingness to consider 
his experiences, often providing timely, thoughtful analyses of events he witnessed, but 
this did not translate into an ability to accept information that was counterintuitive to his 
prevailing ethos.  This resulted in Haking taking the same decisions at Fromelles as he 
had at Loos with the same costly, predictable and perhaps, avoidable results.  
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15 TNA, WO95/165, First Army General Staff War Diary, XI Corps to First Army, 24 July 1916. 
16 Senior, Haking; A Dutiful Soldier, 66-9. 




The second example that can be examined with respect to learning from the 1915 
campaign is the selection of the Fromelles battlefield.  The First Army’s offensive 
operations in the 1915 campaign were dominated by attempts to capture the Aubers 
Ridge.  At Neuve Chapelle, the final objectives included the capture of the villages of 
Illies and Herlies which lay atop the ridge and, in May 1915, the eponymous battle had 
the Aubers Ridge as its primary objective.  Following the latter battle, Haig concluded 
that an attack on Aubers Ridge was unlikely to succeed because ‘the defences on our 
front are so carefully (and so strongly) made [and contain] mutual[ly] support[ing] 
machine-guns’.18  Despite this, in August 1915, Haig still thought that the capture of the 
Aubers Ridge would have ‘the greatest tactical results’ for the First Army when 
compared to a possible attack at Loos.19  The tactical significance of the Aubers Ridge 
was threefold: first, its capture would eliminate the German observation advantage over 
the British trenches; second, it would move the British line out of the waterlogged 
ground in the valley of the River Lys; and third, it would open the door to further attacks 
on the key communications centres at Lille and Bethune.  The importance attached to the 
Aubers Ridge by the First Army did not disappear with the failure of the Battle of 
Fromelles.  In February 1917, the new commander of the First Army, General Henry 
Horne, drafted two attack schemes which proposed the capture of the Aubers Ridge and, 
                                                 
18 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/101, Typescript Diary, 11 May 1915. 
19 NLS, Haig Papers, Acc.3155/102, Typescript Diary, 21 July–2 August 1915. 
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in October 1918, the ridge was eventually captured by Haking’s XI Corps in the 
Hundred Days campaign.20 
 
The plan to capture the ridge was not the first choice for the attack considered by the 
First Army war managers in July 1916.  At that time, the seven divisions of the First 
Army held a front of 38,000 yards running from Fromelles in the north to Vimy Ridge in 
the south.21  On 9 July 1916, General Sir Charles Monro, GOC First Army, informed 
GHQ that there were four areas of his line where the best results could be obtained by an 
offensive action: Vimy Ridge, Hill 70 at Loos, the village of Violaines, and the Aubers 
Ridge.22  Monro concluded that an attack on the Vimy Ridge would be of the greatest 
value but would be too ambitious; an assault on Hill 70 was ‘more within the scope of 
our resources’; an attack on Violaines was hampered by it being ‘in a difficult country in 
which to operate’; and the attack on the Aubers Ridge ‘has no significance unless the 
armies remain in their present positions’.23  Monro’s recommendation was that the First 
Army attack should have taken place at Hill 70, while the army kept one eye on Vimy 
Ridge – which was closest to the Fourth Army operations on the Somme – in case they 
had to support a major breakthrough.  The switch in focus to the XI Corps front at 
Aubers Ridge had operational reasons; on 11 July, GHQ informed the First Army that 
that Germans had transferred eleven infantry battalions from near Lille to the Somme 
and the weakened defensive line opposite Haking’s men provided a tempting objective.  
                                                 
20 See TNA, WO158/40, First Army Aubers Ridge File, 1917. 
21 TNA, WO158/186, First Army Operations File, First Army to GHQ, 9 July 1916. 
22 TNA, WO158/186, First Army Operations File, First Army to GHQ, 9 July 1916. 
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The idea to change the point of attack did not originate at First Army headquarters; at a 
conference of staff officers on 13 July, Major-General Sir Richard Butler, then deputy 
Chief of Staff at GHQ, ‘suggested certain plans’ to the assembled group, who agreed 
‘after some discussion’.24 
 
While First Army headquarters had not foreseen an attack on the Aubers Ridge, Haking 
had been planning for such an eventuality for several months.  At a conference on 9 
May, Haking expressed his desire to undertake ‘a powerful and extended offensive…in 
conjunction with the Australian Corps…the ultimate objective being the capture of the 
Aubers and Fromelles Ridge’.25  Experience in May 1915 had demonstrated that the 
Aubers Ridge defences were impregnable unless there was a substantial number of 
heavy artillery guns to destroy machine-gun emplacements and support the main attack.  
However, by Fromelles, the war managers believed that the Aubers Ridge was ‘most 
suitable terrain [for the attack] if we are short of heavy guns’.26  As chapter four 
highlighted, in May 1915, the war managers failed to appreciate that the German Army 
would have adapted their defensive strategy in the period between Neuve Chapelle and 
Aubers Ridge, with the result that the British attacks did not even penetrate the first 
German line of resistance.  After a year of relative inactivity on the Aubers Ridge front, 
the Germans had further solidified their positions; one portion of the line held by the 16th 
Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment contained seventy-five concrete machine-gun 
                                                 
24 TNA, WO158/186, First Army Operations File, Sir Richard Butler, ‘Memorandum on the 
Arrangements made with First and Second Armies on the 13th July 1916’. 
25 Haking, quoted in Senior, Haking: A Dutiful Soldier, 114. 
26 TNA, WO158/186, First Army Operations File, ‘Note on Monro’s Paper in connection with 
selection of a front of attack’, 11 July 1916.  My italics. 
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bunkers along a 2,000-yard front.27  At Fromelles in July 1916, the war managers made 
the same mistake as in May 1915 and underestimated the force needed to break in to the 
German positions; in short, they failed to identify the lessons which were required to 
solve the specific operational problem with which they were confronted. 
 
The third example concerns the thoroughness of preparations in the battle-planning 
phase.  The 1915 campaign demonstrated that there were significant benefits from 
having a thorough and methodical planning phase and, by March 1916, war managers 
had accepted that the planning of offensive actions should begin weeks before the actual 
assault.28  At Neuve Chapelle in March, the planning phase lasted thirty-two days 
despite Haig’s original ideas that the army could be ready to attack with only ten days 
notice; at Loos, it had extended to three months of methodical planning.  Haking’s 
original scheme of attack at Fromelles, written on 9 July, requested only a four-day 
preparatory phase prior to the infantry attack.29  When the attack was authorised on 13 
July, the date set for the commencement of operations was set for 17 July.  In the event, 
the attack was postponed for two days despite Haking’s protestations that a cancellation 
of operations ‘would have a bad effect on the troops, and [would result in] a loss of 
confidence in the future’.30  Analysis of the battles of the 1915 campaign revealed three 
importance characteristics of the planning phase: the importance of withdrawing 
attacking troops from the trench line prior to the assault for a period of rest and 
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recuperation; that mission-specific training led to better results; and the benefits gained 
by the creation and use of models of the ground over which the assaulting troops would 
attack. 
 
The lesson that attacking troops should be withdrawn from the line prior to the assault 
had been identified, and accepted in the 1915 campaign, and had been codified in the 
general staff publication SS.101 – Notes for Infantry Officers on Trench Warfare.31  
Instead of withdrawing the 61st Division from the front lines to rest prior to the assault, 
Haking ordered them to concentrate opposite Fromelles.  At the time of the assault they 
had continuously been in the front line trenches for thirteen days.  On 17 July, instead of 
resting, the troops were employed removing gas canisters from the front line trenches, 
which left the men ‘completely exhausted and nothing more could be done’.32  The time 
spent fetching and carrying in the run up to the battle prevented the men of the attacking 
brigades from undertaking any form of specific training in preparation for the assault.  
The 61st Division had, since their arrival in France in May, only undergone informal 
training, including a three-day attachment to the 35th and 38th Divisions for each infantry 
battalion.33  Furthermore, their pre-deployment training in Britain was characterised by a 
lack of equipment and a high turnover of personnel.  As a second-line Territorial Force 
formation, the 61st Division was behind both the divisions of the New Army and the 
first-line Territorial Force division – the 48th – in the pecking order for the provision of 
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equipment; indeed the men were only supplied with Lee Enfield rifles in December 
1915, a full fourteen months after the division was formed, and the artillery brigades 
only received the guns they would take to France in early 1916.34  Similarly, unit 
cohesion was tested by the drain of men who were cherry-picked for the 48th Division 
and, from mid-1915, for service in the munitions industry.35  Haking was acutely aware 
of the poor standard of training in the 61st Division; he said as much in a letter to First 
Army two days prior to the assault and he commented in the post-battle analysis that 
‘with two trained divisions…the position would have been a gift’.36  However, neither 
he nor Mackenzie made any provision for instructing their troops in the methods 
required to make it a success.  That being said, Haking had arranged for models of the 
German trenches opposite the XI Corps position to be created on a reduced scale at each 
of his divisional headquarters, however their purpose was to assist in the planning of 
trench raids and there is no indication that the officers of XI Corps or the 61st Division 
used them in formulating the Fromelles attack plan.37 
 
The fourth example concerns the selection of objectives for the assaulting divisions.  In 
the 1915 campaign there existed considerable differences of opinion among the war 
managers regarding the correct attack methodology.  While Haig, Gough and Haking 
favoured planning for a decisive breakthrough battle, others, such as Rawlinson, 
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Robertson and Capper, suggested success was more likely through more deliberate, 
methodical means, variously termed ‘bite and hold’ or the ‘step by step approach’.  
While the breakthrough battle approach set far-reaching objectives for the infantry 
attack, the others were more moderate, preferring to capture a section of the enemy’s 
front line trench system, hold it against the inevitable counterattack before beginning 
again and steadily, if slowly, advancing.  With Haig as the First Army’s chief offensive 
planner in 1915, the breakthrough battle was preferred and gained little reward in terms 
of ground gained.  The exception to this was at the Battle of Festubert in May, when the 
disaster of the Aubers Ridge attack prompted a change in thinking and resulted in 
greater operational success, at least in the first two days of battle.  
 
On 5 July, GHQ instructed the First Army to plan to ‘make a break in the enemy’s line 
and to widen it subsequently, on the assumption that success would result’ from the 
Somme offensive and would prompt a general advance.38  Haking, in his original draft 
plan of 9 July, foresaw the need to capture ‘two main tactical localities’ on the ridge – 
the high ground around Fromelles and the village of Aubers.39  In order to achieve this, 
the 61st and 5th Australian Divisions would be required to assault the German front line 
trench system and then advance some 5,000 yards to the objectives on the ridge.  Haking 
proposed splitting the force into two waves, the first of which would capture the front 
trenches and would then be leapfrogged by the reserve which would ‘continue the attack 
on the Aubers Ridge, each brigade with definite objectives’.  Haking, however, stopped 
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short of actually identifying those objectives.  This vagueness has similarities with the 
actions of Brigadier-General Wallerstein, GOC 45 Brigade, during planning of the Battle 
of Loos who, when asked whether the brigade should push on or consolidate, gave the 
inconclusive answer of ‘if things go well push on regardless, but take it as you find it’.40  
Following Butler’s visits to First Army on 13 and 16 July, it became clear that the 
Fromelles plan was to be used as a diversionary attack rather than as offensive in its own 
right.  Despite this, Haking persisted in promoting the idea of the breakthrough.  In the 
final meeting with Butler on 16 July, Haking asked whether he was allowed to push on 
and assault the Aubers Ridge in the event of his attack being successful; Butler refused 
to sanction such an attack and stressed that Haig desired the First Army’s operations to 
have ‘a strictly limited objective’.41  The 1915 campaign had demonstrated conclusively 
that in the specific strategic and operational context of the western front a breakthrough 
battle was unlikely to succeed.  Despite this, it is clear that Haking preferred planning 
for a breakthrough.  This is another example of Haking’s failure to adapt his own 
thinking based on the evidence presented to him and it was only the restraining hand of 
GHQ which altered his operational approach. 
 
The final example analyses the troublesome problem of the artillery bombardment.  
While all the battles of the 1915 campaign demonstrated the importance of the artillery 
bombardment, the Battle of Aubers Ridge gave the clearest indications of what could 
happen if the war managers did not apply the correct lessons to the operational problem.  
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Following the Battle of Fromelles, Haking concluded that ‘the artillery preparation was 
adequate, there were sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition’.42  However, Major-
General Colin Mackenzie’s after-action report asserted that while the barbed wire 
defences were destroyed and ‘presented no obstacle’, key obstacles in the German line 
remained intact.43  In particular, these obstacles included numerous machine-gun 
strongpoints which were able to make ‘a curtain of fire in front of the trenches’ and halt 
the British advance.44  This had been the same problem as at Aubers Ridge a year 
before.  The cause of this failure at Fromelles was not a lack of guns or a ammunition, 
but was the result of the war managers’ failure to engage with their past experiences and 
draw lessons from them.  The artillery preparation at Fromelles was characterised by 
human error.  Mackenzie noted that the corps heavy artillery ‘had been unable, in the 
time at their disposal, to register’ their guns onto the targets on the Aubers Ridge.45  The 
reason for this was Haking’s insistence on a short preparation phase; he noted on 17 July 
that the operation had to be postponed because bad weather prevented guns that ‘had 
never fired out here before’ from being registered and from gaining practice in counter-
battery fire.46  Furthermore, no system was established by which artillery officers could 
observe the fall of their shells and make the necessary corrections.47  The original plans 
drawn up by XI Corps headquarters asserted the premise that fire superiority ‘can only 
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be gained by killing and demoralising the men behind the machine guns and the infantry 
garrison’.48  In what Haking called ‘the man-killing portion of the scheme’, a series of 
fake barrage lifts would see the German front line trench garrison annihilated, however 
no provision was made to deal specifically with emplaced machine-gun positions.49  The 
XI Corps artillery plan was, in effect, more muddled than those of the 1915 campaign.  
There is no indication that Haking considered any of the First Army’s previous 
experiences in drawing up the plans with the result that the 61st and 5th Australian 
Divisions suffered many avoidable casualties.  The XI Corps proved unable to 
implement many of the lessons identified in the 1915 campaign.  The main reason for 
this was the leadership style of Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking whose inflexible 
approach to battle-planning saw him dominate the preparatory phase of battle in the 
same way as Haig had done the previous year.  In terms of organisational development, 
Haking did not, or could not, accept lessons which sat outwith his paradigm of warfare.  
His was a traditional approach, in which an overriding belief in the offensive spirit and 
personal courage trumped learning the lessons from recent experience.   
 
It now falls to examine briefly how the First Army war managers attempted to learn 
from the Battle of Fromelles.  Throughout the 1915 campaign, Haking provided timely 
and thoughtful after-action reports, in his positions as GOC 1st Division and, from 
August, XI Corps.    On 24 July, five days after the failed attack at Fromelles, Haking 
forwarded the after-action report of the 61st Division to Monro at First Army 
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headquarters.  It was followed two days later by the report of the 5th Australian Division.  
Mackenzie’s five-page report consists of a narrative account followed by certain 
‘remarks’ based on his observations, while Major-General McCay’s report was wholly 
narrative in nature, albeit significantly more detailed than that provided by the 61st 
Division.  Haking’s covering letters with both reports make some attempt at analysis, 
however his comments mainly concern the ‘great deal of good’ the failed attack would 
do to the offensive spirit of the divisions involved.50  Oddly, despite the evidence to the 
contrary, Haking asserted that ‘artillery work turned out even better than I expected’; a 
comment which reveals that Haking still failed to identify the true reason for the failure 
of the attack.51  On 16 August, Haking – by then promoted to command the First Army 
in place of Monro – forwarded a ‘summary of events’ of the Fromelles operation to 
GHQ compiled by the First Army general staff.52  While the individual reports from the 
two divisions were also forwarded, Haking was of the opinion that ‘one comprehensive 
report’ was of more use to GHQ, but, like his earlier writings, make little attempt at 
analysis.   
 
While Haking’s own considerations, and those of his subordinate officers, tend towards 
the narrative, one report bucked this trend.  An undated and unsigned memorandum 
located in the First Army war diary critically examined the earlier narrative reports and 
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asserts ‘that there are some useful lessons to be gained for future guidance’.53  It 
concluded that the time available for carrying out the preliminary arrangements for the 
attack was insufficient, that there was no opportunity given to train the troops, and that 
the hurried nature of the planning phase left the men in a state of exhaustion.  
Furthermore, the memorandum asserts that ‘there may have been an artillery plan, but 
there is no evidence of it’ in contemporary operational files or war diaries.54  The 
memorandum also highlights inconsistencies in Mackenzie’s and Haking’s reports and, 
since it adopts a highly critical tone, it can be assumed that it was authored by someone 
at the top of the BEF structure, perhaps Haig, himself.  Irrespective of the identity of the 
author, the memorandum demonstrates that even though the war managers within the 
First Army showed little ability or willingness to learn from their experiences, the Battle 
of Fromelles was carefully analysed and its lessons were identified for future operations.  
However, the extent to which these lessons were considered, accepted, disseminated and 
implemented is not evident and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The War Managers Later Experience 
Between the end of the 1915 campaign and the opening of the Somme offensive in July 
1916, there were significant changes in personnel in the upper echelons of the BEF war 
management hierarchy.  General Sir Douglas Haig replaced Field Marshal Sir John 
French and assumed the role of commander-in-chief, a position he would hold until the 
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end of the war; Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson temporarily assumed Haig’s 
old role as GOC First Army, before being replaced by General Sir Charles Monro and 
becoming the GOC Fourth Army; Lieutenant-General Sir Hubert Gough remained as the 
GOC I Corps before continuing his rapid rise through the BEF hierarchy and being 
appointed GOC Reserve Army; and Lieutenant-General Henry Horne was promoted to 
command XV Corps and then the First Army in 1916.  This section demonstrates how 
the war managers, who served with the First Army in the 1915 campaign, learned from 
their experiences and used them in later battle-planning in positions outside the First 
Army structure.   
 
Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson had accumulated a wealth of experience as 
GOC IV Corps in the 1915 campaign.  Despite his lack of sincerity and willingness to 
place blame on his subordinate officers, Rawlinson remained one of Haig’s favourites 
and was appointed to command the Fourth Army as a reward for his loyalty to his 
commander-in-chief.  One of Rawlinson’s first tasks was to draw up the operational 
plans for what would become the Somme offensive.  The bulk of this work was 
undertaken by Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery, Rawlinson’s chief-of-staff at 
Fourth Army headquarters, whose draft plan was forwarded to Haig on 3 April.  The 
plan reverted back to Rawlinson’s ‘bite-and-hold’ ideology that originated after the 
Battle of Neuve Chapelle; the aim of the plan was not to capture territory, but to kill as 
many Germans as possible with the least loss to ourselves’.55  Rawlinson was keen to 
point out that previous experience had dictated that the majority of the territorial gains 
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were achieved in the initial advance, again something he had identified at Neuve 
Chapelle.56  Furthermore, in their original operational plans, Rawlinson and 
Montgomery directly referred back to lessons identified from the Battle of Loos, thus 
demonstrating a willingness to consider past experiences and apply them to new 
operational problem solving.57  However, their operational plan demonstrates that some 
lessons remained unidentified and confused.  While the Fourth Army planners 
acknowledged the benefits of a short, intense bombardment, they believed the strategic 
conditions warranted a longer, more methodical approach, however, they continued to 
misinterpret the firepower lessons which had been identified at Neuve Chapelle and at 
Aubers Ridge and they underestimated the number of heavy howitzers needed to destroy 
the two German defensive trench systems.58 
 
Rawlinson also realised that his ‘bite-and-hold’ approach would be unpopular with Haig; 
‘I daresay I shall have a tussle with him over the limited objective’, Rawlinson confided 
in his diary, ‘for I hear he is inclined to favour the unlimited with the chance of breaking 
the enemy line’.59  The experience of the battles of 1915 did nothing to lessen Haig’s 
belief in the power of the breakthrough battle methodology.  Haig’s determination to 
restore mobility to the battlefield had not diminished and, in December 1915, he had 
instructed his corps commanders to pay ‘careful attention to battle training in the open’ 
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when their formations were out of the line.60  Haig believed that as trench warfare ‘is 
constantly being practised’ there was no need to train for it during rest periods, rather 
commanders should ‘bring home to all ranks…the lessons learnt in the war as regards 
open warfare’.61  His opinion had not changed by April 1916 and he envisaged the 
Somme offensive leading to a battle in the open ground beyond the trench systems.62  In 
order to achieve this, Haig suggested an intense bombardment followed by a much more 
ambitious assault.  Here too there was a misreading of the firepower lessons from 1915; 
a short bombardment would be unlikely to destroy the substantial barbed-wire defences 
and machine-gun emplacements without a major increase in the number of guns and 
high explosive.  As Harris suggested, one of Haig’s fundamental weaknesses at this 
point in the war was an inability to understand firepower lessons.63  Indeed, whether the 
bombardment was long or short, the number of guns and the amount of ammunition 
available was the same. And yet, Haig’s plan to push on deep into the German defences 
added more targets which required neutralisation, thus limiting the effectiveness of the 
bombardment.   
 
Part of Haig’s wider plan for the opening of the Somme offensive saw the two cavalry 
corps disbanded and spread through the existing armies with some joining the Reserve 
Corps which was soon to be enlarged into the Reserve Army.64  The role of the Reserve 
Army during the Somme offensive appears to have been to act as a mobile strike force 
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which could be used to exploit any successes made by the Fourth Army using cavalry, 
infantry and artillery in an early version of the all-arms battle style.65  Haig’s desire to 
have a dedicated, centrally commanded reserve may have stemmed from his experiences 
at Loos, where the debacle caused by the failed assault of the 21st and 24th Divisions 
overshadowed many of the battle’s successes.  Central to Haig’s new plan was his 
protégé, Hubert Gough, who was given responsibility for spreading the all-arms doctrine 
around his force.66  In the event, the battle on 1 July did not result in a British 
breakthrough and Gough’s force was not required to exploits operational successes.  
However, his role increased as the battle wore on, and was not without controversy.  
Gough was, like Haking at XI Corps, an archetypal ‘thruster’, who tended to rush troops 
into the attack with little operational planning, preferring to rely on his soldiers’ 
offensive spirit.  On 2 July, the Reserve Army’s attack on the Schwaben Redoubt was ‘a 
complete shambles’ and was characterised by an inadequate planning phase, the use of 
inexperienced troops, deficient artillery support and difficulties in maintaining 
communication networks.67  Gough’s desire for urgency continued throughout the 
campaign; on 18 July, he ordered the 1st Australian Division to attack the village of 
Pozieres with little more than twenty-four hours’ notice.  Recognising the deficiencies in 
planning, the divisional and corps commanders protested and the assault was delayed.  
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When it eventually began on 23 July, after a more deliberate, considered planning phase, 
it was highly successful.68 
 
On the opening day of the Somme offensive only two of the eleven assaulting divisions 
had experience of conducting large-scale offensive operations from the 1915 campaign.  
Major-General Montgomery believed that those divisions which had fought in 1915 had 
a distinct advantage over those who had recently arrived in France, and suggested that 
the 7th Division’s preparations for the opening day of the Somme were ‘particularly’ 
good because they had ‘taken part in every attack from Neuve Chapelle, Festubert [and] 
Loos’.69  The 7th Division benefitted from being under the command of Major-General 
Sir Herbert Watts, an experienced officer who had been part of the divisional structure 
since late-1914 and from being part of XV Corps, commanded by General Henry Horne, 
an officer who had considerable operational planning experience.  The units of the 7th 
Division were quick to recognise the importance of a methodical preparatory phase; 20 
Brigade, which attacked on 1 July, had been in the same position since 20 April and ‘had 
made the most careful arrangements in [their] own trenches to assist in the development 
of the attack’.70  Furthermore, Horne’s innovative artillery barrage enabled the men of 
the 7th Division to cross no man’s land relatively unscathed.  Horne employed a 
prototype version of the creeping barrage which would prove so successful in the 
Hundred Days campaign in 1918, which enabled the men of the 7th Division to advance 
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under constant artillery support.  As an artilleryman, Horne was well-placed to 
understand the intricacies of the firepower lessons from 1915 and demonstrated this 
understanding by concentrating his heavy guns on to machine-gun emplacements, strong 
points, headquarters and observation posts.71  Despite these advances, the over-riding 
factor in determining operational success was the quality of leadership.  The 8th 
Division, which had also served throughout the 1915 campaign as part of the First 
Army, was less successful on 1 July, and suffered from the indecision and unquestioning 
nature of the GOC III Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney.72  It came as no 
surprise that the divisional commander, Major-General Havelock Hudson, was replaced 
later in the Somme campaign, and under his successor, the division, which had been 
‘allowed to become sleepy’ subsequently ‘improved beyond all recognition’.73  While 
units, particularly at the divisional level, may have experienced the same battles, the 
extent to which they were able to identify and apply lessons to subsequent actions 
depended greatly on the individual war managers involved. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine the extent to which the First Army and its war managers 
were able to implement the lessons of the 1915 campaign.  The Battle of Fromelles – the 
First Army’s only offensive action in 1916 – was an unmitigated disaster and replicated 
many of the problems which characterised the 1915 campaign.  At Fromelles, Haking’s 
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XI Corps used inexperienced troops, hurried their preparations, did not provide mission-
specific training, and did not concentrate their artillery fire onto the enemy’s 
strongpoints, all of which had been identified in the 1915 campaign as limiting possible 
operational success.  Furthermore, the war managers did not draw on their previous 
experience of attacking the same position – the Aubers Ridge – and while they did settle 
on a limited objective of the German front line trenches, this was due to the operation 
being classified as a diversionary attack by GHQ rather than XI Corps preferred 
operational method.  The fault for these failings lay with Lieutenant-General Sir Richard 
Haking whose inflexibility of approach limited what could be achieved.  Haking had 
proven himself capable of identifying lessons in the 1915 campaign but was either 
unable to consider their wider implications or was unwilling to accept and implement 
them.  Furthermore, perhaps as a result of the Fromelles battle being a diversionary 
attack, Haking did not conduct his usual thoughtful post-battle analysis, preferring 
instead to limit his output to narrative reports and criticisms of the assaulting formations. 
 
The war managers who had served with the First Army in 1915 but who, by the Somme 
campaign, were serving in other capacities had mixed results in applying the lessons 
from the previous campaign to their new positions.  While Rawlinson and Montgomery 
at Fourth Army headquarters were keen to refer back to their experiences at Loos when 
planning the Somme offensive, the application of the lessons they identified remained 
muddled and piecemeal.  In the planning of the first day of the Battle of the Somme, 
Haig demonstrated his inability to understand the firepower lessons which had been 
revealed in the 1915 campaign, continuing to plan for a breakthrough battle without 
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amending the number of heavy artillery accordingly.  However, by creating a centralised 
mobile reserve which was able to exploit any battlefield successes, Haig also showed 
that he had absorbed some lessons from the earlier fighting.  Of all the former First 
Army war managers, Lieutenant-General Henry Horne, was the one who transferred 
previous lessons learned into success on the battlefield, and the creeping barrage he used 
to protect the advance of the 7th Division on 1 July 1916 would be replicated throughout 
the later successful campaigns.  It is telling then that while Rawlinson’s career stalled 
and Gough was removed from command in 1918, Horne was quickly promoted and led 
the First Army during their successful operations at the Vimy Ridge in April 1917. 
 
If the First Amy’s performance in the 1916 campaign is analysed with respect to the 
Organisational Development Model, a different picture emerges when compared with 
1915.  The planning of the Battle of Fromelles was certainly affected by the same inputs 
as those identified for 1915, although to varying degrees.  Whereas the immediate 
strategic conditions were determined by GHQ, the First Army – and XI Corps in 
particular – formulated their battle plan based more on the prevailing institutional ethos 
than on relevant experience from past battles.  When faced with a task which was not 
central to the success of the wider BEF, thoroughness and methodical planning were 
replaced by a reliance on the offensive spirit of the units involved.  Similarly, the 
consideration phase of the post-battle analysis after Fromelles was less comprehensive 
than that of the battles of 1915.  Indeed, little attempt was made to divine lessons from 
the failed enterprise at any level, let alone by the war managers with the ultimate 
responsibility for force development.  This further reinforces the importance of the 
351 
 
senior war managers in the Organisational Development Model.  With Monro and 
Haking taking no interest in learning from the battle, and Mackenzie and McCay 
inexperienced in the ways of the western front, the First Army war managers did not 
identify any areas which could be improved upon.  As a result, the formation stagnated 
until the appointment of Henry Horne as GOC First Army in late-1916.  The First 
Army’s performance in 1916 reveals the campaign-specific nature of the Organisational 
Development Model; just because an army strove to make sense of its experiences in a 
particular way at one point in its history does not mean that it continued to do so.  
Rather, organisational development is a model that encompasses fluidity in how a 
particular army formation creates, collates, considers, disseminates and rejects new 








In looking back at the war and all its lessons we must not overlook the most important 
lesson of all, viz., all wars produce new methods and fresh problems.  The last war was 
full of surprises – the next one is likely to be no less prolific in unexpected 
developments.  Hence we must study the past in the light of the probabilities of the 
future, which is what really matters.  No matter how prophetic we may be, the next war 
will probably take a shape far different to our peace-time conceptions.1 
 
      Major-General A. E. McNamara 
 
In October 1932, the War Office published their findings following an enquiry into what 
lessons could be drawn from the British experience of the Great War.  A committee of 
five members, presided over by Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Kirke, each examined a 
different area of British operations.  The responsibility for trying to identify lessons from 
the four years’ fighting on the western front was given to Major-General A. E. 
McNamara and Major-General J. Kennedy, who sought to examine the conduct of the 
war in the context of the Field Service Regulations (FSR) and using information 
contained in the recently produced volumes of the British Official History.2  The two 
reports highlighted failings in the process of mobilization, the importance of maintaining 
open networks of communication, the benefits to be gained from issuing clear concise 
orders, and the need to correctly employ units of the reserve following the main attack.  
McNamara identified twenty ‘tactical lessons’, each of which he explained first in 
narrative form before considering the impact upon the FSR and the implications upon 
                                                 
1 Major-General A. E. McNamara, ‘Report on the Lessons of the Great War on the Western 
Front’, in War Office, Report on the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War (London, 1932), 
31. 
2 See also, Major-General J. Kennedy, ‘Report on Operations on the Western Front’, in Report 
on the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War, 33-56. 
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British Army training.  One example concerns what McNamara described as 
‘Intercommunication in Rear Guard Actions’.  After describing the communication 
problems the BEF experienced in the retreat from Mons in August 1914, McNamara 
presented his opinion that the FSR was ‘sound in its precept’, regarding the need to 
maintain lines of communication, but that it was ‘hardly helpful in [finding a] solution 
[to] the problem’ which confronted the commanders in that specific instance.  In relating 
the problems to training provision in the pre-war army, McNamara noted that ‘the 
difficulties of communication hardly arise in peace time training…Hence false lessons 
are apt to be imbibed’.3  While the lessons identified by McNamara’s and Kennedy’s 
investigations were of sound principle, based on evidence and had the scope to affect 
change in the British Army, neither they, nor Kirke in his wider report, addressed the 
lack of a formal system for turning individual and collective experiences into actionable 
lessons in the immediate theatre of war.  This most important of lessons remained 
unidentified, unaccepted and unavailable to the institution’s war managers, even fifteen 
years after the end of hostilities. 
 
This thesis set out to examine critically British operational performance on the western 
front in the 1915 campaign.  The aim was not to contribute to the rehabilitation of the 
reputations of the war managers or to dwell on the horrific casualties suffered by the 
belligerent forces during the strategic stalemate brought about by trench warfare.  
Rather, this thesis has sought to investigate how the war managers engaged with their 
experiences, to demonstrate how they created and considered new information, and to 
                                                 
3 McNamara,’ Lessons of the Great War on the Western Front’, 8. 
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show how they disseminated and institutionalised the lessons they identified.  In doing 
this, it rejected earlier interpretations of understanding learning and institutional change 
in the British Army of the Great War.  In particular, it has shown that the learning curve 
concept, which has dominated the historiography of British operational performance in 
the Great War, does not accurately describe the complex process of institutional change, 
organisational learning and battlefield adaptation which took place on the western front 
in 1915. 
 
In its place, this thesis has proposed the concept of Organisational Development as a 
new way of demonstrating how institutional learning occurred in the British First Army 
in the Great War.  Rather than being a linear process of continuous improvement as 
suggested by the learning curve concept, or a series of peaks and troughs in terms of 
operational performance as in the revised idea of the ‘learning process’, the 
Organisational Development Model encapsulates a more holistic and nuanced approach 
to understanding the nature of institutional change on the western front.  Furthermore, 
this thesis has shown that the use of concepts drawn from business studies and military 
innovation studies can be successfully applied to historical conflicts to give greater 
understanding of how the First Army functioned as an institution.  
 
The Organisational Development Model consists of five stages, which are presented 
below.  In the first stage, long and short-term personal and institutional factors come 
together to create the paradigm in which the First Army’s war managers considered the 
strategic, operational and tactical problems presented by the stalemate of trench warfare.  
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The preparation and conduct of the battles they subsequently planned represents the 
second stage of the model. 
 
Figure 7.1: The First and Second Stages of Organisational Development: 
Knowledge Inputs and Battle Planning and Experience 
 
 
This thesis has shown that following the close of a particular battle the war managers 
used a number of different means to make sense of the information with which they 
were presented.  Over the course of the 1915 campaign, the war managers 
predominantly identified lessons themselves based on their own observations.  Rather 
than being a critique of their own performance and decision-making, this means of data 
creation saw the war managers view battles at the macro level and identify elements of 
the planning and execution which went well and could be replicated and others which 





















learn from their experiences, some war managers were proactive in asking for the views 
of their subordinate officers and some junior officers passed informal reports of their 
experiences up and across the army hierarchy without waiting for instruction from 
above.  In addition, some war managers from outside the First Army structure also 
passed analytical reports to friends and colleagues in the First Army.  The result of this 
process of data creation and collation was a body of new knowledge based on the 
collective experiences of a battle’s surviving participants. 
 
This mass of new knowledge was then considered by the war managers in the fourth 
stage of the Organisational Development Model.  The war managers were faced with the 
choice of either accepting or rejecting the lessons identified in the post-battle analysis.  
The fourth and fifth stages of the model demonstrate the possible outcomes.  In terms of 
the rejection of new knowledge, the war managers could reject, misinterpret, forget, 
discard or withhold lessons.  If the new knowledge was accepted, it could result in the 
creation of a new weapon or technology or it could lead to a change in formation 
structure at the tactical level.  Accepted lessons could be disseminated across the force 
through formal training provision or from the creation of official pamphlets, or they 
could be shared informally between practitioners using existing social networks or 
through the dissemination of ‘best-practice guidelines’.  Furthermore, the lessons could 
be used on an ad hoc basis, becoming knowledge gained through experience and being 

















































Figure 7.4: The Fifth Stage of Organisational Development – Institutionalisation 
and Dissemination 
 
This theoretical framework demonstrates how learning occurred in the British First 
Army in the 1915 campaign.  The changes made to the length of the preparatory phase 
of battle represent one practical example of this system at work.  Prior to the Battle of 
Neuve Chapelle, the First Army war managers believed that the preparatory phase of a 
trench-to-trench attack could last as little as ten days.  This opinion was shaped by their 
professional education at Sandhurst and Camberley and reinforced by the prevailing 
ethos and institutional doctrine which asserted that victory would be achieved through 
elan, bravery, and offensive spirit.  The experience of fighting at Neuve Chapelle 
presented an alternative picture in which deficiencies in the planning phase – 
particularly in the lack of aerial reconnaissance and delays in siting the heavy artillery – 
materially affected the outcome of the battle.  The trench maps produced by aerial 
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they had advanced beyond their scope, and some heavy guns were only placed in 
position the day before the attack, giving them little time to register their targets, thus 
rendering their bombardment ineffectual.  In the post-battle analysis, the war managers 
were quick to identify the lesson themselves – that more careful and more thorough 
preparation would lead to better results in their quest to fight the war-winning 
breakthrough battle.  After consideration, the war managers accepted this lesson.  This 
had two main outcomes.  In the first place, the lesson was used on an ad hoc basis and 
incorporated into the planning for the subsequent battle – Aubers Ridge – which saw a 
six week planning phase rather than the three weeks at Neuve Chapelle.  Second, the 
lesson was, eventually, incorporated into official doctrine and disseminated in SS.101.  
Thus the lesson that a lengthy preparatory period was required was identified, 
considered, accepted, utilised, disseminated and institutionalised.  In short, it became the 
new normal for the First Army. 
 
The Organisational Development Model can, then, be used to demonstrate how specific 
lessons were identified and acted upon by the First Army.  When taken as a whole, it 
represents all the potential avenues that were available to the war managers in terms of 
their decision-making process.  However, it must be stressed that the details of the 
model have been constructed here based solely on analysis of the British First Army in 
the 1915 campaign; the institutional learning processes and practices of other constituent 




In critically examining the British Army’s offensive operations in the 1915 campaign 
this thesis has gone some way to filling the large gap in the historiography identified by 
Gary Sheffield.4  The onset of trench warfare in late-1914 presented the British, French 
and German war managers with a set of strategic conditions for which they had not 
planned.  For the British in particular, this presented a significant challenge; their failure 
to plan for a protracted future conflict in the pre-war years, coupled with their failure to 
mobilise British industry as well as manpower in 1914 proved detrimental to the conduct 
of the 1915 campaign.  Williamson Murray’s assertion that ‘the concepts and 
innovations of peacetime invariably get much of the next war wrong’ holds true for the 
British approach to the Great War.5  In analysing the conduct of the First Army in the 
1915 campaign, it is difficult to disagree with the criticism of the war managers which 
has been made by Travers.  War is a victory-driven business and the campaign was 
bereft of an operational methodology or technology capable of ending the war or even of 
making significant territorial gains.  However, acceptance of this failure does not 
suggest that the war managers failed to adapt their practices to the new conditions of 
war; rapid alterations to the force structure, the quick acceptance of new techniques and 
technologies and their inclusion in offensive plans demonstrate, that at the tactical level, 
the war managers were conscious of the need to adapt.   
 
It was, however, at the operational level of war where deficiencies in the war managers’ 
decision-making, problem solving and critical thinking were most stark.  There were 
                                                 
4 Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, 335. 
5 Murray, Military Adaptation in War, 37. 
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four main problems.  First, in not fully apreciating that the German Army would also 
consider their experiences and strengthen their defences accordingly, war managers 
failed to recognise the symbiotic nature of change in competing institutions.  Second, the 
war managers failed to alter their prevailing operational outlook based on their collective 
experiences; their belief that trench warfare was a temporary state of war on the western 
front which dominated at the start of the campaign dominated at the end.  Third, the war 
managers fundamentally misunderstood many of the lessons which were identified in the 
campaign.  In particular, rather than critically evaluating what went wrong in offensive 
actions, the war managers tended to assume that with more men and more guns and 
more ammunition operational success would be a certainty.  Fourth, and most 
importantly, the war managers’ failure to establish a force-wide system for data capture, 
collation and consideration meant that a significant amount of new knowledge was lost 
to the institution.  This failure to create a formal system of knowledge management 
resulted in an increasing reliance on informal methods of information sharing.  In terms 
of the wider debate on the competency of the war managers, these findings tends to align 
with Travers’ and Keegan’s findings that the British high command were unable to 
deviate from obsolete pre-war principles when planning offensive actions.  While 
material and manpower constraints undoubtedly negatively affected the war managers’ 
ability to wage war in the manner they wanted, it did not affect how they considered 
their experiences and identified and learned lessons.  In the organisational development 
model, the war managers occupy the crucial position, simultaneously able to promote 
and inhibit institutional change and dominating the learning process in the First Army in 
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the 1915 campaign.  The small group of officers, led by Haig, determined the limits of 
organisational development. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the 1915 campaign on the western front was 
considerably more complex than previous studies have acknowledged.  In terms of 
institutional learning, it is no longer enough to assert that learning occurred or to identify 
the particular lessons ‘learned’ by a unit or formation over the course of the war.  As 
such, the ill-defined concepts of the learning curve and learning process, which have 
dominated the historiography of British operational performance in the Great War for 
the past thirty years, have been found to be inadequate and it is suggested here that they 
should be rejected in favour of approaches which are based on more robust frameworks.  
Indeed, this thesis has shown that institutional change constitutes more than just learning 
lessons; rather, it is a means of identifying lessons, accepting them, codifying them and 
disseminating them across the army, before institutionalising them in training practices, 
force structure and formal doctrine.  This thesis has demonstrated what can be achieved 
by adopting a cross-disciplinary approach and, by applying concepts from outwith the 
traditional purview of military history, has shown that methods which are being 
employed to analyse wars in the twenty-first century can be successfully applied to the 
study of historical conflict.  The 1915 campaign demonstrated that learning lessons 
proved to be a difficult process for the First Army’s war managers as they attempted to 
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APPENDIX ONE: LIST OF WAR MANAGERS, 1915 
 
This appendix presents a list of the war managers who served with the First Army during 
the 1915 campaign.  It includes members of the General Staff at army, corps and 
divisional headquarters who had responsibility for operational planning.  In this respect, 
it includes chiefs of staff and commanders of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers 
but not officers with responsibility for non-combatant support services, such as the 
directors of Medical Services or Signals.  Only war managers who took an active role in 
planning one of the five major offensives undertaken by First Army in 1915 are included 
in this list. 
 
Key 
Br-Gen Brigadier-General  
BGGS  Brigadier-General, General Staff 
Col  Colonel 
CRA  Commander, Royal Artillery 
CRE  Commander, Royal Engineers 
GOC  General Officer Commanding 
GSO1  General Staff Officer, Grade 1 
GSO2  General Staff Officer, Grade 2 





MGGS Major-General, General Staff 
 
FIRST ARMY HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  General Sir D Haig   26 Dec 1914-22 Dec 1915 
  General Sir H Rawlinson  22 Dec 1915-4 Feb 1916 
  General Sir C Monro   4 Feb-7 Aug 1916 
MGGS Maj-Gen J Gough   26 Dec 1914-21 Feb 1915 
  Maj-Gen R H K Butler  21 Feb-26 Dec 1915 
CRA  Maj-Gen H F Mercer   15 Feb-8 Jul 1915 
  Maj-Gen E A Fanshawe  8 Jul-23 Aug 1915 
  Maj-Gen H F Mercer   23 Aug 1915-1918 
CRE  Maj-Gen S R Rice   4 Feb-6 Nov 1915 
  Maj-Gen G M Heath   6 Nov 1915-1917 
GSO1  Lt-Col J Davidson   26 Dec 1914-22 Dec 1915 
GSO2  Major J Charteris   26 Dec 1914-22 Dec 1915 
 
I CORPS HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Lt-Gen Sir C Monro   26 Dec 1914-13 Jul 1915 
  Lt-Gen Sir H P Gough  13 Jul 1915-1 Apr 1916 
BGGS  Br-Gen R D Whigham  26 Dec 1914-16 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen A S Cobbe   16 Jul 1915-27 Jan 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen R A K Montgomery  1 Jan-19 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen J F N Birch   19 Jul 1915-29 Jan 1916 
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CRE  Br-Gen S R Rice   4 Aug 1914-11 Apr 1915 
  Br-Gen C Godby   11 April-15 Sep 1915 
  Br-Gen R P Lee   15 Sep 1915-18 May 1916 
 
III CORPS HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Lt-Gen W P Pulteney   5 Aug 1914-16 Feb 1918 
BGGS  Br-Gen J P Du Cane   5 Aug 1914-25 Jan 1915  
  Br-Gen G F Milne   25 Jan-25 Feb 1915 
  Br-Gen A L Lynden-Bell  25 Feb-13 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen C F Romer   13 Jul 1915-1917 
CRA  Br-Gen E R Phipps-Hornby  5 Aug 1914-5 Jun 1915 
  Br-Gen A Stokes   5 Jun 1915-1 Apr 1916 
CRE  Br-Gen F L Glubb   4 Aug 1914-9 May 1915 
  Br-Gen J E Capper   9 May-14 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen A L Schreiber  14 Jul 1915-10 Nov 1917 
 
IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Lt-Gen Sir Henry Rawlinson  5 Oct 1914-22 Dec 1915 
  Lt-Gen Sir H Wilson   22 Dec 1915-1 Dec 1916 
BGGS  Br-Gen A G Dallas   30 Dec 1914-19 Aug 1915 
  Br-Gen A A Montgomery  19 Aug 1915-5 Feb 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen A H Hussey   5 Oct 1914-10 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen C E D Budworth  10 Oct 1915-26 Mar 1916 
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CRE  Br-Gen C R Buckland  5 Oct 1914-19 Feb 1916 
 
 
XI CORPS HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Maj-Gen Earl of Cavan  29 Aug-4 Sep 1915 
  Lt-Gen Sir R C B Haking  4 Sep 1915-13 Aug 1916 
BGGS  Br-Gen H M de F Montgomery 29 Aug-26 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen W H Anderson  26 Oct 1915-27 Sep 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen G G S Carey   12 Sep 1915-31 May 1917 
CRE  Br-Gen L Jones   11 Sep 1915-27 Nov 1917 
  
INDIAN CORPS HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  General Sir James Willcocks  Oct 1914-4 Sep 1915 
  Lt-Gen Sir C A Anderson  4 Sep 1915-3 Nov 1915 
BGGS  Br-Gen Sir H Hudson   Oct 1914-31 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen R Charles   31 Jul 1915-3 Nov 1915 
CRA  Unknown 
CRE  Unknown 
 
GUARDS DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Maj-Gen Earl of Cavan  18 Aug 1915-3 Jan 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col H P Hore-Ruthven  25 Aug 1915-21 Mar 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen A E Wardrop   12 Sep 1915-1 Mar 1916 
400 
 
CRE  Lt-Col J E Vanrenen   26 Aug-1 Oct 1915 
  Lt Col A Brough   1 Oct 1915-10 Jul 1917 
1st Guards Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen G P T Feilding  29 Jun-15 Dec 1915 
2nd Guards Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen J Ponsonby   26 Aug 1915-19 Nov 1916 
3rd Guards Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen F E Heyworth  26 Aug 1915-9 May 1916 
 
1st DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Maj-Gen R C B Haking  19 Dec 1914-11 Sep 1915 
  Maj-Gen A E A Holland  11 Sep 1915-12 June 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col E S H Nairne   3 Jan-26 Jul 1915 
  Lt-Col J A Longridge   26 Jul 1915-18 Aug 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen E A Fanshawe  18 Sep 1914-8 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen C E D Budworth  8 Jul-19 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen G N Cartwright  19 Oct 1915-19 Oct 1917 
CRE  Lt-Col A L Schreiber   4 Aug 1914-30 Apr 1915 
  Major H R Russell-Brown  30 Apr-10 May 1915 
  Lt-Col H F Thuillier   10 May-2 Oct 1915 
  Lt-Col H R Russell-Brown  2 Oct 1915-22 Feb 1918 
1st Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen H C Lowther   23 Nov 1914-23 Aug 1915 
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  Br-Gen A J Reddie   23 Aug 1915-18 Oct 1917 
 
2nd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen C B Westmacott  23 Nov 1914-5 May 1915 
  Br-Gen G H Thesiger   5 May-22 Aug 1915 
  Br-Gen J H W Pollard  22 Aug-5 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen H F Thuillier   5 Oct 1915-10 Mar 1916 
3rd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen R H K Butler   23 Nov 1914-22 Feb 1915 
  Br-Gen H R Davies   22 Feb 1915-19 Nov 1916 
 
2nd DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 
GOC   Maj-Gen H S Horne   1 Jan-5 Nov 1915 
  Maj-Gen W G Walker   5 Nov 1915-27 Dec 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col J E Gogarty   4 Jan-24 Feb 1915 
  Lt-Col L R Vaughan   24 Feb 1915-14 Apr 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen E M Perceval   4 Aug 1914-1 Feb 1915 
  Br-Gen W H Onslow   1 Feb-8 Sep 1915 
  Br-Gen G H Sanders   8 Sep 1915-end of war 
CRE  Lt-Col G P Scholfield  12 Nov 1914-20 Jun 1916 
4th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen Earl of Cavan  14 Sep 1914-29 Jun 1915 
  Br-Gen G P T Feilding  29 Jun-15 Dec 1915 
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5th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen A A Chichester  31 Dec 1914-13 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen C E Corkran   13 Jul 1915-15 May 1916 
6th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen R Fanshawe   1 Jan-30 May 1915 
  Br-Gen A C Daly   30 May 1915-21 Jan 1917 
19th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen P R Robertson  19 Aug-25 Nov 1915 
 
7th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Maj-Gen Sir T Capper  27 Aug 1914-19 Apr 1915 
  Maj-Gen Sir H P Gough  19 Apr-19 Jul 1915 
  Maj-Gen Sir T Capper  19 Jul-27 Sep 1915 
  Maj-Gen Sir H E Watts  27 Sep 1915-7 Jan 1917 
GSO1  Col A R Hoskins   12 Nov 1914-25 Mar 1915 
  Lt-Col J F Gathorne-Hardy  25 Mar 1915-1 Jan 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen H K Jackson   3 Sep 1914-14 Mar 1915 
  Br-Gen J F N Birch   14 Mar-19 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen J G Rotton   19 Jul-20 Aug 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col R P Lee   6 Jan-18 Sep 1915 
  Lt-Col G H Boileau   18 Sep 1915-15 Nov 1917 
20th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen F J Heyworth   14 Nov 1914-16 Aug 1915 
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  Br-Gen J F H F S Trefusis  16 Aug-24 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen C J Deverell   29 Oct 1915-7 Aug 1916 
21st Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen H E Watts   31 Aug 1914-27 Sep 1915 
  Br-Gen R A Berners   27 Sep-3 Dec 1915 
22nd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen S T B Lawford  7 Sep 1914-27 Aug 1915 
  Br-Gen J M Steele   27 Aug 1915-9 Feb 1918 
 
8th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Maj-Gen F J Davies   19 Sep 1914-27 Jul 1915 
  Maj-Gen H Hudson   1 Aug 1915-10 Dec 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col W H Anderson  22 Sep 1914-27 Oct 1915 
  Lt-Col H Hill    27 Oct 1915-10 Aug 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen A E A Holland  30 Sep 1914-20 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen G H W Nicholson  21 Jul 1915-1 Jan 1917 
CRE  Lt-Col W H Rotherham  30 Sep 1914-19 Feb 1915 
  Lt-Col P G Grant   7 Mar-9 Nov 1915 
  Lt-Col F G Guggisberg  9 Nov 1915-22 Jul 1916 
23rd Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen R J Pinney   29 Oct 1914-27 Jun 1915 
  Br-Gen T R Travers-Clarke  27 Jun-7 Sep 1915 
  Br-Gen H D Tuson   7 Sep 1915-27 Aug 1916 
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24th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen F C Carter   29 Sep 1914-17 Mar 1915 
  Br-Gen R S Oxley   17 Mar-11 Jul 1916 
25th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen A W G Lowry Cole  8 Oct 1914-9 May 1915 
  Br-Gen R B Stephens   9 May 1915-1 Apr 1916  
 
9th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (May-September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen H J S Landon  21 Jan-9Sep 1915 
  Maj-Gen G H Thesiger  9-27 Sep 1915 
  Maj-Gen W T Furse   28 Sep 1915-2 Dec 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col C H De Rougemont  7 Jan-24 Jul 1915 
  Lt-Col F A Buzzard   24 Jul-4 Sep 1915 
  Lt-Col S E Hollond   4 Sep 1915-24 Feb 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen E H Armitage  30 Sep 1914-28 Jan 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col H A A Livingstone  9 May-26 Sep 1915 
  Major G R Hearn   26 Sep-24 Oct 1915 
  Lt-Col C M Carpenter  26 Oct 1915-27 Jan 1916 
26th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen E G Grogan   16 Nov 1914-31 May 1915 
  Br-Gen A B Ritchie   31 May 1915-5 Dec 1916 
27th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen C D Bruce   7 Jan-26 Sep 1915 
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  Lt-Col H E Walshe   26 Sep 1915-26 Mar 1916 
28th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen S W Scrase-Dickins  9 Sep 1914-6 May 1916 
 
12th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen F D V Wing  15 Mar-2 Oct 1915 
  Maj-Gen A B Scott   3 Oct 1915-26 Apr 1918 
GSO1  Lt-Col C J Sackville-West  16 Jan-15 Dec 1915 
CRA  Br-Gen W J McLeod   29 Mar 1915-30 Jan 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col S F Williams   1 Oct 1914-22 Jul 1916 
35th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen C H van Straubenzee  29 Aug 1914-23 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen A Solly-Flood  2 Nov 1915-8 Nov 1916 
36th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen H B Borradaile  24 Aug 1914-10 Nov 1915 
  Br-Gen L H Boyd-Moss  10 Nov 1915-28 Nov 1916 
37th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen C A Fowler   26 Aug 1914-5 Feb 1916 
 
15th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from July 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen F W N McCracken  22 Mar 1915-17 Jun 1917 
GSO1  Lt-Col J S Burnett-Stuart  3 Mar-22 Nov 1915 
  Lt-Col H Knox   25 Nov-14 May 1917 
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CRA  Br-Gen E A Lambart   3 Oct 1914-25 Aug 1915 
  Br-Gen E W Alexander  25 Aug 1915-24 Apr 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col G S Cartwright  15 Oct 1914-7 Mar 1916 
44th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen M G Wilkinson  14 Sep 1914-18 Apr 1916 
45th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen F E Wallerstein  13 Sep 1914-11 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen E W B Green   12 Oct 1915-13 Apr 1916 
46th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen A G Duff   9 Dec 1914-22 Jul 1915 
  Br-Gen T G Matheson  29 Jul 1915-18 Mar 1917 
 
19th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from July 1915) 
GOC  C J M Fasken    23 Sep 1914-14 Dec 1915 
GSO1  Lt-Col A S Buckle   29 Jan 1915-13 Jan 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen C E Lawrie   3 Jun-25 Dec 1915 
CRE  Lt Col C W Davy   10 Mar 1915-26 Mar 1916 
56th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen B G Lewis   12 Sep 1914-17 Dec 1915 
57th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen L T C Twyford  14 Sep 1914-16 Jun 1916 
58th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen D M Stuart   8 Jul 1915-19 Jan 1916 
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20th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from July 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen R H Davies   20 Oct 1914-8 Mar 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col W R N Madocks  4 Feb 1915-6 Jan 1917 
CRA  Br-Gen J Hotham   3 Nov 1914-24 Oct 1916 
CRE  Col E R Kenyon   Nov 1914-17 Feb 1916 
59th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen C D Shute   6 Jul 1915-4 Oct 1916 
60th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen J W G Roy   8 Jul 1915-5 May 1916 
61st Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen C Ross   6 Jul-13 Nov 1915 
 
21st DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen G T Forestier-Walker 11 Apr-18 Nov 1915 
GSO1  Lt-Col F E Daniell   16 Aug 1915-4 Mar 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen C H Alexander   9 Nov 1914-6 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen C R Wellesley  6 Oct 1915-12 May 1917 
CRE  Lt-Col C Coffin   9 Jun 1915-9 Jan 1917 
62nd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen T G L H Armstrong  18 Sep 1914-4 Sep 1915 
  Br-Gen E B Wilkinson  4 Sep 1915-11 Jun 1916 
63rd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen N T Nickalls   31 Aug-26 Sep 1915 
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  Br-Gen E R Hill   7 Oct 1915-8 Jul 1916 
64th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen G M Gloster   18 Aug 1915-5 Mar 1916 
 
23rd DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen J M Babington  18 Sep 1914-18 Oct 1918 
GSO1  Lt-Col A Blair   24 Jun 1915-16 Mar 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen D J M Fasson  24 Jun 1915-27 Jan 1917 
CRE  Lt-Col P J J Radcliffe   9 Jun-30 Sep 1915 
  Lt-Col A G Bremner   30 Sep 1915-6 Feb 1917 
68th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen E Pearce Serocold  3 Jun 1915-1 Feb 1916 
69th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen F S Derham   29 Sep 1915-8 Mar 1916 
70th Brigade Headquarters (until October 1915) 
GOC  Br-Gen L F Phillips   11 Sep-5 Nov 1915 
24th Brigade Headquarters (from October 1915) 
GOC  Br-Gen R S Oxley   1 Aug 1915-16 Jul 1916   
 
24th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen Sir J S Ramsay  19 Sep 1914-3 Oct 1915 
  Maj-Gen J E Capper   3 Oct 1915-12 May 1917 
GSO1  Lt-Col C G Stewart   16 May 1915-23 Feb 1916 
409 
 
CRA  Br-Gen Sir G V Thomas  9 Nov 1914-26 Oct 1915 
  Br-Gen L M Phillpotts  26 Oct 1915-8 Sep 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col A J Craven   25 Jul 1915-12 Feb 1917 
71st Brigade Headquarters (until October 1915) 
GOC  Br-Gen M T Shewan   28 Aug-11 Oct 1915 
72nd Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen B R Mitford   19 Sep 1914-14 Mar 1917 
73rd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen W A Oswald   19 Sep 1914-26 Sep 1915 
  Br-Gen R G Jelf   26 Sep 1915-9 Nov 1916 
 
28th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen E S Bulfin   17 Dec 1914-11 Oct 1915 
  Maj-Gen C J Briggs   12 Oct 1915-18 May 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col R H Hare   27 May 1915-12 Nov 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen D Arbuthnot   9 May 1915-14 Jan 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col A R Winslowe  25 May-4 Oct 1915 
  Lt-Col E S Sandys   4 Oct 1915-end of war 
83rd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen H S L Ravenshaw  19 May 1915-18 May 1916 
84th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen L J Bols   24 Feb 1915-7 Sep 1916 
85th Brigade Headquarters 
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GOC  Br-Gen B C M Carter   29 Sep 1915-24 Oct 1917 
 
46TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (from September 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen E J M Stuart-Wortley 1 Jun 1914-6 Jul 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col P W Game   18 Jul 1915-19 Mar 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen H M Campbell  1 Aug 1914-13 Mar 1918 
CRE  Br-Gen C V Wingfield-Stratford 19 Oct 1914-2 May 1918 
137th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen E Feetham   2 Apr 1915-18 May 1916 
138th Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen G C Kemp   15 Aug 1915-29 Apr 1917 
139th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC   Br-Gen C T Shipley   9 Sep 1911-27 May 1917 
 
47th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 
GOC  Maj-Gen C St L Barter  3 Sep 1914-28 Sep 1916 
GSO1  Lt-Col W Thwaites   17 Feb 1912-1 Jun 1915 
  Lt-Col W P Hore-Ruthven  1 Jun-20 Aug 1915 
  Lt-Col B Burnett Hitchcock  20 Aug 1915-15 Jun 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen J C Wray   1 Apr 1912-5 Feb 1916 
CRE  Col A H Kenney   1 Sep 1914-30 Jul 1915 
  Lt-Col S H A Crookshank  30 Jul 1915-27 Nov 1916 
140th Brigade Headquarters 
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GOC  Br-Gen C J Cuthbert   26 Nov 1914-12 Jul 1916 
141st Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen G C Nugent   29 Aug 1914-2 Jun 1915 
  Br-Gen W Thwaites   2 Jun 1915-5 Jul 1916 
142nd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC   Br-Gen C S H-D-Willoughby 11 Apr 1912-10 Jun 1915 
  Lt-Col W G Simpson   10 Jun-14 Aug 1915 
  Br-Gen F G Lewis   14 Aug 1915-26 Dec 1916 
 
48th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (June-July 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen R Fanshawe  31 May 1915-20 Jun 1918 
GSO1  Lt-Col J S J Baumgartner  20 Apr 1915-2 Apr 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen C M Ross-Johnson  11 May 1915-30 January 1916 
CRE  Lt-Col H J M Marshall  19 Apr 1915-27 Feb 1917 
143rd Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Unknown 
144th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Unknown 
145th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Unknown 
 
49th DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (10 April-31 May 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen T S Baldock  19 Sep 1914-17 Jul 1915 
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GSO1  Lt-Col J R G Tulloch   14 Jan-30 Apr 1915 
  Lt-Col C H Harrington  30 Apr-13 Sep 1915 
CRA  Br-Gen S D Browne   1 Jan 1913-3 Jun 1915 
CRE  Lt-Col R B Heywood   3 Nov 1914-26 Jul 1915 
146th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen F A MacFarlan  25 Nov 1913-20 Dec 1915 
147th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen E F Brereton   11 May 1912-13 Sep 1916 
148th Brigade Headquarters 
GOC  Br-Gen R Dawson   1 Apr 1912-7 Jun 1916 
 
51st DIVISION HEADQUARTERS (10 May-27 June 1915) 
GOC  Maj-Gen R Bannatine-Allason 27 Aug 1914-24 Sep 1915 
GSO1  Lt-Col G R Cory   4 May-19 Jun 1915 
  Lt-Col I Stewart   19 Jun 1915-11 Nov 1916 
CRA  Br-Gen H A Brendon   15 May 1913-8 Jul 1915 
CRE  Lt-Col C L Spencer   22 Jan 1915-25 May 1915 
  Lt-Col H W Weekes   25 May 1915-23 Mar 1916 
152nd Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen W C Ross   13 Nov 1914-9 Jul 1916 
153rd Brigade Headquarters  
GOC  Br-Gen D Campbell   1 Feb 1915-6 May 1917 
154th Brigade Headquarters 
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GOC  Br-Gen G L Hibbert   19 Apr-1 Oct 1915 
   
 
